Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

291. Minutes of a Meeting of the Senior Review Group¹

Washington, January 17, 1972, 3:09–4:05 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Vietnam Assessment

PARTICIPATION

• Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
• State
  • Mr. U. Alexis Johnson
  • Mr. William Sullivan
  • Mr. Arthur Hartman
• Defense
  • Mr. Armistead Selden
  • Major Gen. Fred Karhos
  • Mr. Clay McManaway
  • Mr. Dennis Doolin
• JCS
  • Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
  • B/Gen. Richard Bresnahan
• CIA
  • Mr. Richard Helms
  • Mr. George Carver
  • Mr. Norman Jones
• Treasury
  • Dr. Charls E. Walker
  • Mr. John J. McGinnis
• NSC Staff
  • Col. Richard T. Kennedy
  • Mr. Philip Odeen
  • Mr. John Court
  • Mr. John Negroponte
  • Mr. Mark Wandler

It was agreed that:

• —There should be a further evaluation of the military situation in Vietnam and of the measures designed to improve U.S. and RVNAF military capabilities in light of the enemy threats expected through July 1, 1972. In particular, the following areas should be examined: the enemy threat; immediate actions required to ensure U.S. and RVNAF readiness to cope with enemy activities; GVN manning and leadership problems; air support (including helicopters and STOL aircraft) for the South Vietnamese; and the size and composition of remaining U.S. forces in Vietnam.²

Dr. Kissinger: The primary purpose of the meeting today is to get a fix on what is ahead for us during the next three to six months in Vietnam. We should have some discussion on what remedial measures, if any, need to be taken. I don’t know if all of you have read the CIA threat assessment.³ If everybody has read it, there is no sense in asking Dick [Helms] to give us a summary.

Mr. Helms: I think there is basic inter-agency agreement with the paper. Defense’s views are consistent with ours.

Adm. Moorer: We should remember that this paper was prepared on the basis of a force level of 60,000 by July 1. Considering the President’s latest withdrawal announcement, however, I don’t know if all the statements in the paper still hold. In effect, we are compressing the withdrawal time schedule by 45 days.

Mr. Carver: The threat assessments presented in the paper are not materially affected by the increased withdrawal schedule.

Adm. Moorer: That’s true. But our actions may be affected.

Dr. Kissinger: The increased withdrawal rate will not have an effect in terms of enemy capabilities.

Adm. Moorer: I agree.

Mr. Johnson: Is there anything new on the air side? During the last 45 days, the other side has been very aggressive, and it seems to have greatly increased its anti-aircraft capabilities.

Adm. Moorer: You’re right. There are three aspects to this situation. The first aspect is missiles, mainly SA–2s. The NVA have 26 battalions south of 20 degrees. Four of these battalions are in Laos: two of them in the Tchepone area, and two around the Mu Gia pass. The second aspect is aircraft. There are now nine Migs south of 20 degrees, and they have been very active lately. Since January 1, there have been some 26 incursions into Laos. The third aspect is anti-aircraft capability, particularly in the Panhandle of North Vietnam and in Laos.

The enemy has greatly increased capability, therefore, to defend against our air, especially in the Trail area. He has also caused us to call off the slow movers in Laos. There is no indication, though, that the enemy has the ability to launch air-to-ground attacks. Nonetheless, we have to devote more air assets—such as a combat air patrol in the Danang area—to our operations. Their increased activities degrade to a certain extent our air efforts in Laos.

Mr. Johnson: Does this trend of increased degradation of our air efforts change our estimates of the enemy’s throughput capabilities?

Adm. Moorer: No, not yet. As I said, we had to call off some interceptor aircraft and forward air controllers, and we had to devote some F–4s to combat air patrol. But I would not say yet that this has had a significant effect on our operations.

The trend of enemy air activity is up. Since January 1, they have made 26 incursions into Laos. They made nearly 50 incursions since last October, but during the same time period of the year before they only made three of four incursions. The planes generally make a fast circle and then head back to North Vietnam. They’ve shot down one of our aircraft, fired two missiles at an F–4 and fired two other missiles at a B–52.

Mr. Sullivan: I think this activity is designed to have more of a political and psychological effect than a military effect. They want to cause some embarrassment to us in the air war—and this is just as much in their interest as is an offensive in MR II.

Adm. Moorer: I agree. The whole thing is designed to have a political effect.

Dr. Kissinger: As I read the assessment paper, I noticed a gap between the personnel and logistics infiltration. How do we explain this? Is this the key to their intentions? Are we not getting the right information? Is the infiltration of supplies keeping pace with the infiltration of personnel? Do they have caches?

Mr. Helms: I think they have a lot of supplies hidden in caches, but there is also some question about our information.

Adm. Moorer: This point about logistics is a good one, and we were working on it this morning. Will they make all the moves we think they can make without a full commitment of forces? We question that they have a strong logistical posture, although we must assume that they do. We don’t have very accurate information because we haven’t been able to intercept their tactical instructions. Perhaps they are using land lines.

Dr. Kissinger: It’s not fair for the North Vietnamese to change the rules in the middle of the game.

Mr. Carver: Their logistical activity has picked up in the last week.

Dr. Kissinger: As I recall, last year, our analysis showed that they had enough logistic capability to engage in protracted warfare throughout the dry and wet seasons. This year they have less of a capability.

Mr. Jones: So far, but it’s picking up rapidly.

Dr. Kissinger: I’m talking about right now. They don’t have more than what’s consistent with the strategy of protracted warfare. Is that right?

Mr. Jones: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: Can we assume that they will have the ability to launch an offensive in February in MR’s I or II and sustain this offensive?

Mr. Jones: Yes, if the present rate of supply continues. The rate has accelerated very markedly in the last two or three weeks.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Jones) What do you mean by “very markedly?” Can you give me a percentage of increase? Do DIA and CIA agree this year?

Mr. Jones: There is no disagreement. In our paper, we estimated that from October, 1971, through January 4, 1972, the enemy moved approximately 11,000 tons of supplies through the system. Due to the increased rate of activity in the past couple of weeks, however, we estimate that the enemy will now be able to move about 17,000 tons during this dry season.

Dr. Kissinger: How does this compare to last year?

Mr. Jones: This dry season’s input performance through January 4 is roughly three-quarters of that achieved during the same period last year. There’s no question that they are behind, but they can make up the difference in short order.

Dr. Kissinger: Even if they do catch up, they’ll still only be able to engage in protracted warfare.

Mr. Jones: Even though the lag appears large in percentage terms, the absolute difference between this year’s and last year’s performance is not overwhelming. There is no great impediment to making up the difference, which will enable them to launch an offensive in MR I or MR II.

Dr. Kissinger: How long would this take? Would you say three weeks?

Mr. Jones: They can do this in a few months if they soon initiate the high level of input activity they have sustained in the past.

Dr. Kissinger: Is it your judgment then that with the present rate of supply they have the capability to mount high points of military activity, but that they still need a few more weeks of preparation in order to launch an offensive which will last two or three weeks?

Mr. Jones: Yes, I think that they will be able to launch an offensive within a month.

Dr. Kissinger: I draw two conclusions from what you just said. The first is that if they keep the present rate of supply, they could not launch an offensive next month. The second is that if they want to increase supply rate—and launch an offensive—they can do so.

Mr. Jones: What you say is true if they maintain the rate that they had from October through December. However, if they maintain the rate that they had during the last week they will be able to launch an offensive.

Dr. Kissinger: Let’s say they maintain the rate of last week. Even so, if I understand you correctly, it would still take them two or three weeks to get ready to launch an offensive.

Mr. Jones: Yes. That’s the judgment we make from the available data.

Dr. Kissinger: Following this analysis, we can’t say that they are ready to attack any day and carry out a sustained offensive.

Adm. Moorer: I think they want to wait for Tet.

Dr. Kissinger: And probably for the visit to China, too.

Adm. Moorer: Yes, we’ve got to remember that they’ve always had high points of military activity like this. The infiltration pattern is also a little different this year. This time the enemy is infiltrating whole units rather than fillers. It’s difficult to measure the logistics that these units are bringing with them. Consequently, we have another unknown in the situation.

Mr. Carver: There are two benchmark dates we have to keep in mind: Tet and February 20. Our analysis indicates that after Tet and after the President leaves for China, the situation will be noisy.

Dr. Kissinger: It will be noisy, but the President’s visit will push the offensive off page one.

Mr. Carver: The North Vietnamese will be trying to push the President off page one. They know the battlefield very well. Incidentally, I don’t think we can expect to get detailed warnings of their operations.

Dr. Kissinger: Why do you say that?

Mr. Carver: For one thing, our participation at the district level is much lower than it has been in the past. Another thing is that their communications are much more difficult to monitor now. They seem to be relying more on land lines in tactical situations. I think it’s a bad mistake to assume that we will get two or three day advance warnings on their tactical operations.

Mr. Sullivan: They’re announcing their intentions to the whole world. For the first time, they’ve infiltrated men ahead of logistics. Usually it’s the other way around. You have to wonder whether they’re trying to spoof us.

Adm. Moorer: We have to assume not.

Dr. Kissinger: But it is conceivable?

Adm. Moorer: Yes.

Mr. Carver: The North Vietnamese have never gone in for deception before. This is not to say, though, that they couldn’t start now.

Mr. Sullivan: They’ve never given advance notice of what their intentions were, either. They’ve made several public claims.

Mr. Carver: We must be careful. We’ve obtained pre-attack directives for MRs I and II. But we have to remember that we’ve obtained directives like this before.

Gen. Karhos: We also give advance notice of our intentions.

Dr. Kissinger: We can expect the enemy to have an offensive capability in MR II in about three weeks. What about MR I? When will he have the capability to launch an offensive there?

Mr. Jones: That’s a bit complicated, mainly because of the large food factor. It should require many months for the enemy to get ready. However, if we assume that he is committing his forces without large reserves of food, he can be ready to launch an offensive in two or three months.

Adm. Moorer: The North Vietnamese can move troops directly down the road in the western part of the DMZ.

Mr. Jones: If they move the 304th and the 324B divisions into MR I, they will be doubling their strength.

Dr. Kissinger: Could they launch an offensive in MR I before the trip to China, or is March the earliest they would be able to do it?

Mr. Jones: If they made a concerted effort to improve the logistical situation in MR I, move armament there and assure an adequate food supply, they could be ready within two months.

Dr. Kissinger: But you don’t think they could do it before two months? I’m not going to shoot you if your judgment is wrong. I’m just trying to get a handle on the time frame.

Mr. Jones: My judgment is that it would take them two months.

Adm. Moorer: The South Vietnamese are stronger in MR I. I think the North Vietnamese will find MR I difficult, and I think they will make their move in MR II. Many of the infiltrators seem to be earmarked for the coastal regions there. I think the enemy could occupy temporarily a city like Pleiku. Perhaps he could also drive to the lowlands, which have traditionally been held by the VC. The enemy’s preparations seem to indicate that this is what he will do. At any rate, we are getting more activity in MR II.

Mr. Carver: Of course, he can always go to Quang Tri any time he wants to.

Dr. Kissinger: That would be a violation of the 1968 understanding, wouldn’t it?

Mr. Carver: That’s right. But the road in the western part of the DMZ now gives them the capability of moving troops into Quang Tri. They’ve never had this capability before.

Mr. Jones: Let’s set aside the food problem for the moment. In terms of arms, the SRG model of last April indicated that it would take 60 days to push enough through to launch an offensive and at the same time maintain adequate forces elsewhere.⁴

Dr. Kissinger: When does the rain begin in MR I?

Gen. Karhos: It began in late September, with the northeast monsoon.

Mr. Sullivan: We’re in the monsoon period now.

Dr. Kissinger: In other words they could move in July.

Gen. Karhos: They could have a high level of activity in June, July and August. Last year, the major actions in MR I occurred in our summer.

Dr. Kissinger: On the other hand, they could start low level actions anywhere, anytime. This is especially true in MRs I and II.

Let’s talk for a minute about the ARVN capabilities.

Adm. Moorer: The South Vietnamese have the First and Second divisions in MR I, and a third division is becoming operational. In addition they have 175 MM artillery and tanks in operation. The tank operators in MR I are the best the South Vietnamese have. Perhaps the best leadership in the ARVN is found in MR I, too. That’s why I think they’re more ready there than they are in MR II. In MR II we’ve had some trouble with the leadership. This is being corrected, though. At any rate, they’re aware of the problem. The current plans call for the Marines and airborne troops currently in the strategic reserves to be used in MRs I and II, respectively.

Dr. Kissinger: The Marines didn’t do very well last year, did they?

Adm. Moorer: The Marines fought very well.

Dr. Kissinger: The airborne units weren’t very good.

Adm. Moorer: They were the most aggressive South Vietnamese units around the Chup area. They didn’t have very much staying power, but they were the most aggressive units the South Vietnamese had.

Dr. Kissinger: That’s not saying very much.

Adm. Moorer: They took about 7,000 to 8,000 casualties. But still, they weren’t as aggressive as they should have been. They did want to fight, however.

We must be sure that we have the lift capability to move the airborne troops where they are needed. This can be done with fixed wing aircraft, and I think we have an adequate capability.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Adm. Moorer) Do you think the troops in MR II will fight well enough?

Adm. Moorer: Yes, if they are attacked. They weren’t as aggressive as they could have been when they moved into base area 702. Last year, though, they fought well. If the NVA attack, they will fight. But they won’t go charging across Laos.

Mr. Sullivan: The commander of the 21st division has been replaced. I think this was a good move to make.

Adm. Moorer: The NVA had the 5th, 7th and 9th divisions in the Chup area when the South Vietnamese withdrew. We can expect the NVA 7th division to stir things up and to try to prevent reinforcements from reaching MR II. Gen. Vien has already directed that one division from MR IV move up to MR II.

Dr. Kissinger: The division will be fighting out of its area. Will it do well?

Adm. Moorer: It has done well under its new leadership, but it remains to be seen how it will do away from home. Gen. Vien has published clear directives, stating exactly what he intends to do. His commanders know what is expected of them.

Dr. Kissinger: As I looked at the papers on ARVN capabilities,⁵ I noticed that most combat units were below 70% strength. On the other hand, most headquarter units were near 100% strength. Are they trying to imitate MACV? What’s the problem? Are they just too top-heavy?

Adm. Moorer: I don’t really know. One of the problems might be that the headquarters units only have a few hundred people, while other units have thousands. We have also had some difficulties with desertions, recruitment and the size of the ARVN. One problem, for example, is that the ARVN is continuously expanding. New units are always being activated, and this has an effect on the abilities of other units to stabilize and fill up.

Dr. Kissinger: Can we take a look at the personnel problem and make sure that everything that has to be done is being done to beef up the combat units?

I also have a question about helicopters.

Mr. Doolin: Before we discuss helicopters, I might say that we are looking into the manpower problem. We’ve asked Saigon to provide us with some of the answers to these problems by January 24.

Dr. Kissinger: Good. Let’s talk about helicopters now. Can we get an up-to-date assessment of how many helicopters we will have left and how many the South Vietnamese will have? My main worry is that we will deprive the South Vietnamese of mobility.

Adm. Moorer: Let me outline the current program for you. The South Vietnamese are going to receive 496 small helicopters—mostly UH–1s, with the guns in the doors. So far they have five squadrons still in the process of becoming operationally ready.

Dr. Kissinger: Last year we ordered an increase in helicopter strength for the South Vietnamese.

Adm. Moorer: That was done. We’re also giving them CH–47s. These ships can lift up to 5,500 men.

Dr. Kissinger: I would have sworn that we decided to go above 500 (number of helicopters given to the South Vietnamese).

Adm. Moorer: We’re going up to 528.

Dr. Kissinger: That’s not a very great increase—to go from 500 to 528. (to Mr. Odeen) Phil, will you check on what we decided last year?

Mr. Odeen: Yes.

Adm. Moorer: The South Vietnamese will have the third largest helicopter force in the world.

Dr. Kissinger: That really doesn’t mean very much.

Adm. Moorer: No, it doesn’t, especially if they can’t perform the proper maintenance on all of those helicopters.

Dr. Kissinger: How many helicopters will we have left?

Adm. Moorer: We plan to leave 156 UH–1s, 32 CH–47s, 86 gunships and 34 small helicopters.

Dr. Kissinger: How many do we have now?

Adm. Moorer: As of February, we will have over 1,200.

Dr. Kissinger: Between now and May 1, therefore, we will pull out more than 1,000 helicopters.

Adm. Moorer: That’s right.

Dr. Kissinger: But this is exactly what we’ve been resisting for three years—the compulsion to get the helicopters out.

Adm. Moorer: But as the troop level decreases, we lose some flexibility. For example, it takes about 20% of our force level just to maintain security.

Dr. Kissinger: I know we had a meeting on this subject last year in the President’s office.⁶ Laird and Packard were there. The President gave an order to keep the helicopter strength at the absolute maximum level. Can we get two plans: this one, and one that will keep the helicopter strength at its current level until the present operations are over?

Adm. Moorer: Yes. We have two problems. The first is maintaining adequate security, and the second is helicopters.

Gen. Karhos: The figures on helicopters result from the latest withdrawal announcement.

Dr. Kissinger: The drawdown has only been pushed forward by 45 days. We should have all the alternatives before we do anything irrevocable.

Adm. Moorer: We were anticipating an additional drawdown 45 days later. Consequently, the figures wouldn’t have been the same.

Dr. Kissinger: If we want to stay heavy in helicopters, we must sacrifice something else. What can we sacrifice? If we want to keep 700 helicopters, what other forces would have to come out? Once we get that, the President could take a look at it and make a decision.

Adm. Moorer: We can do that, and we can also review the security, intelligence collection and advisory problems.

Dr. Kissinger: Good. Let’s take a look at it. As we do this over the next week, let’s also take a look at what improvements can be made in the South Vietnamese forces before the various offensives begin.

Mr. Sullivan: One thing we should keep in mind, is that the NVA are moving 122 mm pieces into MR II. The South Vietnamese have nothing comparable, just some 175 mm howitzers in MR I.

Adm. Moorer: We’ll take a look at that.

Gen. Karhos: The 122s are guns, and they outreach the 175 mm howitzers.

Dr. Kissinger: Someone should also take a look at the STOL program.⁷ What’s the current situation with that?

Gen. Karhos: There’s an ongoing test, with 30 aircraft in MR II, but the drawdown may impact upon this.

Dr. Kissinger: How will the drawdown affect the test?

Gen. Karhos: Air Force resources may be impacted.

Adm. Moorer: We need 375 spaces for the test. If we have 30 planes, we need people to take care of them and to load them, and we have to get these people from other units.

Gen. Karhos: We also have the same problem, of course, with the helicopters.

Dr. Kissinger: That’s why I want to see the trade-offs. It would be helpful to get some charts, too. We must have alternative courses. I’m not challenging the present program, however, because I don’t know the alternatives.

Adm. Moorer: Abrams is looking at various ways he can get the force level down to 69,000. He’s examining the possibility of moving some forces to Thailand and of reducing intelligence collection capabilities. He’s got a security problem because 20% of the current force is used for security purposes. He’s also looking into the logistic support for the ROK troops and into logistics back loading—that is moving equipment quickly to Okinawa and Taiwan and not spending much time on it in Southeast Asia. We may have to close Cam Ranh Bay, reduce the number of advisors and cut back on FANK training. Abrams is taking a good hard look at all of this.

Dr. Kissinger: We will meet a week from today and look at all the alternatives, keeping in mind that the maximum danger is in the next four to five months. We should decide what improvements we must make, especially in regard to the ARVN, in order to get through this period.

(to Mr. Odeen) Phil, do you have anything you want to add?

Mr. Odeen: Yes, we should put particular emphasis on the alternatives for helicopters, the STOL program and interdiction in Laos.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–113, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1972–1973. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Situation Room of the White House. All brackets are in the original.
2. In a memorandum to Johnson, Packard, and Helms, January 19, Kissinger asked for these evaluations. (Ibid., Box H–62, SRG Meeting, Vietnam Assessment 1/17/72 (2 of 2))
3. CIA Intelligence Memorandum SC–07029/72, “Enemy Strategy and Capabilities in Indochina through May 1972.” (Ibid.)
4. See Document 179.
5. Kissinger is apparently referring to a January 10 report entitled “RVN Assessement,” prepared by the Department of Defense, and a December 3 memorandum from Laird to Nixon reporting on the improvements accomplished in response to NSDM 118. (Both ibid.) Regarding Laird’s December 3 memorandum, see Document 290.
6. See Document 169.
7. According to a January 14 memorandum from Odeen and Negroponte, briefing Kissinger for the meeting and summarizing the CIA and Defense Department papers, the STOL (Short Take Off and Landing) program was an effort to supply the GVN with 200 light, inexpensive aircraft that were useful for close air strikes and re-supply missions. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–62, SRG Meeting, Vietnam Assessment 1/17/72 (2 of 2))