Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

239. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 29, 1971.

PARTICIPANTS

• Henry A. Kissinger
• Ambassador Dobrynin

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Vietnam.]

Vietnam

I then turned the conversation to Vietnam. I said we had reason to believe that Hanoi was at a very crucial point in its decision. I knew that Le Duc Tho was returning to Hanoi. While in the last year and a half I had accepted the proposition that the Soviet Union could not do much about Vietnam, I was now approaching him because I thought there was a useful moment for intervention. If the war in Vietnam continued, it was certain that the bargaining position of Hanoi vis-à-vis us would decline. In fact, Hanoi was in the curious position of threatening us with a continuation of the war, at the end of which—whether Hanoi won or lost—we would not be in a position to do for them what they were asking simply because the number of our troops would have declined too much.

Dobrynin said that he had had a full report about my meeting with Le Duc Tho in Paris on July 12. He said I had fooled even him. At first he had thought that of course I was going to meet Le Duc Tho, no matter what the press said; but then when the China initiative was sprung he thought that maybe I had used Le Duc Tho as a cover for Peking. Now he did not know whether I was using Peking as a cover for Le Duc Tho or whether the two were independent. At any rate, he received the telegram about my meeting with Le Duc Tho just after I had had lunch with him to tell him about the Peking meeting.²

Dobrynin said that Hanoi told them that there were only two issues left—setting a deadline and overthrowing the Thieu Government. All other issues Hanoi believed could be settled. I said that I did not think the deadline was an insuperable difficulty; Dobrynin said that this was his impression also. But with respect to the overthrow of the Thieu Government, I said that this was a condition we could not accept. First, because we did not have the power to do so. Second, because it would be dishonorable even to discuss overthrowing the government of an ally. On the other hand, we had made proposals whose practical consequence had to be to give maximum freedom of choice to the South Vietnamese. I recapitulated the proposals we had offered: to set a deadline after final agreement; to affirm the concept of neutrality for Vietnam; and to accept limitations on military and economic aid after a settlement. It was hard to see how much more we could do. I said this would have a profound impact on the election campaign. Dobrynin said, yes, he had to admit that.

Dobrynin then asked me how I proposed to proceed. I said that our idea was that we could sign a statement of principles on the points which we had agreed upon at the private talks and then transmit those to the conference for implementation. He asked how the PRG and the Saigon Administration were going to be handled. Were they going to associate themselves with these principles? I said, yes, they would have to associate themselves with these principles, but I thought this would not be a major difficulty on our side. Dobrynin said, well, it should be possible to find some formula to do this.³

Dobrynin asked whether we were going to set a firm deadline or whether we were going to make it dependent on the final agreement. I said we were going to make the deadline start running on the day the final agreement was signed, because otherwise I was afraid their allies were going to delay forever, and we would still be talking to them about the other point while the last American troops had left Vietnam. Dobrynin said, well, the trouble with the North Vietnamese is that they want everything signed and delivered. It isn’t enough for them to start a political process. They want to make sure that Thieu is overthrown. I said that, short of giving them that assurance, I thought the other points were manageable. Dobrynin said that Hanoi had told them they were willing to continue fighting, but he felt that there was a real desire to come to an agreement this year.⁴

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Vietnam.]

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 492, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 7, Part 2. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in General Hughes’ office in the East Wing of the White House. According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, the meeting lasted from 6:38 to 8:10 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) This memorandum is Tab A to a covering memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, August 9. The full text of the memorandum of conversation is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Soviet Union, volume XIII, October 1970–October 1971, Document 303.
2. A memorandum of conversation of the July 19 meeting is ibid., Document 288.
3. In a meeting on August 5, Dobrynin stated that after seeing a report on Kissinger’s July 26 meeting with the North Vietnamese, he believed that Hanoi saw the chief obstacles to an agreement as Kissinger’s refusal to set a deadline for withdrawals and a desire to keep U.S. military advisers behind. Dobrynin also explained that he believed Hanoi was close to coming to an agreement as outlined to him by Kissinger on January 9; see Document 102. Kissinger suggested that this was an “opportunity for official Soviet intervention on a delicate basis,” and Dobrynin agreed to pass this message to Moscow. The memorandum of conversation is printed in full in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–October 1971, Document 311.
4. In a letter to Brezhnev, August 5, Nixon wrote: “In assessing the issues which affect the constructive evolution of our relations, one should not overlook the complication posed by the continuation of the conflict in Southeast Asia. As long as the war persists, it inevitably introduces distortion into the policies of some key countries beyond the basic principles outlined in this letter. As Dr. Kissinger has explained to Ambassador Dobrynin, we have made an eminently fair proposal for bringing an end to that conflict on a basis just to all sides. I would hope that the Soviet Union would exercise its influence to achieve peace in that area of the world. Such an action would give a great impetus to the policies of reconciliation we intend to pursue.” The letter is printed ibid., Document 309.