Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

265. Memorandum From K. Wayne Smith of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

• Ceasefire

Introduction

Pursuant to the SRG’s instructions at its July 21, 1971, meeting,² the VSSG Working Group has completed a summary paper on Indo-China ceasefire terms (Tab B).³

The summary paper boils down the earlier analysis⁴ by providing sets of terms encompassing main force and control war variants for South Vietnam and terms for Laos and Cambodia. It also seeks to provide a conceptual framework for relating the mechanics of ceasefire to the larger political issues at stake.

The SRG also asked that Mission comments be obtained. These were received on August 21, 1971 (two weeks late) and are at Tab C.⁵ They provide a useful critique of the paper considered at the July 21, 1971, SRG meeting but not of the summary paper to be considered on Friday.⁶

Brief Summary

Conceptual Framework—After contrasting Hanoi’s view that a ceasefire must be part of a final settlement with the U.S. view that it should be the first step toward negotiations, the paper concludes that if there is any possibility of a ceasefire, it would appear to be in the realm of some concession on our side (e.g., a fixed withdrawal date) in conjunction with a belief on Hanoi’s part that its cause would profit from a period of low level political-subversive conflict followed by a final settlement or a resumption of hostilities.

Sets of Terms—Two extreme and two mid-range sets of terms are provided. Common to all sets of terms are the following assumptions and general provisions:

Assumptions:

• —U.S. redeployments continue at about present rates.
• —U.S. advisors and selected combat service support elements remain.
• —Allied aerial reconnaissance over Indo-China continues as does GVN/U.S. coastal surveillance.
• —Economic aid to the GVN, GKR, and RLG continues.

General Provisions:

• —Hostile military acts including terror and coercion cease.
• —Augmentation of forces (personnel) or supplies beyond replacement levels is prohibited.
• —Population resettlement except by special agreement is prohibited.

Alternative Sets of Specific Terms:

• —Alt 1: Hanoi’s Choice—For South Vietnam: Main forces and territorial forces freeze in place (200 meter patrolling limit). Current ICC investigates complaints and Joint Military Commission works out details. Laos would be partitioned in accordance with current force dispositions (the PDJ could be neutralized). Cambodia partitioned on Lon Nol line, and GVN forces withdrawn to SVN while communist forces can remain in sanctuaries south of Lon Nol line.
• —Alt 2: Best for Allies—For South Vietnam: Enemy main forces regroup in sanctuaries, friendly main forces freeze in place, friendly local forces patrol up to 2 km, and a strong ISB monitors supply and personnel movements in South Laos and main force locations in South Vietnam. Laos terms are the same as for Alt 1. GVN forces withdraw from GKR if all communist forces move northeast of Lon Nol line and free travel on Routes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and the Mekong is assured.
• —Alt 3: Middle Range Option with Strong ISB to Monitor Resupply and Infiltration—For South Vietnam: Friendly and enemy main forces freeze in place, GVN local forces patrol to 2 km, and a strong ISB monitors trail entry into South Laos but not in place locations of main forces as for Alt 2. Forces in Laos and Cambodia are divided by line and GVN withdraws from Cambodia.
• —Alt 4: Middle Range Option with Only ICC Monitoring—Exactly the same as Alt 3 except that ICC is only monitor which means there is no effective supervision of either locations of enemy main forces or resupply and infiltration at the entry points into South Laos.

Outcome Assessment—Two basic criteria were employed to assess outcomes: (1) Whether or not the enemy could locate, resupply and infiltrate personnel for a major offensive; and (2) the extent of control changes of the rural population over six months and one year.

Main Force Buildup:

• —Alt 1 would not preclude a large-scale enemy buildup within six months.
• —Alt 2 would preclude an enemy buildup within six months or one year.
• —Alt 3, even though enemy forces are not in sanctuaries would prevent a main force buildup within six months by its strict resupply terms and strong ISB at the trail entry point into South Laos.
• —Alt 4’s terms would not preclude a main force buildup within six months.

Control Outcomes:

The table below summarizes the projected control outcomes.

			Percent of Rural Population
	Control	Now	In 6 Months	In a Year
Alt. 1 Hanoi’s Choice	GVN	66	54	37
	VC	2	22	36
Alt. 2. Best for Allies	GVN	66	61	57
	VC	2	19	23
Alt. 3 Strong ISB	GVN	66	58	47
	VC	2	20	29
Alt. 4 ICC Monitoring	GVN	66	56	43
	VC	2	21	33

Negotiability Assessment—Very briefly, the negotiability assessments for each option are:

• —Alt. 1 would be easiest to negotiate with Hanoi. Its forces would be relatively unrestricted and the ICC would be predictably ineffective. GVN control forces would be tied to their outposts. Hanoi could opt for a main force build up or pursue protracted war. The GVN, GKR, and RLG would balk at Alt. 1’s terms.
• —Alt. 2 would probably be non-negotiable with Hanoi because Hanoi is unlikely to permit its forces to be regrouped in sanctuaries subject to international supervision. Nor would Hanoi permit unrestrained GVN police activities. Hanoi would probably balk at international inspection at the entry point of the trail in South Laos. The formation of a 14,000-man ISB would also be an obstacle to the negotiability of this option. While the GVN would be attracted to most of the provisions of this option, it would probably reject the provision for enemy main force sanctuaries within the boundaries of South Vietnam.
• —Alt. 3’s provision for a main force freeze in place without ISB supervision thereof might interest Hanoi. However, Hanoi might balk at the 2 km radius of operation for GVN territorial forces and an ISB role monitoring inputs into the trail in South Laos. Up to 6,000 ISB personnel would still be required. The GVN would be attracted to the ISB role in South Laos but reluctant to forego ISB inspection of enemy main forces. The GVN might live with this option.
• —Alt. 4, because it dispenses with an ISB would be more acceptable to Hanoi than Alt 3 but less acceptable to the GVN. The rate of GVN control losses projected for Alt 1 declines for this Alt because territorial forces could operate up to 2 km. But the GVN could not restrain itself beyond six months in the face of such losses. It is unlikely the GVN would accept even these losses and the risk of an enemy offensive within six months.

Mission Comments

The Mission comments are on the paper encompassing the detailed analysis of ceasefire terms considered at the July 21 SRG rather than the paper to be considered at Friday’s SRG. Thus, the Mission’s views are in many respects outdated. Nonetheless, the comments are useful. The Mission’s major points and my comments thereon follow:

• —(1) The Mission notes that political issues should be discussed along with specific ceasefire terms. This comment has been dealt with conceptually in the new paper, but an analysis of the political carrots the U.S./GVN could offer to gain Hanoi’s acceptance of more favorable ceasefire terms was not undertaken. At Ambassador Sullivan’s request the VSSG was directed to steer clear of political issues.

  The Mission’s views are inconsistent on this point. On the one hand the Mission acknowledges that political concessions from our side would be necessary to interest Hanoi in a ceasefire. Yet, the Mission judges Hanoi’s response to the specific sets of terms within the narrow framework of Hanoi’s ceasefire preferences—a view that overlooks possible Hanoi concessions on ceasefire to obtain linked political concessions from the U.S./GVN.

• —(2) The Mission reports it has no evidence of changes in the GVN’s views on ceasefire as reported over a year ago. The Mission could have said with equal veracity that it has no evidence that the GVN’s views have not changed. The GVN’s views formulated a year ago were hastily contrived and there is abundant evidence that little thought went into them. There is, in my view, a good chance that the GVN’s views have changed or would change if we raised the issue with them.
• —(3) The Mission’s view is that the terms that are least desirable from a security standpoint appear to be the only “practical” choice from a negotiability standpoint. I have several problems with this view.
  • First, the Mission does not take a position on appropriate control terms; therefore, the foregoing judgment provides no basis for opting for the new paper’s Alt. 1 (Hanoi’s choice) over Alt. 4 (2 km radius for GVN territorials).
  • Second, as noted above, if our side makes substantial political concessions this could have an impact on the ceasefire terms Hanoi would accept.
  • Third, who knows what Hanoi thinks? I am concerned that our experts are reading their tea leaves too closely. Perhaps we should float a set of terms relatively advantageous to us just to probe Hanoi’s views.
• —(4) The Mission seems to be of two views on GVN effectiveness in a ceasefire. On the one hand, it judges that GVN morale would suffer more than communist morale. On the other, the Mission believes the GVN leadership would be more effective than does the VSSG. The two examples of GVN effective activity cited, propaganda and police activity, are those in which the VSSG finds the GVN most deficient.
• —(5) The Mission believes that there are self-adjusting aspects to a ceasefire that could facilitate its self-enforcement over a reasonable period. In other words, the Mission seems to be suggesting that even if we started down a path not too advantageous to the GVN (e.g., alternatives 1 or 4 in the new paper) the risks would be minimized by the GVN’s ability to assert itself to halt a serious deterioration, even to the point of resuming hostilities. I believe there is some truth in this point. I cannot imagine a ceasefire lasting more than six months, unless there is substantial progress in the negotiations. Surely the GVN will protect itself. In my view, however, this probable GVN response should not serve as a justification for our advocacy of a non-supervised in place ceasefire on terms favorable to Hanoi. The risks would be too great and such a ceasefire embarked on with the assumption that the GVN would break it would be little more than a tactic. I am not sure the benefits of such a tactic justify our accepting Hanoi’s terms and the associated risks that GVN could not halt the decline in its position. Such a tactic could also backfire politically if the GVN resumed the war.
• —(6) We have heard informally via the JCS that the original MACV position on ceasefire was altered substantially in the course of reaching a Joint Embassy/MACV position. MACV had cabled the JCS in the back channel indicating it favored the sanctuary option (Alt. 2). But it appears MACV fell off this position. The JCS has asked MACV for a new reading on its position.

Where Do We Go from Here?

There appear to be several alternatives on future courses of action short of an actual initiative. We could:

• —(1) explore the subject with the GVN;
• —(2) develop more detailed political/ceasefire scenarios;
• —(3) move the issue to a final decision, perhaps at the NSC level, on the assumption that, while the uncertainties are great, they are not going to diminish;

A decision among these choices involves issues on which I have little knowledge.

If we move toward a final choice now (course 3 above), we could:

• —Choose Alt. 1 or Alt. 4, the most negotiable options on the premise that Hanoi will reject the others out of hand. If we did this, we would forego the better options, risk GVN opposition, and assume the ceasefire would be self-enforcing.
• —Propose terms more favorable to our side (Alt. 2 or Alt. 3) in an effort to gain political credit and find out what Hanoi thinks.
• —Take steps to implement a set of terms unilaterally. For example, we could state Alt. 2 terms and move unilaterally toward their implementation by standing down ARVN main forces in a freeze in place and limiting territorial force operations to 2 km. We could continue bombing in Laos and Cambodia pending evidence that Hanoi is not infiltrating supplies and personnel for a major offensive. If Hanoi appeared to be scaling down its activities, we could go a step further. If Hanoi persisted, the GVN could resume main force activities.
• —Take no ceasefire initiative and let the war continue.

Talking Points

Your talking points are at Tab A.⁷

I recommend you read the papers at Tabs B and C.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–59, WSAG Meeting, Ceasefire 10/2/71. Top Secret.
2. The SRG meeting was held on July 22. See Document 235.
3. Tab B, entitled “Alternative Sets of Cease-Fire Terms,” August 23, is attached but not printed.
4. See footnote 2, Document 235.
5. Tab C, telegram 13445 from Saigon, August 21, is attached but not printed.
6. The paper was discussed at the October 1 SRG meeting; see Document 266.
7. Tab A, Kissinger’s talking points, August 27, are attached but not printed.