292. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Vietnam.]

P: I was thinking about your comments on the NVN. I wonder if in the letter to the Chinese the way to handle them might be to say we have intelligence reports saying the Soviet Union is urging the NVN to launch a major attack to embarrass us prior to our visit to the People’s Republic. We are making a peace proposal but other than that we will have to take actions to support our people. Get the impression that others are doing it.2

[Page 1043]

K: I asked Haig to place that argument in a sketchy way when he was there so that it was playing back to something he had received.3

P: Right.

[Omitted here is discussion of planning for Nixon’s address to the

Nation on Vietnam; see Document 294.]

[P:] Anything we can do to the NVN? Not in the air but SVN in Cambodia?

K: They will not do it fast enough. They have pulled their troops out of Cambodia and put them in II Corps. One way or other it will be settled by election time. If the SVN break it settles it and if they hold and weather what happens there domestically then I think it’s 50–50 they will settle it before the election. They are making a scale they cannot repeat if they don’t make it.

P: SVN, can we get them anything more? Tanks or anything?

K: In our withdrawal schedule the Pentagon is putting emphasis on pulling out helicopters. Many of the gun ships. We need them desperately. Change composition of forces and keep helicopters in there until May. It doesn’t affect troop numbers.

P: Get that out right away. Get Laird and Moorer out of there. Do it today.

K: As soon as we hang up.

P: Moorer owes us one too. Say we want plenty of helicopters until May and let’s use them.

K: I think we can handle it.

P: They have no air power and no helicopters. No reason for them to win.

K: If they suffer the same losses this year as last year in Laos then I think it will be over.

P: I think you are right. You will see Dobrynin tonight?4

K: Right. I will call you. It may be too late. I will place a call anyway.

P: Your line with him will be conciliatory on the big things but we cannot have the defensive. We will respond—at a level they don’t expect. Let them think we will hit Haiphong.

K: I think I should warn him that we will be tough.

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P: It will be interesting to see what he is bringing. A whole agenda on trade.

K: He will be conciliatory. I have that from the tone of his conversation.

P: It was interesting that when you brought up India he said let’s go on from there.

K: They are guilty and they know it. They are a bunch of thugs.

P: Get Laird over. It is important to say we don’t lose ______ on this. I will take some knocks. I don’t mind 5 day strike.

K: The Democrats want to say it took us 4 years to lose. Then whipsaw us.

P: We will set it up well with peace proposal. Then they hit us and we respond by saying you will not drive us out that way. Maybe we will get public support this way.

K: We should and go on the defensive against the Democrats. They had on the “Today” show this morning comments by Muskie and Humphrey on military position of your speech. They only want more efficiency. They didn’t attack frontally. They are all patriotic.

P: ______ if the AF gets some planes. Hit for 2 day cracks.5

K: Two days and stop for 2–3 days and then a day. Mix it up so opponents don’t get set.

P: Really whamp on them.

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. All omissions are in the original.
  2. A message to the Chinese Government, along with a “Republic of Vietnam and United States Proposal for a Negotiated Settlement of the Indochina Conflict,” were sent to Paris on January 24 under a covering letter from Haig to Walters. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 849, For the President’s File—China Trip, China Exchanges) For text of the U.S. message, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, Document 186.
  3. Haig traveled to Beijing January 3–10 to prepare for the President’s trip in February. See ibid., Documents 183–184.
  4. See Document 293.
  5. Nixon is referring to plans to launch an air attack on DRV forces concentrated in Kontum Province. Documentation on the operation is in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume VIII, Vietnam, January–October 1972.