38. Memorandum for Record Prepared by the Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Knowles)1

Subj: JCS Meeting, 1500 Hours, Wednesday, 9 September

1. Mr. Perot briefed the Chiefs on his efforts to obtain the release of US prisoners of war. He started out by saying his basic strategy was to put and keep pressure on the North Vietnamese on the POW question. He said it became obvious in the initial negotiations that the North Vietnamese did not understand our interest in POWs. In their eyes a POW is a disgrace. War is the real issue and not the POWs. They would not accept his position that the entire United States is interested in 1500 prisoners. It is his opinion that the North Vietnamese feel the American people do not understand the war. They are not mad at the people of the United States—just the US Government. They feel that the Americans do not do a good job of electing their leaders. In their view, a small, well organized minority rules the US, not the majority. Mr. Perot feels when the pressure we put on them become untenable, we will see results. He indicated he had his own intelligence net which he uses to get information in and out of Hanoi. He said as far as results to date are concerned, the US prisoners are now being treated better than ever before. He pointed out the film Congressman Zion had obtained was made in May of this year and not at Christmastime as advertised. [Page 101] Morale amongst the prisoners has improved. The POWs have word that their families and people in the US are trying to get them out. They get this information from new POWs and pilots recently shot down. They know their wives are organized and working hard. He pointed out the tremendous response he received from his TV appearance with Hugh Downs on the 1st of January. Indicated he has prepared a list of things that Congress can do. The replica of cells and cages over in Congress caused the North Vietnamese considerable concern. They made numerous efforts to have them taken down on the basis they were not accurate. He said he offered to send them blue prints so they could correct them. They declined the offer. He said he urged the Senators to put something together. If one of them would go to Paris, he would probably get a better film than Congressman Zion. He suggested that there should be a joint session of Congress on the subject. He felt there was a unique opportunity during the elections for those campaigning to make an appeal for the immediate release of prisoners in all camps. The North Vietnamese would not like that. Also, he was trying to get Congressmen to go to Cambodia and Laos. He said the main objective is to demonstrate the importance we place on POWs to the North Vietnamese, not to the American people. He is trying to organize now a city by city campaign and he feels this would get good results. “Already tried a pilot model at Fort Worth.” This would assist in building a base of support. “Hopefully for the short term but certainly for the long term.” What he will do is get each city to make up a package of letters and appeals that can be delivered to the North Vietnamese Delegates in Paris. The purpose would be for the NVN to obtain a profile of concern across America. Suggestions for the military are: (1) Brief all our people—said word will get to the prisoners of the military’s concern. (2) Improve the package control system. Packages should be sent to every prisoner at every opportunity. This is terribly important. If one man doesn’t get a package, the military ought to provide a package. If the military doesn’t do that, let him know and he will see that they are taken care of. Another thing we should consider is some of the key NVN prisoners. The North wants them back very badly. They don’t want all the prisoners—just the key ones. Consequently, the key prisoners may be the basis for some sort of exchange. Overall, he said the NVN feel confident in saying we can have a military victory any time we want one. They understand that. Admiral Moorer outlined the recent proposal made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with regard to returning POWs. He indicated we have a problem with SVN. Must have agreement with them in order to make any proposal along these lines workable. Mr. Perot suggested they might be able to make a three-way deal. For instance, we might offer them some housing for their military people that they want very badly in exchange for some type of POW package. Another proposal which [Page 102] should be looked at would be to offer to build facilities to put our men and their men in a neutral country. CNO asked if there were any problems the Chiefs could help with? Mr. Perot responded: “help inform the people of America what is going on.” The people don’t really know. We shield the people from the war. Many think the Ho Chi Minh Trail is a highway. Admiral Moorer commented that this is because we adopted the guns and butter approach and no mobilization. Mr. Perot said the students don’t have a closed mind. They have strong emotions and lack of knowledge. If the kids would just be intellectually honest, it would help a great deal. For example, they didn’t understand that the refugees in Laos fled from the North Vietnamese, not the bombing. General Palmer commented that the NVN POWs know that they are a disgrace. Consequently, he thought the idea of the neutral country was a good one. It is hard to find NVN POWs who are willing to go back. Mr. Perot pointed out that the old prisoners are very tough. Some want to rejoin their units and get back into battle. The Commandant of the Marine Corps asked what is their minimum price to get the prisoners back? Mr. Perot responded by saying “to get all our troops out.” He went on to point out that there are eight of our prisoners in China. These eight men must be part of the overall POW packet.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Vietnam.]

  1. Source: National Archives, RG-218, Records of the Chairman, Moorer Diary, July 1970–July 1974. Top Secret.