Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

266. Minutes of a Meeting of the Senior Review Group¹

Washington, October 1, 1971, 3–3:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Ceasefire

PARTICIPATION

• Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
• State
  • Mr. U. Alexis Johnson
  • Mr. William Sullivan
• Defense
  • Mr. David Packard
  • Mr. Armistead Selden
  • Major Gen. Fred Karhos
• JCS
  • Lt. Gen. Richard T. Knowles
  • Brig. Gen. William C. Burrows
• CIA
  • Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman
  • Mr. George Carver
• NSC Staff
  • Dr. Wayne Smith
  • Mr. John Negroponte
  • R/Adm. Robert Welander
  • Mr. Mark Wandler
  • Mr. James T. Hackett

It was agreed that:

• —Options 1 and 4 of the Alternative Sets of Ceasefire Terms² are not preferred. The choice between options 2 and 3 will depend on the political context at the moment of negotiation and the negotiation itself.
• —The Vietnam Working Group will prepare studies on: (1) the actions, on both sides, which will be triggered by the start of negotiations; and (2)³ the separate monitoring of military violations and infiltration violations of the ceasefire.
• —The State Department will prepare studies on the most practical possibilities in the POW and political settlement issues and build hypothetical models which we can use as points of reference, if and when the circumstances arise.⁴

Dr. Kissinger: I thought we should briefly review the ceasefire paper. I see from reading the papers that my staff likes sanctuaries. The sanctuary idea has been knocked out at least five times, but every time the papers are revised, the idea comes back in again.

If the war ever ends with negotiation, and one could not guess that from what’s going on in Paris now, then a ceasefire would be an essential element. We might review where we stand with respect to a ceasefire.

There are four options. All of you are familiar with them, so there’s no sense in reviewing each one in detail. The first option is considered to be the most negotiable. It calls for main forces and territorial forces to freeze in place, with a 200-meter patrolling limit. The current ICC would investigate complaints, and a Joint Military Commission would work out the details of the settlement.

My staff claims that the second option is the best for the Allies. This would put the enemy main forces in sanctuaries, while the friendly main forces freeze in place and friendly local forces patrol up to two kilometers. A strong ISB would monitor supply and personnel movements into South Laos, as well as main force locations in South Vietnam. I think we would have to know where the sanctuaries would be placed before we make a judgment on whether this is the best option or not.

Dr. Smith: I agree. This has been in the back of our minds. If you recall, in the first study,⁵ we said the sanctuaries would be located away from the population centers.

Dr. Kissinger: For this to be the best option, we would have to assume that the sanctuaries were located away from the population centers. It is not self-evident, though, why the other side would accept that [sanctuaries away from population centers].

The third option, one of the two middle-range options, calls for friendly and enemy main forces to freeze in place, for GVN local forces to patrol up to two kilometers and for a strong ISB to monitor Trail entry into South Laos. Option 4, the other middle-range option, is the same as 3, except that the monitoring is done by the ICC.

As far as I know, Hanoi has never expressed its view of what it expects a ceasefire to be. There’s a difference in timing: they want the ceasefire to come at the end of the settlement process, while we want it to come earlier. They have never stated their understanding of what they mean by a ceasefire.

Mr. Sullivan: They have gone on about the phony ceasefire: they stop shooting at us when we get on the ships. But they have even been vague about that proposal.

Mr. Johnson: That’s right. The only thing they are clear about is that the ceasefire comes at the end of the settlement process, when a coalition government is already formed in South Vietnam.

Dr. Kissinger: Even so, they have never defined what they mean by ceasefire. They have just been explicit about the timing. Is that correct?

Mr. Johnson: Yes. The assumption is that it comes at the end of the settlement period. They have never defined a ceasefire in any way as a prelude to a settlement, but always as the conclusion.

Dr. Kissinger: We don’t know how they define a ceasefire. The way they define a political settlement, though, means there will be no forces left. I don’t think a ceasefire is their paramount concern.

Would we consider option 1? Can we accept the limitations of that option and the monitoring by the ICC?

Mr. Packard: One thing stands out in all the options. They [the options] assume that the swing population goes over to the VC. VC control of the rural population is only 1 or 2 percent now. All the options, though, assume the VC will pick up the swing population.

Dr. Kissinger: Is that assumption wrong?

Mr. Packard: That’s not the point. It may be right. But to the extent the government can maintain effective police actions, its control will be more effective. We now assume the swing population is under GVN control during the day and under VC control during the night. All the options, though, assume the VC will gain control of the population during the day and night, and, therefore, there really isn’t much difference between the options. Option 1 is the least favorable. But if we can help the GVN assert more effective police actions, it will have more effective control and option 1 could be more acceptable.

Mr. Johnson: I understand your point. You’re saying there is an enormous range of variables which affect these calculations.

Mr. Packard: Basically, I think the analysis is good. Option 1 is the least acceptable because the VC control goes to 14 percent after six months and to 23 percent after a year. Option 2 is better because the VC control goes to 12 and 14 percent. I’m not sure, however, all of the factors considered here have been placed in the right priority. A strong ICC or ISB would help, of course. At the same time, if we counted on effective policing, this would make any option more acceptable.

Dr. Kissinger: We have to take into consideration two things in regard to violations of the ceasefire: (1) actual combat actions and (2) reinforcement capabilities. The combat actions can be monitored, in part, by an ISB, and we can try to have the local forces in balance. The other question is reinforcement.

Mr. Packard: The only way to make this [monitoring of reinforcement capabilities] more effective is to have more supervision.

Dr. Kissinger: Just for the purposes of this discussion, I’d be inclined to be more lenient in regard to combat violations, compared to infiltration violations. If I recall correctly, our analyses of last year indicated they were getting 15 to 20 percent of their supplies through. If we just have a rough inspection system, they could cut down their supplies by 50, or even 75, percent—a noticeable reduction. With a bombing halt, however, everything would be getting through. On top of that, if they have a military standdown for a couple of months, they could very easily build up their supplies and launch a major attack.

Mr. Packard: Henry, you just brought up the $64 dollar question. Would they devote most of their effort to staging a buildup and launching a major attack or to increasing their control of the swing population? I think we have to worry about both.

Dr. Kissinger: That’s true. The answer to the question about increasing control is to strengthen the GVN local forces so that the other side will find it too costly to pick them off. I think they will concentrate on building up for an attack.

Even if we strengthen the GVN local forces, the other side could tip the scales by cutting down on its infiltration, but still have more supplies come in than if the bombing and combat were continuing.

Mr. Packard: You’re right. Can we detect this infiltration? Even more important, can we do something about it if we do detect it? We might get some signals about increased infiltration, but not enough to know for sure. Can we do anything to make sure we get first-hand information about what they are doing?

Dr. Kissinger: Have we done any studies on what it would take to monitor the supply situation?

Mr. Sullivan: We have done some. The studies indicate we can stop the infiltration with about 12 men, with 3-man teams at each of the four passes from South Laos into South Vietnam. When the new road is completed through the DMZ, we would need another 3-man team. I’m talking about the infiltration of supplies, not men.

I think, though, that this focuses on another problem. The study is not set in a larger context. True, it does have annexes on Laos and Cambodia, but it doesn’t look at the overall settlement situation. In October, 1970, we put a ceasefire first in our total settlement picture. The other side put it last in its seven-point proposal. The study does a good job in its frame of reference, but it is not really practical.

Dr. Kissinger: I detect a little sting in that remark. Is the study useless?

Mr. Sullivan: No. I think it provides a good term of reference from which to negotiate.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree. We can’t float a ceasefire proposal without a political framework.

Mr. Sullivan: In the worst possible case, a coalition government would come to power in Saigon and would be amenable to North Vietnam. Then we wouldn’t have to worry about a ceasefire.

Mr. Packard: I’d like to return to what Bill [Sullivan] said before. I don’t agree that we can control the infiltration with 12 or 15 people. I think we should check that again.

Mr. Sullivan: That presupposes the other side is willing to accept people at the passes. And if that is the case, you know they made a political decision not to send the supplies through.

Mr. Packard: The Trail is so complex. I think we need a more sophisticated inspection system than 10 or 12 people.

Mr. Sullivan: Another study indicated we would need an ISB of 7,500 people—if we assume they are trying to beat the system.

Dr. Smith: On page 23 of the study, our calculations show that they would need only eight additional trucks per day in order to build up for an offensive in MRs 1 and 2. This, I think, gives some indication of the added supplies they would need to get through.

We were also aware of the general political framework in which the ceasefire should be placed. In the second paragraph of the paper, we say we are going to describe the general concept framework in which ceasefire terms might be considered, without, however, attempting to relate these terms to the political and other issues of an overall settlement.

Mr. Johnson: We’re not saying you weren’t aware of the political framework. A major variable, though, is the political appeal of the government in Saigon and its effectiveness. Did you base your study primarily on a straight-line GVN political appeal?

Dr. Smith: Yes, it’s fair to say that. We used 1970, rather than 1968.

Dr. Kissinger: Do you think we can devise a system which would prevent them from getting additional trucks through per day?

Dr. Smith: CIA says, “No.”

Mr. Packard: We certainly can’t do it with 12 men.

Mr. Sullivan: I said we could do it with 12 people, provided the other side is not fighting the situation.

Gen. Cushman: If they are carrying out their re-supply by truck and we negotiate the stationing of teams at the passes, it’s one thing. But it’s another thing if they are back-packing the supplies in and trying to cheat the system.

Mr. Sullivan: If they are going to cheat, they would not agree to the 12 observers in the first place.

Mr. Packard: I’m not so sure about that.

Mr. Sullivan: They didn’t agree to having inspectors in 1954 or 1961.

Mr. Packard: I mean that I don’t agree with the statement that if they permit 12 inspectors, we should trust them.

Dr. Kissinger: We have to be concerned about two things: (1) monitoring the infiltration system, and (2) monitoring actual violations of the ceasefire in military actions. We need a more detailed study on what kind of system we want and the levels of tolerance it can sustain. We cannot assume that if they permit 12 inspectors, that would be sufficient. If they don’t permit 12 people at the passes, what do we do?

Mr. Johnson: If they don’t agree to 12, they certainly won’t agree to 7,500.

Mr. Packard: I can conceive of something in between.

Gen. Knowles: Option 2 calls for an observer force of 14,000.

Dr. Kissinger: Is that figure broken down into elements concerned with infiltration and combat violations?

Gen. Knowles: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: How many would be involved with the monitoring of the infiltration?

Gen. Knowles: About 4,000.

Dr. Kissinger: I don’t think they would permit 10,000 men to monitor their military activities.

Mr. Packard: With a few hundred mobile inspection teams we could have a more acceptable system.

Mr. Sullivan: That was tried in 1962 with the ICC observers, but they shot down a helicopter.

Gen. Knowles: That doesn’t show very good faith on their part.

Mr. Packard: When they do that, the ball game is over.

Mr. Johnson: What would we do if we had a mobile system like that and if they shot the helicopters down?

Mr. Packard: I guess we would have to go back to the drawing board.

Dr. Kissinger: The ultimate sanction, of course, is the strength of the South Vietnamese. If they violate the ceasefire, we can step up our military supplies to the South Vietnamese.

Mr. Packard: If there are violations, we can certainly increase the gunship actions.

Mr. Sullivan: I think the North Vietnamese would accept a cease-fire if they are on the verge of achieving their goals in the South anyway, or if they make the political decision to settle for what they have at the moment. From our point of view, the ceasefire should be a trip wire which can be maintained with a minimum number of people.

Mr. Packard: (to Mr. Sullivan) I think there’s also a third possibility, Bill. They could look upon the ceasefire as a temporary expedient and put great emphasis on the local control situation. They could just wait for the opportune moment to renew the hostilities again.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Packard) You are right. I think this is a distinct possibility. It’s clear they would do this under option 1, and it’s probable under option 3. I think it’s more probable that they will want to preserve their base and achieve a settlement which gets us out of South Vietnam and which results in a weaker South Vietnam. Then they can build up their resources and go on the offensive again. If they don’t get the kind of settlement they want, we must assume they will violate the ceasefire. We must, therefore, devise a ceasefire which will be tough for them to violate.

Mr. Johnson: How can we come up with a ceasefire proposal which they will accept and which will be difficult for them to violate?

Dr. Kissinger: If they are not going to accept a ceasefire, then we are simply wasting paper. However, if they come to us one day and say they would like to talk about a ceasefire, we at least will be able to tell them what we want.

Mr. Packard: I think the paper is a good reference point in this regard.

Dr. Kissinger: What choices do we have if they ever say they are ready to talk ceasefire? Regardless of what their motivation is, what would we say to them?

Mr. Packard: Normally, we would start with the proposal most advantageous to us: sanctuaries.

Gen. Knowles: Option 2 is the best for us.

Dr. Kissinger: Do we tell them that they must go into sanctuaries while we remain in the countryside?

Gen. Knowles: We could say that, after all, it is our country.

Dr. Kissinger: I’m not sure they would accept that.

Dr. Smith: There is one important factor in all of this that should not be overlooked. We must judge how long we expect the ceasefire to last. After six months, the decline in control loss is relatively small—and the GVN still remains in control of the rural population. The real difference is between six months and a year.

Mr. Sullivan: The ceasefire would presumably be part of some other movement in the negotiations. We have had some experience with this in Paris. For example, if there were progress on negotiating a ceasefire, we would expect progress on other things, as well. We would expect other movements related to the ceasefire.

Dr. Kissinger: We need an assessment of what we have to do to put the GVN in the best position to deal with violations.

Mr. Packard: There’s no difference between options 2 or 3. The percentages [VC controlled population] are 13 [option 3] vs. 12 [option 2] after six months and 18 [option 3] vs. 14 [option 2] after one year. The figures, though, are not very precise. Option 3 is more practical. The one key element that it has is increased inspection. Option 2 is better for us, but I just don’t think it is very practical. I come down on option 3, with modifications.

Dr. Kissinger: Does everyone agree that options 1 and 4 are not preferred?

All agreed.

The choice, then, between option 2 or 3 depends on the political context at the moment and the negotiations.

Mr. Sullivan: Option 2 would be so difficult to negotiate that I think we should focus on 3.

Mr. Johnson: Perhaps we can start out with option 2 and then go to 3 as a fall-back position.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree that option 2 is not very practical. Option 3 is more realistic. Even if the other side accepted the idea of sanctuaries, they could put them just a couple of miles outside Hue or Danang.

Mr. Packard: The difference between options 3 and 4 is the strength of the ICC. Our experience is that we would do better with a strong ICC.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Packard) Dave, we’re talking about options 2 and 3.

Mr. Packard: I thought we were arguing about 3 and 4.

Dr. Kissinger: I guess we’re agreed we should give priority to option 3. (to Dr. Smith) Wayne, if your group has the time, can it do some more work on 2?

Dr. Smith: Even if the other side agrees to sanctuaries, we have to decide where we want them to be.

Dr. Kissinger: Have we ever done a study on this? They surely won’t put the sanctuaries where they will do us the most good.

Gen. Knowles: As a matter of fact, we will have the same problem with a ceasefire in place.

Dr. Kissinger: Let’s assume we will negotiate a ceasefire in place. Has anyone ever studied what either side will do the month before the ceasefire takes effect to achieve the best position? Let’s say the cease-fire will take effect April 30. If they grab Hue, for example, on April 20 and hold it for ten days, they will have it during the ceasefire. It’s possible they could do that. Have we studied the actions a negotiation of the ceasefire would trigger?

Dr. Smith: No, we have assumed they would do the most they could.

Dr. Kissinger: If there had been a ceasefire after Tet, we would have been in a fix. It took quite a while to recapture Hue.

Gen. Knowles: It took us three weeks to get it back.

Dr. Kissinger: That’s right.

Mr. Packard: I think it would be just as well if both sides were in agreed sanctuaries.

Mr. Sullivan: I hate to bring up something unpleasant, but in October, 1970, the President called for a ceasefire in place.⁶ We have been focusing on that.

Mr. Packard: The President has been known to change his mind once or twice.

Mr. Carver: A ceasefire is unlikely to be raised by the other side as a separate issue. It’s much more likely to be raised as part of a total package.

Dr. Kissinger: Whatever work we will have done will then put us that much ahead of the game.

Mr. Carver: Yes. But for the moment, I think we’ve gone just about as far as we can.

Dr. Smith: Should we look at what the GVN can do?

Dr. Kissinger: Do we have a list?

Dr. Smith: Yes. An annex to the study shows what the police and other forces can do.

Dr. Kissinger: Looking at all of this in terms of what will help the GVN, we need a study of what actions would be triggered by the start of negotiations. We also need a study on the separate monitoring of military violations, as against infiltration violations. And we ought to see how we should address the political context of which the ceasefire is a part. (to Mr. Johnson) How would we do this?

Mr. Johnson: We have three elements here: (1) the settlement; (2) the disposition of the POW question, both theirs and ours; and (3) the ceasefire. These are the issues, and the ceasefire is only one element within them. Frankly, I have a hard time coming to grips with all three elements.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Sullivan) How would you deal with this, Bill?

Mr. Sullivan: We must make certain assumptions. Just as we use option 3 as a point of reference, we must take the most practical possibilities in the POW and settlement issues and build hypothetical models which we can then use as points of reference. When and if circumstances arise, we can have relevant points of reference to relate to.

Dr. Kissinger: That’s a good idea.

Mr. Johnson: Bill’s [Sullivan] group is, I think, the best group to do this [build hypothetical models on POW and settlement issues].

Dr. Kissinger: Does everybody agree that is what is needed?

All agreed.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–112, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Situation Room of the White House. All brackets are in the original. Jeanne Davis forwarded the minutes to Kissinger under an October 5 covering memorandum and Kissinger read them on November 6.
2. Reference is to the August 23 paper prepared by the VSSG for this meeting. See Document 265.
3. Johnson forwarded the study to Kissinger under an October 27 letter. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 157, Vietnam Country Files, Vietnam, Oct 71)
4. Johnson forwarded the study under his October 27 letter.
5. See footnote 2, Document 235.
6. See Document 46.