225. Editorial Note
In July 1971, the Presidential election campaign in the Republic of Vietnam, scheduled for October 3, intensified as the three potential candidates, President Nguyen Van Thieu, Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky, and General Duong Van Minh, actively sought the requisite number of endorsements from either Senators or provincial legislators needed by August 3 to qualify to run. Under the Presidential election law, passed by the South Vietnamese National Assembly on June 3 and signed into law by President Thieu on June 24, each candidate needed the endorsement of either 40 members of the national legislature or 100 provincial or municipal council members in order to run. (Telegram 10019 from Saigon, June 24; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 14 VIET S)
In his 93d message to the President, May 9, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, wrote: “We shall choose appropriate opportunities to emphasize our policy of non-intervention and that we want to see a fair and honest election. But the opinion will still be generally held here in Viet-Nam that we want Thieu re-elected. Despite the problem posed by the competition of both Ky and Minh as candidates, I think Thieu at this stage is clearly the front runner.” The message is printed in The Bunker Papers, Reports to the President From Vietnam, 1967–1973, pages 829–837. Kissinger provided a summary of the message to President Nixon in a memorandum, May 20. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 155, Vietnam Country Files, Viet July 71)
On May 27, the Embassy in Saigon issued the following instructions to its personnel on how to approach the upcoming elections:
“U.S. military and civilian personnel must not offer or give support to any candidate or group of candidates, political party or organization. They must avoid implying by word, deed or acts of presence that the United States supports any individual candidate or group of candidates or political party for elective office. No American-controlled equipment, supplies, transportation or other facilities may be used in behalf of such candidates or in connection with the campaigns and the elections.” (Telegram 6169 from Saigon; ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 14 VIET S)
National Security Council staff member W.R. Smyser forwarded a draft of the instructions to Henry Kissinger under a covering memorandum on May 19 and Kissinger approved them with some modifications on May 26. In a separate memorandum to Kissinger on May 19, however, Smyser wrote that the draft instructions “will be a very tricky issue, especially in light of our other plans.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 154, Vietnam Country Files, Viet 1 May–31 May 71) The “plans” were the decision by the 40 Committee [Page 773] on February 4 to provide Thieu with covert support. See Document 119.
On July 15, Bunker met with Thieu to discuss allegations of campaign irregularities. Bunker noted that “Many of the charges are no doubt greatly overdrawn,” and Thieu denied them. (Telegram 11152 from Saigon, July 15; ibid., Box 155, Vietnam Country Files, Viet July 71) Evidence of election malfeasance mounted, prompting Bunker to set up a follow-up meeting on July 28 to discuss the “unfair practices that are threatening to make it impossible for Vice President Ky to obtain certification.” In telegram 11939 from Saigon, July 28, Bunker detailed many reports of election irregularities, including complaints from Ky and Minh that their supporters had been harassed and threatened, province chiefs registering endorsements from provincial representatives on blank certificates or in Thieu’s name to prevent them from endorsing other candidates, and province chiefs making themselves unavailable to certify endorsements for Ky. (Ibid., Box 869, For the President’s Files—Lord, Vietnam Negotiations, Sensitive, Camp David, Cables, 10/69–12/31/71) In his reporting telegram on the meeting, Bunker wrote that he “found it desirable to underscore on several occasions my opinion that an uncontested election in Vietnam would create an impossible situation in the U.S., that Thieu is a strong frontrunner whether he is opposed by one or two opponents and that the practices being pursued in his behalf, in addition to being unacceptable per se, are unnecessary.” Bunker described the meeting as follows: “Thieu was visibly disturbed by my statement. He underscored the constraints he is under as President in not being able to respond to malicious and often untrue criticism of him by Ky and Minh groups. I said that his dignity and restraint in response to these provocations had worked to his advantage.” Bunker added, “throughout the conversation, which was difficult, the President was defensive and restrained himself with difficulty. He did not, however, challenge the essential accuracy of my presentation. Toward the end, he said he would see what he could do about the situation and let me know.” (Telegram 11936, July 28; ibid.)
In backchannel message 103 to Kissinger, July 28, Bunker commented further on his meeting with Thieu: “While I am not overly optimistic, since Thieu’s henchmen have gone far in rounding up endorsements for him, I hope at least further obstructions of Ky’s efforts will be terminated.” He added that Prime Minister Khiem had sent out instructions to the province chiefs on July 27 to desist in these activities. (Ibid., Box 854, Sensitive, Camp David, Vol. X)
Under mounting pressure from the United States Congress and press to ensure that the South Vietnamese elections were free and fair, the administration had considered having Thieu invite an international observer team into the country to oversee the process. Secretary of State William Rogers forwarded a proposal to the President in a memorandum, [Page 774] May 24, recommending that the administration discreetly endorse a resolution that had been introduced in Congress for a 15-member team appointed by the House, Senate, and President. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 14 VIET S) Initially, Kissinger endorsed a proposal in a June 3 memorandum from National Security Council staff member John Holdridge to create an ad hoc group to study the idea, but according to the correspondence profile attached to the memorandum, the White House informed the Department on September 8 that it was rejecting the plan. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 155, Vietnam Country Files, Viet July 71)