Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

216. Minutes of a Meeting of the Senior Review Group¹

Washington, June 9, 1971, 3:33–4:42 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Vietnam Military Assessment

PARTICIPATION

• Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
• State
  • Mr. John N. Irwin ²
  • Mr. William Sullivan
  • Mr. Arthur Hartman
  • Mr. Joseph Wolf
• Defense
  • Mr. David Packard
  • Mr. Warren Nutter
  • Maj. Gen. Fred Karhos
  • Lt. Col. W. James Eddins
• JCS
  • Admiral Thomas H. Moorer
  • Brig. Gen. Adrian St. John
  • Rear Admiral Robert O. Welander
• CIA
  • Mr. Richard Helms
  • Mr. Paul Walsh
  • Mr. George Carver
• OMB
  • Mr. James Schlesinger
• NSC Staff
  • Col. Richard Kennedy
  • Mr. Wayne Smith
  • Mr. John Holdridge
  • Mr. Robert Sansom
  • Mr. W.R. Smyser
  • Mr. Keith Guthrie
  • Mr. Mark Wandler

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

1. Summary Analysis of 1972 Enemy Strategies. The SRG endorsed the conclusions of the June 7 summary paper (Summary Analysis of Probable 1972 Enemy Strategies and Alternative Measures to Cope with the Main Force Situation at 100,000 and 50,000 Mid-1972 U.S. Force Levels)³ with respect to the order of probability of enemy threats and the general need to strengthen friendly forces in MRs 1 and 2 to meet these threats.

2. Flow Chart on Force Deficits. Defense is to submit a flow chart showing how friendly force deficits in each military region are expected to evolve over the period between now and mid-1972.

3. RVNAF Improvements. Defense will provide by June 10 for Presidential consideration a plan specifying alternative measures that can be taken to improve RVNAF capability to cope with the threats set forth in the June 7 Summary Analysis.⁴

Dr. Kissinger: At the suggestion of the President, I’ve asked Attorney General Mitchell to sit in on these meetings until our Vietnam strategy is worked out.

Mr. Mitchell: I’m just sitting in. I’m not supposed to provide the strategy.

Mr. Packard: Why don’t we turn the whole thing over to him?

Dr. Kissinger: The primary purpose of this meeting is to see where we agree or disagree about the factual situation in South Vietnam and about the situation we will face next year. We also want to see what we have to do to fix some of the difficulties we will have if the worst case comes about, rather than the predicted case. I think the analytical work that has been done is extremely valuable. I understand that Mr. Walsh is prepared to brief us on the threat section. Col. Eddins, who I understand has done an outstanding job on the military region analysis, will tell us about that; and General St. John will talk about the RVNAF improvement alternatives. Mr. Walsh, do you want to move to the table? Can I assume that you and DIA are in accord now on your estimates?

Mr. Walsh: For the moment.

The threat section in the paper is basically the summation of work that has been done by this group during the last four weeks. We looked at the strategies that the enemy could choose in 1972, and we found that this would depend on two considerations: (1) Hanoi’s estimate of the impact of increased military activity on the political situation in South Vietnam and in the U.S., particularly in light of the upcoming elections in both countries, and (2) Hanoi’s consideration of its logistical and manpower capabilities—and the constraints on these capabilities. Hanoi will also have to give consideration to the control situation in South Vietnam and to the main force balance in South Vietnam and Cambodia during the next 12–18 months.

As a starting point, we’re confident that whatever happens in South Vietnam in 1972, there will be a significant increase in the level of combat.

Dr. Kissinger: Unless Clifford ends the war.

Mr. Walsh: By June, 1972, we consider that the U.S. ground force levels will have diminished to the point where Hanoi will be able to meet the South Vietnamese face to face.⁵ Hanoi will be able to mount an operation without risking significant U.S. ground action. Hanoi also sees time running out unless it does something to counter the Vietnamization program before the ARVN reaches full strength. Hanoi has also had a year to rebuild and expand its logistical system in Laos—as well as the experience of operating and defending the system. We feel that Hanoi has a new sense of confidence, resulting in part from the Lam Son 719 operation, where they were able to weather the ARVN’s attack without really hurting themselves. This is also indicated by the events of the last few weeks—for example, the activity around Snuol and Phnom Penh. As the U.S. elections approach, Hanoi is given an incentive to use its forces.

From a manpower point of view, Hanoi must pay a cost to execute higher level strategies than protracted warfare. We looked at this, trying to predict the effect U.S. withdrawals would have on the infiltration from the North. As you can see from the table on Page 3, we have estimated infiltration requirements from a low of 70,000 [protracted warfare] to a maximum of 175,000–210,000 [general offensive in RVN and Cambodia]. These figures incorporate enemy manpower requirements for Cambodia and Laos.

Mr. Mitchell: Are these figures through 1972?

Mr. Walsh: Yes. But it really is an annual requirement.

Dr. Kissinger: The 175,000 figure is for an offense in South Vietnam and Cambodia.

Mr. Walsh: Yes. With the lower U.S. force levels, there will be essentially no U.S. ground combat troops. We estimate, therefore, that there will be a decrease in the enemy casualties of about 30 percent. The figures take this into account, and we conclude that from the manpower point of view all of the enemy’s strategies become feasible in 1972.

Dr. Kissinger: What about from the logistical point of view?

Mr. Walsh: There’s some difference between our own analysis of the enemy’s logistical capabilities and the JCS study discussed at the last meeting.⁶ We both see eye to eye on Hanoi’s ability to mount offensives in MRs 1 or 2, but we differ on the timing. We think Hanoi can mount an offensive in MR 1 or MR 2 a little earlier than DIA does. But we both think these offensives could be launched by January 1972.

Dr. Kissinger: You mean in either MR 1 or MR 2?

Mr. Walsh: Yes. As for a simultaneous offensive in MR 1 and MR 2, we think they could do this in early 1972, but JCS thinks this would be marginal. We say that an MR 1/Cambodia offensive is feasible on logistics grounds, while the JCS says such an offensive is not feasible.

Dr. Kissinger: What about what’s going on in Cambodia now? Would you call that an offensive?

Mr. Walsh: This is the kind of thing we warned about in our earlier reports. The model we have constructed doesn’t fit the situation in Cambodia very well. The kind of enemy actions we have seen in Cambodia recently could be called hot high points. What is distressing is what these actions tell us about the relative capabilities of the [NVA and FANK] forces.

Dr. Kissinger: In the light of the West report,⁷ this is not surprising.

Mr. Walsh: Getting back to the briefing, I’d like to mention the control situation in South Vietnam. The GVN control position in MRs 3 and 4 is good enough to make Hanoi think two or three times about conducting an offensive there. The GVN control position in MRs 1 and 2 is not so good. If we see increased enemy offensive activity next year, it will likely be in MRs 1 and 2 because of the poor GVN control there and because of the proximity to North Vietnam. Out net judgment is that there will be further enemy offensive activity in 1972 in either MR 1 or MR 2, though it will perhaps come a little later in MR 2. The worst case would be a simultaneous offensive in MRs 1 and 2.

There are, however, two caveats which I would like to discuss right now. The first is that we feel in the present situation in Cambodia, the enemy has an on-going capability to escalate the military activity significantly any time and any place he wants to. We think that the supplies are there and that the infiltration is sufficient. The NVA could do a great deal of damage even without a major offensive.

The other caveat is that we have always tended to write off MR 3 [as a danger area] and perhaps we shouldn’t do so. It would not be too difficult for the NVA to redeploy back to MR 3. They could do this for two purposes—(1) to raise the level of activity in the MR or (2) to make it difficult for Saigon to redeploy the strategic reserve. Such a move on the part of the NVA would tie up crucial manpower for the GVN.

Dr. Kissinger: Before we get to possible solutions, does anyone disagree with this analysis?

Adm. Moorer: I believe it is about right in terms of capabilities, that is, the courses of action available to the enemy. I’d like to return for a moment to their logistical capability. I recently had a briefing from Gen. Clay on Commando Hunt 5. This covered all interdictions in Laos since October. It seems that last year was the most successful year we had regarding interdiction.

Dr. Kissinger: Are we sending more helicopter gunships out there?

Adm. Moorer: My point is that this shows the need for more gunship sorties. Our assumption [in these studies] is that the air support continues.

Regarding that incident northeast of Phnom Penh, I found out that the FANK aircraft never lost contact. There were 26 Cambodians killed against 87 North Vietnamese. It wasn’t the bad loss that it was first reported to be. I think this incident points out that the Cambodians must get off the roads and must stop letting the enemy come to them.

Mr. Carver: The analysis focused on the timing and danger of a major offensive between now and 1972. We shouldn’t forget that the enemy can nibble away at us anytime. Each incident can be small, but the total of all these incidents can be important. While we’re focussing on the dangers of an offensive, the enemy can cause trouble with many small incidents, not one of which is really dramatic. However, this could have an important cumulative effect on control in MR 3 and other areas.

Adm. Moorer: Gen. Abrams met on the 8th with President Thieu and told him how we felt about MRs 1 and 2. He mentioned that we thought we could get through the remainder of this year in MRs 1 and 2 with reinforcement as needed but that next year some redistribution of forces would have to be done.

Dr. Kissinger: Does everyone agree that this is the correct analysis of what we could be up against?

All agreed.

Adm. Moorer: It shows what could happen.

Dr. Kissinger: We have to protect against the worst. Let’s turn now to the military region analysis and to the various improvement alternatives.

Col. Eddins: The essential purpose of this analysis was to estimate for 1972 for 50,000 and 100,000 mid-1972 U.S. force level variants the possible friendly main force surpluses or deficits in each MR and countrywide. My remarks on the friendly forces are keyed to the table at the bottom of Page 17.⁸ I’d like to make two points that the table conveys, and then I’ll comment about what this means with respect to the control situation and earlier studies.

The table is rather busy. However, it shows two points. The first is that the projected friendly main force deficits in MRs 1 and 2 could under some conditions be offset by the surpluses in MRs 3 and 4. The second point is that the two variant U.S. force levels (50,000 and 100,000) have a relatively minor impact on the analysis. On the other hand, the desired MFR⁹ has a major impact.

We postulated that the most probable threat in 1972 would be a major offensive in MRs 1 and 2 and protracted warfare in MRs 3 and 4. We also postulated that the worst probable threat would be simultaneous offensives in MRs 1 and 2 and continued protracted warfare in MRs 3 and 4.

(Mr. Irwin joined the meeting at this point.)

The desired MFR was keyed to several factors including the historical relationship between MFR and GVN control data, RVNAF force quality and the area priority (e.g. MR 3 has priority because the capital is there; MR 4 because it is the food-producing area). As you can see, we come up with quite a big range for the surpluses and deficits in each case.

Dr. Kissinger: If we take the most probable case in MR 1, with 100,000 Americans, we have a deficit ranging from 20–58 battalions.

Col. Eddins: That’s right. If there are 50,000 Americans, the deficit range is 25–64 battalions. This gives us a large range of 50–70 battalions.

Dr. Kissinger: Can you define for us what you mean by the high and low MFR?

Col. Eddins: The high desired ratio affords the GVN a good chance of coping with a sustained enemy offensive in such a way that neither a serious control loss or major psychological defeat would ensue. It does not preclude temporary control losses, but these could be re-couped.

The low ratio means the GVN could avoid permanent control losses of serious proportions. However, the low ratio may not preclude the enemy from achieving a major psychological effect by temporarily occupying a principal city.

I might add that these deficits are used as indicators; they’re not to be taken literally. They show the relative problem, as in the worst case in MRs 1 and 2.

Dr. Kissinger: What is the worst case?

Col. Eddins: A simultaneous offensive in MRs 1 and 2.

Dr. Kissinger: In that case, and with 100,000 Americans, we would be short a minimum of 47 battalions in MR 2 and 42 battalions in MR 1. With 50,000 Americans, we would be short a minimum of 47 battalions in MR 1 and 52 battalions in MR 2.

Col. Eddins: Yes, but there’s only a difference of six battalions in these force levels.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand that. But Walsh considers—and everyone agrees—that the enemy would have the capability to undertake a simultaneous offensive in MRs 1 and 2 by no later than March. With those deficits, not even a military genius could win the battle.

Mr. Walsh: You must remember that these deficits may not arise until the middle of 1972.

Col. Eddins: That’s right.

Dr. Kissinger: I wonder if we could get a flow chart showing these deficits over the time period we’re talking about.

Col. Eddins: We can do that. I think it would be worthwhile. We could also show the deficits country-wide.

If you look at the midpoint of the estimates for the most probable case, there will be a countrywide deficit of 4 battalions, corresponding to a MFR of 2.1. In the worst case, there will be a deficit of 85 battalions, corresponding to a MFR of 1.6. 2.1 is roughly the same as the MFR in the first half of 1969, and 1.6 is a little less than 1968.

Mr. Sullivan: You haven’t taken into account the RF and PF forces.

Col. Eddins: We have.

Mr. Sullivan: The RF and PF do have an impact and they should be taken into account in these figures. What happens if you put in the RF in MR 3?

Col. Eddins: We’ve attempted to grind the impact of the RF and PF into the figures in the process of setting our desired MFRs. There are several factors to consider in regard to the RF and PF forces. They’ve increased in size, and gotten better equipment. They make a significant contribution to the main force war in MRs 1, 3 and 4. However, since the U.S. redeployment has begun, there has been a degradation in firepower and mobility. We don’t really know how to balance all this out.

Gen. Karhos: But you haven’t ground the RF and PF into the statistics. This is a strength-driven analysis.

Col. Eddins: Yes, it is. The only way the RF and PF were taken into account was in selecting the desired main force ratios.

Dr. Kissinger: The main force balance is going against us. According to your analysis, the MFRs [in mid-1972] will be less advantageous than in 1968.

Gen. Karhos: The ARVN had M–1s and carbines in 1968, but now they have M–16s. ARVN’s mobility and firepower have significantly increased.

Dr. Kissinger: That may be true of the mobility and firepower of ARVN. But mobility and firepower for the total [friendly] forces in Vietnam has probably decreased [since 1968].

Mr. Sansom: Our assumption was that the ARVN unit of today is as good as a U.S. unit—man for man—in 1968.

Mr. Sullivan: Except that today you are pitting them 2 to 1 against the enemy.

Mr. Sansom: We think it’s more accurate to make the comparison between this quarter and the last quarter of 1970 than between this quarter and 1968.

Mr. Irwin: What is the ratio between the ARVN and the NVA?

Mr. Sansom: It’s 2.1 [2 to 1].

Mr. Irwin: Would it be the same for U.S. forces?

Mr. Sansom: Yes. The table on page 14 of the study shows the MFRs as they actually existed [in the fourth quarter of 1970].¹⁰

Mr. Smith: The impact of the PF and RF is discussed on Page 12 of the study.

Col. Eddins: The ratio of the RF and PF to the type of units they are normally expected to cope with has increased four times since 1968, except in MR 4. We took this into account in selecting the desired MFRs.

A final point I would like to make is that control losses in both MRs 1 and 2, or in one or the other, are likely in the worst case, even if feasible force shifts are implemented. We can’t tell, however, if these losses will be temporary or secular. This does indicate that some of the fixes discussed in Section III of the paper will be helpful.

Dr. Kissinger: Does everyone agree with the military region analysis?

Gen. Karhos: We essentially agree, but I would like to underscore again the point that mobility and firepower are not measured in the analysis. This must be taken into consideration when deciding what fixes are needed.

Dr. Kissinger: How would you propose to do this?

Gen. Karhos: The ARVN units can move, and they do have good firepower. I don’t think that we can say that one unit is twice as good as in 1968.

Mr. Sansom: The issue is whether they have improved. The issue is whether the per man support to ARVN will be sufficient.

Dr. Kissinger: As I understand it, the [desired] MFRs are established on the basis of certain assumptions regarding what mobility and firepower are sufficient and desirable. If the ratios drop, there will be certain consequences unless there are compensating factors. If you say that a drop in MFRs will be made up by [increased] firepower and mobility, that argument I can understand. On the other hand, if you say that there will be a decline in MFRs, while firepower and mobility, as a result of U.S. withdrawals, are declining—or at least certainly not increasing, then I fail to see why we don’t have a problem. All the evidence I have seen indicates that firepower and mobility in mid-1972 will be less. What’s wrong with this analytical point?

Mr. Sullivan: In protracted warfare, combat is spread out and small scale. In the worst case, there is massing of forces and conventional contact. Presumably U.S. air power has a bearing on this. Has it been cranked into the study?

Dr. Kissinger: I think you’re not starting with the right assumption. You’re talking about warfare in a limited area. Whether we’re talking about the worst case, simultaneous offensive in MRs 1 and 2, or the most probable case, offensive in MR 1 alone, the combat intensity is the same. The difference is that there will be a greater area covered in the worst case. We still define a major offensive the same way. If that is so, then the only difference is that in one case U.S. air power will be used only in MR 1 while in the other, it will be used in both MRs 1 and 2.

Col. Eddins: Protracted warfare will take place in populated areas.

Dr. Kissinger: The desired MFRs are not measured against protracted warfare.

Mr. Sullivan: You used the fourth quarter of 1970 as the ratio, but this isn’t valid because the enemy didn’t have the capability to wage intensive warfare then.

Col. Eddins: That’s only for comparative purposes. The selection was based on the table on Page 11 comparing the historical MFRs and control data since 1968.¹¹ The selection of the desired MFR was based on the historical relation of MFR to control.

Mr. Sullivan: When there is a shift to intensive combat, is U.S. air power included in the MFR?

Mr. Sansom: It’s not specifically accounted for. We are in effect saying that it will be the same per battalion as in 1968.

Dr. Kissinger: In the first half of 1968, at the time of Tet, the MFR in MR 1 was 1.1 when there was a massive concentration of enemy forces. Now you’re talking of an MFR of 0.7 against the most probable threat during the first half of 1972, with 100,000 Americans.

Col. Eddins: That [ratio of 0.7] is without any force adjustments.

Dr. Kissinger: We have less air power today than we had in 1968. Isn’t that right?

Mr. Packard: No. As a matter of fact, we have an excess of close air support. However, there is a problem as regards interdiction.

Dr. Kissinger: Nevertheless, in the worst probable case for 1972, we face an MFR of 0.7, as against an MFR of 1.1 in 1968. We have to make one hell of an allowance for U.S. air power if we say it will be a compensating factor. I admit that when you compare protracted warfare against high points, air power is more effective against high points. But I find it hard to believe that the desired force ratios can be lower for a high point than for protracted warfare.

Mr. Packard: We all agree that there’s a deficit in MR 1. But the situation in all of Vietnam is not as bad as it was in the first half of 1968.

Col. Eddins: That’s correct. The [overall] MFR is about 2.1 now.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree that we’re better off, except in MR 1.

Mr. Packard: This points to the need for force shifts. It doesn’t say that the overall situation is bad. Of course, it doesn’t answer the question of comparing ARVN divisions against our divisions (in terms of firepower and mobility).

Dr. Kissinger: Firepower and mobility favor the American divisions, I suppose.

Col. Eddins: Primarily in helicopters and airlift capability, not particularly in artillery. The ARVN now have their own artillery.

Mr. Irwin: This leads in turn to the question of the composition of our 100,000 man force. How important is the proportion of support to combat personnel?

Dr. Kissinger: The Washington Post says we won’t have 100,000 men there.

Adm. Moorer: I have some figures here from Gen. Abrams’ plans.

Mr. Irwin: When I was out there [in Saigon] recently, I asked about the composition of the force. I was told 70% would be involved primarily in logistical retrograde. Offhand that seems like a lot.

Adm. Moorer: Between June and December, 796 helicopters will come out.

Dr. Kissinger: At U.S. force levels of either 50,000 or 100,000, the ratios in the worst case will be lower in MRs 1 and 2 and higher in MRs 3 and 4 than in 1968. I want to avoid moving out so fast that we invite another major offensive. We got creamed in 1968, or so the public thought. We all know we can’t stand another Tet next year. This is the problem we’re up against. The worst case, according to Mr. Walsh, is not impossible.

Mr. Packard: The problem is that we have to decide what we can do.

Dr. Kissinger: I’m trying to go at this step by step. If we all agree on the facts, then we can consider what we need to do.

Mr. Sullivan: I agree that the MFR is worse now than it was in 1968. But the PF and RF didn’t exist in 1968.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Col. Eddins) What is your answer?

Col. Eddins: We included the impact of the PF and RF judgmentally. That’s why we showed a range of possible deficits and desired force ratios. The low range may preclude significant control losses, but it may not preclude psychological losses. The high range, on the other hand, attempts to preclude both. There’s also a big range in the deficit in terms of battalions—50–70, at 80 percent strength. This is roughly equal to 27–35 U.S. battalions.

Mr. Walsh: We have done studies throwing in the RF and PF. There are a number of differences, but the trend is the same with either analysis.

Mr. Sullivan: There is no question that if we pull two U.S. divisions out, there would be an effect.

Gen. Karhos: His [Sansom’s] paper shows the variables involved and the trend. In that respect, it’s good.

Col. Eddins: We have to consider the loss of U.S. combat support elements. On the other hand, there have been compensating improvements: in the control statistics, in the quality and size of the RF and PF, and in the quality of ARVN weapons. We have tried to take these factors into account.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Gen. Karhos) You say the paper shows the trend? But is this trend still above the tolerable limit?

Gen. Karhos: The trend is correct. We still ask, though, how firepower was included. He says it was included.

Mr. Sansom: It was taken into consideration by saying that the ARVN unit of today is as good man for man as the U.S. unit of 1968.

Dr. Kissinger: He doesn’t have to show the change in the numerical value of the ratios because of improvements in firepower. If firepower is no worse, then we can proceed on the basis of the existing ratios.

Mr. Packard: It seems to me that the situation is not as good as we would like. We would like to have a better ratio. This analysis indicates that we’re close to a critical situation and that we better get on and do what has to be done.

Dr. Kissinger: Exactly. The worst thing we could do by doing too much would be to waste money.

Mr. Mitchell: (to Mr. Packard) Will our surplus of close air support occur now or in mid 1972?

Mr. Packard: I don’t have the figures. But I believe there would be a surplus almost anytime.

Adm. Moorer: Normally only 30 percent of our air resources goes for close air support. During the dry season, this goes up if there is a lot of military activity. During Lam Son, for example, we diverted some of the interdiction missions to close air support. In 1968, we were flying 28,000 sorties a month. Of course, at that time we were also bombing North Vietnam.

Mr. Packard: On the average, there isn’t a large percentage of sorties flown for close air support. We might be able to increase it. But we have to figure out some way to keep our surge capability. I think we can maintain adequate close air support. We are looking at the issue now. We should have some recommendations on this by the end of the month.

Dr. Kissinger: Shall we hear now from Gen. St. John?

Gen. St. John: I would like to give you a brief summary of Section III, the Alternative Improvements for RVNAF, but first I would like to say that we accept the analysis of Section II, which indicates the trend of the imbalance in MRs 1 and 2.

There are three general ways we can offset these imbalances: (1) qualitative improvement of existing forces; (2) redistribution of existing forces; (3) possible increases in the total force structure. These alternatives don’t imply that we do one or the other; in fact, all can be carried out in conjunction. The qualitative improvements have, I believe, already been discussed by the SRG. This includes such things as better pay, food supplement programs, dependent housing programs, and accelerated promotions. Perhaps instead of a general across-the-board pay increase, there could be a dislocation allowance for combat troops operating an extended distance from home bases. This may help cut down the desertion rate and it would be more manageable for the Vietnamese economy. Leadership has been a great problem area as the ARVN has expanded. We have several programs underway, and we keep pushing. The best program has proven to be one of giving the Vietnamese schooling, training and experience.

Logistics has been another significant area of concern to us. The Improvement and Modernization Program should enhance the capability of the RVNAF. We would like to see measures taken to increase the manning levels of ARVN battalions from the current 78 percent to 90 percent in mid-1972. The spaces are available to do this within the 1.1 million limit. We’re now accelerating from FY 73 to FY 72 the program to provide the equipment needed for a 1.1 million force level. We can also activate units that were not scheduled to be activated until 1973. The RF and PF play a large role, especially in protracted warfare. The GVN is reducing the strength of the PF platoon from 35 to 32 men, and the space savings will result in 200 additional platoons. I think that the redistribution of forces has also already been discussed here.

Dr. Kissinger: It’s essential in any event that the forces in MRs 1 and 2 be strengthened.

Gen. St. John: That’s right. A permanent redistribution of forces involves many problems. One way to shift forces is to move the general reserves, which consist of marines, airborne troops, and rangers. Another way to do it is to cut down some of the units in MRs 3 and 4, where we have a surplus, and put additional units in regions 1 and 2. Still another way is to form an additional division out of the 1st ARVN Division. This would, however, not be a total additional division. A second possibility, as discussed on Page 30, would be to form units from the Kontum area into 2 or 3 regiments, with combat support elements. Regarding expansion possibilities, the RVNAF could go to 1.2 million men, or some lesser order of magnitude. It’s debatable whether the manpower is available to do this. In any case, the major constraint against doing this would be the lack of leadership rather than the lack of manpower. We think that some redistribution of strength to MRs 1 and 2 is necessary. It’s important and desirable to get the GVN to go along with this.

Mr. Helms: Is there any way we can speed up strengthening the RVNAF?

Gen. St. John: We’re accelerating as fast as we can. The GVN should reach the 1.1 million force level in 1972.

Mr. Carver: The problem with this type of analysis [the analysis in the June 7 summary paper] is that redeployment is the quick and easy answer. We will have a problem with some of the ARVN force who do not want to be redeployed from MR 3 to MR 1. We should be able to get by in MR 1 by jacking up the forces and men already deployed there.

Gen. St. John: That’s the thrust of what we’re proposing. We want to move spaces, not necessarily men. In MR 2 we’re faced with the same quantitative problem.

Dr. Kissinger: We have seven months to go.

Mr. Packard: We can recommend several courses of action. There are two or three decisions we ought to make. (1) Do we all agree something has to be done in MRs 1 and 2? (2) Should we raise the RVNAF to 1.2 million men or leave it at 1.1 million? I personally think we should stabilize it at 1.1 million and concentrate on raising quality and manning levels. (3) Should we work to get stronger RVNAF leadership and other things Gen. St. John mentioned? This, I think, is the least that needs to be done. That leaves two other issues to which we should address ourselves: One is close air support. We will have some recommendations on this later in the month. The other is the ROK forces.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Sullivan) You owe us the ROK paper. It was due May 28.

Mr. Sullivan: We have the paper, but it hasn’t been signed by the Secretary. We have agreement within the Department and from Defense. If you wish, I can give it to you.¹²

Dr. Kissinger: What does the paper recommend?

Mr. Sullivan: We have several options. However, the consensus is that the Marine Brigade should go home. The two divisions should stay through CY 1972. We should agree to fund the two divisions up to January 1, 1973, but we shouldn’t pay more than we’re paying now. In 1973, if necessary, we should negotiate a new arrangement with the Koreans. We also will have to tell the Koreans about our plans for withdrawals from Korea in 1973.

Dr. Kissinger: Will the paper be coming over in a day or so?

Mr. Sullivan: Yes.

Adm. Moorer: We must talk with the Koreans about this.

Mr. Packard: We ought to have a decision before the Secretary leaves.

Dr. Kissinger: Which Secretary? There are so many of them traveling these days.

Mr. Packard: Laird.

Mr. Mitchell: (to Mr. Packard) What have you proposed to do about moving RVN forces?

Mr. Packard: We think we should leave that to Gen. Abrams.

Adm. Moorer: I don’t think we will have a serious problem moving them from MR to MR. Right now it takes 38 hours to move a division from MR 3 to MR 1. We will have 96 C–130s in Vietnam through 1972, and I think we’re relatively well taken care of in this respect. It’s an entirely different matter for helicopters used in assault operations. The ARVN will add 120, but we will go down from 940 to 300—mostly UH–1s. There are two problems: (1) going from one region to another and (2) tactical mobility. The first is not too difficult. The helicopter problem should be looked at closely. John, does that handle the first part of your question?

Mr. Mitchell: I take it there’s no constraint on taking forces out of MRs 3 and 4.

Dr. Kissinger: There is a time factor. If their forces are out of there very long, it gives the other side incentive to raise hell there.

(to Mr. Packard) Can you give us a paper in ten days? Give us your judgment on what is needed; relate the program to the need. We have to know whether the additional forces needed in MRs 1 and 2 should come out of MR 3 and or whether we should create and put in new units. I have no judgment on how to do this. The usual advice we get is that we shouldn’t move units because they would lose their effectiveness. We need this study by the end of next week so that the President can make a decision. That way we can have a program that can be carried out by the end of the year. I think the general ideas you have developed are good. We will be able to move with confidence.

Mr. Packard: We should just keep moving and not talk about it so much.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–112, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Situation Room of the White House. All brackets are in the original.
2. Not present at the beginning of the meeting. [Footnote in the original.]
3. Smith forwarded the paper to Kissinger under a June 8 covering memorandum. The paper is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–55, SRG Meetings, Vietnam Assessment 6–9–71.
4. In a June 15 memorandum to Irwin, Packard, Moorer, and Helms, Kissinger changed the due date to June 18 and noted that the SRG agreed “that the threat facing RVNAF at probable U.S. force levels in 1972 was serious and that measures should be taken now on an urgent basis to further strengthen RVNAF.” (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 19–8 US–CAMB)
5. In addition to the withdrawal of military personnel, the President wanted to reduce Defense Department and AID personnel in Vietnam, including foreign nationals. Kissinger informed Rogers and Laird in a June 3 memorandum that Nixon wanted a report by June 10 on such reductions. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 155, Vietnam Country Files, Viet June 1971) Irwin submitted an initial report on June 18. (Ibid.) Kissinger sent a memorandum to Irwin on September 10, authorizing the following ceilings: AID direct hire and PASA—633; CORDS and AID civilian—590; and CORDS military—2,028. (Ibid., Box 157, Vietnam Country Files, Viet Sept 1971)
6. See Document 204.
7. See footnote 5, Document 212.
8. The chart lists the amount of RVNAF forces and battalions that would be needed to compensate for the deficits that would be created in MR 1 and MR 2 if the United States reduced its forces to either 100,000 or 50,000 troops.
9. Main Force Ratio, the ratio used in the study of “friendly to enemy main force combat strength.”
10. According to the table, the friendly to enemy ratio—that is, the South Vietnamese main force personnel in relation to North Vietnamese and Viet Cong main force personnel—in MR 1 was 2.7 to 1; in MR 2, 2.8 to 1; in MR 3, 3.9 to 1, excluding 8,700 troops in the strategic reserve and operating in Cambodia; and in MR 4, 2.4 to 1, excluding 2,800 troops operating in Cambodia. In South Vietnam as a whole the ratio was 3 to 1.
11. The table illustrates the gains in the ability of the South Vietnamese to control the countryside in MR 1 in spite of a low MFR; the MFR in MR 2 always exceeded the average for the country and MR 3 and MR 4 had the biggest gains in MFR from the enemy being able to move into Cambodia.
12. Rogers forwarded the paper to Nixon under a June 17 covering memorandum and Kissinger issued NSDM 113 on June 23, ordering U.S. support of two ROK divisions in South Vietnam through CY 1972, a review of the situation after the 1971–1972 dry season, three-way negotiations on support costs, no increase in U.S. support over FY 1972 estimates, discussions with the ROK to improve its combat performance, and no linkage between ROK force levels in Vietnam and possible U.S. redeployments from the ROK. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972, Document 95, footnote 2, and Document 96.