Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

37. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, September 12, 1970.

SUBJECT

• Instruction to Ambassador Bunker Regarding the Vietnam Negotiating Package

Secretary Rogers has sent us the instruction to Ambassador Bunker to begin consultations with President Thieu on the package proposal. I have cleared the cable, making a number of changes cited below.²

The elements in the package. The cable, as drafted by State, asks Ambassador Bunker to tell Thieu that the package would consist of the following four interrelated proposals:

• —An internationally supervised, standstill cease-fire throughout all Indochina. According to State, the following conditions would apply:
  • —The cease-fire would not be an end in itself, but part of a larger effort to end the war.
  • —We will insist on a halt to infiltration for troop reinforcements, but would permit continued rotation and logistics.
  • —We would consider the ICC, as presently established, to be inadequate, but—rather then eliminate it entirely—we would concentrate on having it improved or supplemented by Asian observers. We would also expect some joint commissions of belligerents.
• —An immediate, unconditional release of all POW’s held by both sides. State believes that this will give Thieu more trouble than any other provision in the package, but says that we regard it as an essential ingredient. We might be prepared to moderate the universality of the proposal, but must insist on release of all Americans.
• —An acceptance in principle that U.S. armed forces will be withdrawn from the Indochina states. State says that in this you will be restating the position you have taken earlier. But, the cable says, it will be clear that we will not link this statement either with mutual withdrawal or with Vietnamization. In short, according to State, we will leave the impression that we would be prepared to make our withdrawal plans more concrete in connection with other elements in the package. We would be prepared to enter negotiations with the North Vietnamese, if they are interested, on the timetable and scope of U.S. withdrawals. But Bunker may assure Thieu that we will be guided by “the need to be convinced that our undertakings were consistent with continuing security for the people of South Vietnam.”
• —An expanded international conference among interested parties to seek a negotiated settlement throughout Indochina. We will indicate to Thieu that we are not prepared to pay any price for convening such a conference, and will continue the Paris talks if Hanoi declines.

Additional Points. In addition, Ambassador Bunker is asked to make the following points to Thieu:

• —The package includes no proposals regarding political arrangements for South Vietnam.
• —We will be making parallel approaches to Lon Nol and Souvanna Phouma.

Ambassador Bunker is also told that:

• —If the consultation proceeds smoothly, we would bring Bruce home in the near future for consultations.
• —You would expect to make the package proposal in late September or early October.
• —To develop our plans further, we would appreciate knowing how long Bunker believes it will take him to get Thieu on board.

Comment: In effect, their draft involves unilateral withdrawal. It would mean that your statement would not be a cease-fire proposal, but a unilateral withdrawal with cease-fire attached.

Changes I have made. Accordingly, and in line with our earlier talks, I have made the following changes:

• —Modified the withdrawal proposal to bring it into line with your May 14 formulations,³ while making it clear that we are talking about total U.S. withdrawal and a readiness to make our withdrawal plans more concrete. I have also changed the reference to our withdrawal to make it apply to Vietnam rather than the Indochina states.
• —Changed the section regarding international supervision to remove reference to possible retention of the ICC. Even if we ultimately have to do this, I see no need to reveal it at this point, particularly since it may be better for us to supervise a cease-fire unilaterally than through the ICC.
• —Deleted the reference to bringing Bruce home for consultations and substituted more general language saying we will consult him in the near future.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 124, Vietnam Subject Files, President’s Vietnam Speech 10/6/70, Drafts and Game Plan. Top Secret; Nodis; Cherokee. Sent for information.
2. The final text was sent in telegram 149946 to Saigon, September 13. (Ibid.)
3. In an address to the Nation on May 14, 1969, President Nixon outlined a proposal for mutual withdrawal from Vietnam in 12 months. The address is printed in Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 369–375. See also Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume VI, Vietnam, January 1969–July 1970, Document 68.