Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

119. Memorandum for the 40 Committee¹

Washington, February 3, 1971.

SUBJECT

• Covert Actions in Support of U.S. Objective in South Vietnam’s 1971 Elections

1. CIA’s Vietnam Station has proposed a program of covert action to be taken in support of the policy recommendations made by Ambassador Bunker.²

2. The covert action program is designed to achieve the following objectives:

a) Re-elect Nguyen Van Thieu as President in October 1971.

b) Influence political party development in South Vietnam so that a small number of parties will come to possess the long-range stability they need to play a vital role in the political struggle on the ground against North Vietnamese political agents. The goal of these efforts will be two to four viable political parties which can bind the democratic structure of the government to South Vietnam’s approximately 6.2 million voters.

c) Elect individuals to the Lower House in 1971 who will support President Thieu’s election in October and his subsequent legislative programs.

d) Ensure an orderly transition of power should Thieu not be re-elected.

e) Contribute to maintaining a government in South Vietnam that supports long-term United States policy objectives in Southeast Asia.

f) Elect twenty individuals to the Lower House in 1971 who will be responsive to CIA direction. This group of legislators would be predominantly pro-Thieu and could work directly with him. For contingency purposes, however, some of them would be in the opposition camp. These individuals, after their election, would be used to collect political intelligence from key GVN ministries or political parties. In addition, they would simultaneously function as agents of influence in both the Thieu and the opposition camps in order to have a positive impact on Lower House legislation and South Vietnamese political events which are of policy concern to the United States.

3. Our operational program has four main elements: (a) covert support to the organizational activity or Lower House candidates of the nascent Farmer-Worker Party, a Montagnard party, a unified Catholic grouping, and the Progressive Nationalist Movement; (b) covert support of approximately 20 candidates for election to the Lower House who will be responsive to CIA covert direction; (c) establishment of a contingency fund of [dollar amount not declassified] for President Thieu; and (d) contingency actions comprising direct election support to two An Quang Buddhist candidates and measures to improve access to Duong Van (“Big”) Minh’s entourage.

4. Our efforts would include the following:

a) We would continue to provide assistance to the organizational efforts of the Farmer-Worker Party (FWP). On 7 August 1970 the 40 Committee approved the expenditure of [dollar amount not declassified] for support to FWP organizational activity.³ These funds were not expended as rapidly as originally anticipated due to a slower pace of organizing provincial conventions, and approximately half remains unspent at this time. A national convention was finally held on 17 January 1971. The FWP currently encompasses among its key supporters seven Senators and three Lower House members who represent Catholics, Buddhists, Khmers, Chams, and some Hoa Hao and Cao Dai. The funds which remain would be used to support FWP candidates for the Lower House in specific constituencies. The FWP would be guided through its Executive Council to support President Thieu’s re-election and would expect to have Thieu’s support for a fixed number of FWP Lower House candidates.

b) We would provide support to Montagnard leaders who would work through the Movement of Unity of the Highland Ethnic Minorities to elect candidates to the Lower House from the provinces of Quang Ngai, Kontum, Pleiku, Phu Bon, Darlac, Quang Duc, Tuyen Duc and Phuoc Long. These leaders wish to reach an understanding with President Thieu for mutual election support. One of the Montagnard leaders has already discussed this proposal with President Thieu and has received some funds with which to initiate the project. However, additional covert support and guidance will be needed to assist this development through other clandestine assets. We would support the election of from 10 to 12 Montagnard candidates through the expenditure of [dollar amount not declassified].

c) We would covertly exercise leverage within Catholic parties, particularly the Revolutionary Social Humanist (Nhan Xa) Party and the Greater Solidarity Force, in order to encourage political coalescence and voter unity. The envisaged resultant party would also include some Hoa Hao elements. This effort is most important if dissipation of the Catholic vote, which occurred during the 1970 Senate elections, is to be avoided. The unified party would put forth Lower House candidates who would work with and support President Thieu in his own re-election bid. It is proposed that funds be utilized to promote efforts toward political coalescence of the existing parties; but failing such consolidation, direct action would be taken to support, through clandestine assets, the Lower House candidacies of one or two Catholics in constituencies considered pivotal in President Thieu’s re-election campaign. We would spend [dollar amount not declassified] for this activity.

d) We would provide support to two or three Lower House candidates of the Progressive Nationalist Movement (PNM) through covert channels to the leadership of this party. The primary intent of this effort would be to nudge the PNM firmly into the Thieu camp. Through this action, or through direct infusion of funds into the PNM if direct candidate support should not prove feasible, we would attempt to retain an equity in this group in the event it should become a full-fledged opposition element. If President Thieu should fail to be re-elected, it is quite possible that the PNM will have a position in the next government, at which time our access to it could be significant in terms of bringing about an orderly transition of power. We would spend up to [dollar amount not declassified] for this activity.

5. Most of the 20 candidates for election to the Lower House whom we would assist would be supporters of President Thieu and, once elected, could influence their local constituencies to get out the vote in favor of Thieu in the Presidential elections a month later. However, several candidates would be in the opposition camp, and we would assist their campaigns in order to have intelligence coverage of, and influence over, the opposition in the event President Thieu fails to win reelection. Following the election all of our assets in the Lower House would be utilized both for intelligence collection purposes and as agents of influence to promote or block passage of legislation according to the needs of U.S. policy. An effort would be made to assure a regional balance among these 20 candidates. The average individual financial support given to these candidates would be [dollar amount not declassified] and maximum total support would be [dollar amount not declassified].

6. The [dollar amount not declassified] contingency fund for President Thieu would come from funds previously approved by the 40 Committee, but not spent, for support of the now-moribund National Social Democratic Front (NSDF). On 7 August 1970 the 40 Committee was informed that half of the previously approved [dollar amount not declassified] had been passed to President Thieu for the NSDF, and no additional funds have since been passed. These contingency funds would be for direct election support should Thieu specifically request this from Ambassador Bunker, or for funding activities which the Vietnam Station identifies to Thieu as problem areas, or for activities which are in Thieu’s election interest and to which he agrees but for which he would be unable to find the necessary funds. While it is recognized that the major costs of President Thieu’s campaign will be borne by Thieu and his financial backers, the availability of this contingency fund would provide the Vietnam Station with flexibility in case of need.

7. We would take the following actions both to assist our collection of intelligence information on opposition activities prior to the elections and to prepare for the contingency that President Thieu may not win re-election:

a) We would improve our contingent capability by working through clandestine assets within the An Quang Buddhists to elect two Lower House candidates [less than 1 line not declassified] capable of being influenced by us. This effort would endeavor to focus An Quang political action on preparation for its 1975 political goals while at the same time strengthening the moderate wing of An Quang over the militants by assisting it to achieve several carefully selected 1971 election victories. This effort would not only assure us an intelligence window into An Quang political activity during the 1971 election campaigns, but in the event President Thieu should fail to win re-election, it would provide essential access to this group which would then probably be on the side of the winner. The cost of this activity would not exceed [dollar amount not declassified].

b) Our Vietnam Station would spend up to [dollar amount not declassified] in order to recruit or infiltrate one or two persons into “Big” Minh’s entourage. This would be done for the purposes of obtaining intelligence information on Minh’s campaign activities, possibly as a basis for designing counter-activities in support of President Thieu’s campaign, and of having agents of influence close to Minh in case he should win the election.

8. The activities described in paragraphs 4 through 7 above would cost a total of [dollar amount not declassified]. Of this amount, the 40 Committee previously approved expenditure of [dollar amount not declassified] for Farmer-Worker Party organizational activity. The Vietnam Station has proposed, in addition, that [dollar amount not declassified] of the funds authorized for the NSDF be used for President Thieu’s contingency fund. Thus, if the 40 Committee were to approve our Vietnam Station’s proposals in full, additional funding approval in the amount of [dollar amount not declassified] would be required [dollar amount not declassified]. Funds in this amount are available within the CIA budget.

9. Although it is a part of President Thieu’s own campaign strategy to influence the Lower House elections in order to promote support for his own re-election, we would not want to reveal to him our support for specific Lower House candidates. First, our support to these candidates will be very limited, and if Thieu were knowledgeable of our support he might well deny these candidates his own financial support which many of them may require. Secondly, our support in several cases would go to opposition candidates for the purposes indicated previously, and Thieu obviously should not have knowledge of this activity. Thirdly, our long-range intention is to place agents in the Lower House who can influence legislation in support of U.S. objectives on a non-attributable basis, an influence which could be jeopardized if Thieu were aware of the U.S. connections of these assets.

10. The Vietnam Station would pass funds to Lower House candidates, or to the political parties, in increments sufficiently small to be covered by their overt sources of income. In all cases, the existence of adequate overt income sources would be assured before commitments were made. The Station would also assure itself that it would be in the self-interest of all recipients of funds not to reveal their source. In the event that any claims of CIA or U.S. support should be made public, we would expect to have the U.S. Embassy deny them. We would further expect that President Thieu would be given such strong personal assurance of U.S. support for his re-election that he would tend to discount any claim of U.S. support which might emanate from any oppositionist Lower House candidate.⁴

11. On 30 January 1971 Ambassador Bunker gave his approval to these proposals.

1. Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 40 Committee Meetings. Secret; Eyes Only. Coerr forwarded the memorandum to Johnson on February 4, and recommended that he ask at the 40 Committee meeting that day about the risks of press or Congressional detection of the covert assistance, the chances for South Vietnamese legislators if they were not given covert support, and the implications if the legislators whom the United States supported lost their elections. He also recommended that Johnson propose making approval contingent on developments in the next few weeks. On the back of the memorandum is the following undated note: “Karamessines now says: 1. CIA favors and will support in 40. 2. It is a relatively modest plan. 3. CIA believes it can maintain security.” In a February 3 memorandum to Kissinger, Chapin recommended that he ask for Helms’ and Johnson’s assessment of the prospects for the election and Minh’s chances, Helms’ and Packard’s view on how a GVN leadership change would affect current U.S. programs, Helms’ ideas on avoiding detection, everyone’s assessment of telegram 307 (Document 100), and the relative effectiveness of overt and covert actions. (National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, Subject Files, Vietnam, 14 Jan 1971–22 Dec 1971)
2. See Document 100.
3. See Document 14.
4. According to an unsigned memorandum for the record, October 22, the 40 Committee met on February 4 and approved the proposal, but since the Executive Secretary was not present no minutes of the meeting were taken. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 40 Committee Meetings)