Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

204. Minutes of a Meeting of the Senior Review Group¹

Washington, May 24, 1971, 3:09–4:27 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Vietnam Military Assessment

PARTICIPATION

• Chairman—Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
• State
  • Mr. U. Alexis Johnson
  • Mr. Charles Whitehouse
  • Mr. Rodger Digilio
• Defense
  • Mr. David Packard
  • Mr. Armistead Selden
  • Maj. Gen. Fred Karhos
  • Lt. Gen. Donald V. Bennett
  • Mr. George C. Fowler
• CIA
  • Mr. Richard Helms
  • Mr. Paul Walsh
  • Mr. George Carver
• JCS
  • Gen. William C. Westmoreland
  • Brig. Gen. Adrian St. John
• OMB
  • Mr. James Schlesinger
• NSC Staff
  • Mr. K. Wayne Smith
  • Mr. Robert Sansom
  • Mr. John D. Negroponte
  • Mr. W.R. Smyser
  • Mr. Morris F. Edmundson
  • Mr. Keith Guthrie
  • Mr. Mark Wandler

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

1. Outlook for 1971–72. It was the consensus of the SRG that there were no manpower constraints on the enemy’s choice of strategies in 1971–72 and that the JCS evaluation of the order of probability of various enemy strategies was correct.

2. Further Study Requirements. The assessment of the military situation in 1971–72 is to be completed in time to have the issues presented to the President for decision no later than mid-June. For this purpose, the following papers are to be completed by June 4:

a. Summary Situation Estimate. Based on the analysis contained in the studies submitted by CIA, JCS, and OSD,² the VSSG Working Group will prepare a summary estimate setting forth the best, most, and worst probable situations and outlining the implications of each, particularly as regards U.S. and allied force levels, requirements for U.S. air and logistical support, and RVNAF capabilities. In connection with this estimate, two models for the reduction of U.S. forces should be provided covering (1) a program that would permit a smooth logistical phasedown and (2) a program that would maximize friendly capability to deal with the worst probable case.

b. ARVN Force Improvements. The VSSG Working Group will also develop alternative RVNAF force improvement programs applicable to the best, most, and worst probable cases set forth in the summary situation estimate referred to in sub-paragraph a.

c. Air Interdiction Study. As confirmed by Mr. Packard at the SRG meeting, the Defense Department will provide a study of air interdiction options as requested in Dr. Kissinger’s memoranda of April 15 and 28.

d. Ground Interdiction Plan. Defense will provide a plan for possible ground interdiction operations in Laos.

e. Options on ROK Forces. Based on the analysis completed under the auspices of the Vietnam Ad Hoc Group, an options paper will be prepared for the President setting forth the basic alternatives for employment of Korean forces in Vietnam: (1) phase-out along with U.S. forces, (2) maintaining ROK forces through 1972, with phase-out in 1973, and (3) establishment of a mobile task force, with possible phase-out of ROK forces not required for the task force.

Dr. Kissinger: I thought we should bring to focus our strategic assessments, lest we end up by having the most brilliant study ever made after the Vietnam war is ended. Perhaps we could begin with a short briefing by the JCS on their assessment.

Gen. St. John: What I plan to do is give you a quick overview of our assessment. Our objective was to develop friendly capabilities and to focus on the probable outcomes in accordance with the requirements you set forth at the April 27 SRG meeting.³ Annex A deals with enemy capabilities, and Annex B with friendly capabilities. These annexes are followed by a summary which gives the issues and our conclusions.⁴

Let me review the basic assumptions: (1) U.S. redeployment will continue in accordance with the President’s latest directive, which specifies that troop levels will be down to 184,000 by December 1, 1971.⁵ (2) We have considered that with 150,000 troops in mid-1972, U.S. forces would decline thereafter to a MAAG-level by June 30, 1973, that with 100,000 troops in mid-1972 they would decline thereafter to a MAAG level by December 31, 1972, and that with 50,000 troops in mid-1972 they would remain thereafter at that level, which is essentially that of a MAAG.

Mr. Johnson: Does the 50,000 include personnel sufficient to continue air sorties at the present level?

Mr. Packard: That’s 50,000 in-country.

Gen. St. John: We would continue the air sorties at the present level. There would be at least 1,000 B–52 and 10,000 tactical air sorties per month in CY 72. Of course, some support is provided by units stationed outside Vietnam, for example, in Thailand.

Dr. Kissinger: I thought we were talking about FY 72.

Gen. St. John: We received a correction from your staff changing FY to CY. We followed that directive.

Dr. Kissinger: My staff? Who did it? May I find out?

Gen. St. John: We received a copy of a message from the Staff Secretary saying that it should be changed to CY.

Mr. Smith: I got a copy the same as everyone else.

Dr. Kissinger: I never heard of it.

Gen. St. John: To continue with the assumptions, we also postulated that one ROK division would be withdrawn by June 30, 1972. We concluded that manpower does not place any limits on the enemy’s options. The major constraint on the enemy is the amount of throughput he can deliver to combat areas.

Mr. Schlesinger: You say the enemy is facing no quantitative limitation, but is the quality of enemy manpower holding up?

Gen. St. John: Yes, it is.

Dr. Kissinger: Just to make clear on sortie rates, I want to point out that the issue is between FY 73 and CY 72.⁶

Gen. St. John: As I was saying, one ROK division would be pulled out during the period we are discussing.

As for enemy capability, manpower would not be a limiting factor in the case of a major offensive. We define a major offensive as the equivalent of having 9–15 battalions in contact with the enemy for 5–10 days.

Dr. Kissinger: Do you mean that after 5–10 days they would have to quit?

Gen. St. John: Yes, but this can be expressed in different ways—45 to 150 battalion days of operation, not 10 days per se. It’s also possible to have 2–3 divisions in operation for 30 days, with each battalion in contact for one day out of six.

Dr. Kissinger: How would you have described the Tet offensive in these terms? What would have been the Tet figure in battalion days?

Gen. Bennett: Tet was a little below this level.

Gen. St. John: I believe they had more battalions [for Tet].

Gen. Westmoreland: (to Gen. Bennett) I would question what you just said, Don.

Gen. Bennett: I’ll have to go back through the data and look it up.

Mr. Packard: It depends on how you average it out. For example, you can have more battalions concentrated in a shorter number of days.

Gen. St. John: You have to realize that there are certain imponderables which may affect enemy logistical capabilities as well as the probable likelihood that the enemy would undertake certain strategies. For example, he might decide to sustain major losses in an MR 1 offensive in order to discredit the GVN and the Vietnamization program. As another illustration of what I mean, it is also possible that he would continue military activity at present levels. The idea would be to hold off until U.S. forces go down to a minimum level and to build up stock piles.

Throughout we have based our assessment on certain general considerations concerning friendly capabilities. We have assumed that normal use would be made of the GVN reserve and that they would be moved if necessary to reinforce threatened areas. We have also assumed that there would be some permanent redeployment of GVN forces either to deal with the protracted warfare situation or to improve control in any MR where this might be needed. For instance, there might be some permanent redeployment in MR 1 or MR 2. We also considered that the ROK forces might be moved either permanently or temporarily. This is not a major factor, and we have another paper which addresses this question. However, we generally concluded that the quid pro quo that would probably be required would make this an unreasonable course of action. We also took into account cross-border operations, that is, air and ground interdiction of enemy logistical activities in Cambodia and Laos.

Dr. Kissinger: But aren’t you assuming there won’t be substantial South Vietnamese forces in Cambodia and Laos next year?

Gen. St. John: We feel there should be substantial South Vietnamese forces in Cambodia and Laos next year.

Dr. Kissinger: But that isn’t OSD’s view.

Mr. Smith: As our force levels decline, so does our support for big South Vietnamese operations such as Lamson. The ARVN has no capacity to launch operations like that.

Gen. St. John: We have assumed that U.S. support would be available.

To return to the considerations regarding friendly forces that I was speaking about before, there could be some acceleration of the RVNAF improvement and modernization program. The OSD paper also covers this. I believe our analysis is consistent with what OSD said. There are certain non-military factors that could offset these considerations: adverse election results, weakening of South Vietnamese will to continue, economic or other factors and the withdrawal of U.S. support. We have set forth our conclusions regarding the enemy’s capabilities in the form of a chart which parallels that which was presented by CIA at the last SRG meeting.⁷ We believe that the enemy can continue protracted warfare throughout the period under discussion. Our definition of protracted warfare includes surges and high points, possibly one in Cambodia that would be sufficient to create a crisis there. In terms of logistical capabilities, the enemy could mount a MR 1 offensive by October 1971. However, we believe he would probably delay until late 1971 or early 1972 because of weather conditions. I believe this is generally in agreement with CIA’s estimate.

Dr. Kissinger: Is your analysis affected in any way by the fact that the enemy is apparently keeping supplies moving through the rainy season?

Gen. Bennett: The study was based on the assumption that they were not closing down the supply system during the rainy season.

Gen. St. John: Our estimate for an offensive in MR 2 is similar to that in MR 1. The enemy has the capability to mount such an offensive by January 72. We believe that the enemy capability to launch offensives simultaneously in MR 1 and MR 2 or in Cambodia is marginal. By this we mean that such offensives would be possible only at the highpoint of his capabilities. He would have to have considerable success in getting his supplies into the combat areas. For example, he would have to have good luck and good weather conditions.

We have concluded that the enemy does not enjoy the capability to mount simultaneous offensives in MR 1 and Cambodia or in the whole of Vietnam and Cambodia.

Dr. Kissinger: If I get back to Harvard by the spring of 72, I have a fighting chance of making it—and letting Alex take the responsibility.

Gen. St. John: To conclude, we believe that by using their reserves (and we believe that we will need to begin visualizing some redistribution of RVN forces), the Vietnamese can hack it through CY 72. We consider the most likely enemy strategy will be protracted warfare with surges and high points in selected areas. MR 1 is the high-threat area. We are also concerned about Cambodia. Because of the FANK’s lack of capability, the enemy could cause a serious military crisis in this area. This would be especially serious if a crisis were combined with an ARVN withdrawal or some political difficulties. We don’t necessarily foresee it, but we are concerned.

Mr. Johnson: Would an ARVN offensive in southern Laos alter the likelihood of the enemy’s being able to provoke a crisis in Cambodia?

Gen. St. John: It would not at this time change our assessment. Depending on what we do, particularly as regards air interdiction, as we approach CY 73, the enemy’s capability to undertake some of these strategies may shift from marginal to feasible.

Dr. Kissinger: When you say a strategy is feasible, does that mean it will succeed?

Gen. St. John: No. It means the enemy has the capability of launching an operation of that size. Then we look to see what we can do, to see if we have enough to meet such an operation. We have concluded that for this CY we can meet an offensive in MR 1.

Mr. Packard: This means they can handle the military situation. It gives no assessment of what effect enemy action will have on the pacification effort.

Dr. Kissinger: But this is the easiest enemy strategy.

Mr. Packard: Yes. (to Gen. St. John) You haven’t made an assessment of the impact of protracted warfare.

Gen. St. John: Yes, we have. There would be some disruption, but it would not cause the fall of the ARVN.

Mr. Packard: Not enough to cause a change in the rate of withdrawal.

Mr. Johnson: How does the U.S. redeployment rate change the estimate?

Gen. St. John: It doesn’t make a tremendous amount of difference. As you get to the lower residual force levels, you necessarily have a lot of your men tied up in support activities, for example, logistical retrograde.

Dr. Kissinger: You mean the last people pulled out will be the processing clerks?

Mr. Packard: We have to salvage something.

Gen. St. John: In planning the withdrawal, there is a real problem in balancing the advisory, security and processing personnel.

Dr. Kissinger: Everyone agrees, then, that there is no manpower constraint on the enemy’s choice of strategies. Isn’t that right?

As I understand it, there is no logistical constraint on an offensive in MR 1. If that is true, then what keeps them from launching simultaneous offensives in MR 1 and 2?

Gen. Bennett: There are logistical restraints in MR 1 until the end of the rainy season. But in order to continue the present level of activities, they would have to move in more reinforcements and supplies. This is not a logical course of action.

Dr. Kissinger: I’m not challenging this. I just want to understand your analysis. You say they can’t mount an offensive in MR 1 until December and that they can’t mount an offensive in MR 2 until February, but that they can’t do both simultaneously until May. Why is this so?

Mr. Packard: That’s a marginal strategy.

Gen. Bennett: They need additional supplies in both areas.

Dr. Kissinger: You mean that 9–15 battalions will be operating in each MR?

Gen. Bennett: Yes.

Gen. St. John: We might as well lay on the table one difference between CIA and us. We are less optimistic about enemy logistical capability than CIA. We take the view that he has less logistical capability than CIA estimates.

Dr. Kissinger: It’s so unusual in this room that I see you disagree. What does CIA think?

Mr. Walsh: We give them more logistical capability. We think the DIA analysis is very restrained with regard to enemy capabilities.

Dr. Kissinger: What figures would you put on it?

Mr. Walsh: In Cases 1 and 2, our estimates are in line with DIA’s. In the other cases we give them the capability to launch an offensive 2–3 months earlier than DIA. In Case 6, we give the enemy the capability at the end of the dry season, and DIA gives him none. We agree in Case 7.

Dr. Kissinger: Why do you all put Cambodia so late?

Gen. St. John: Because of the throughput requirement and the distance the supplies have to be moved.

Dr. Kissinger: How much do they need in order to take on the FANK?

Gen. St. John: We assumed that ARVN remains in Cambodia.

Mr. Walsh: We put Cambodia in the middle of the dry season. You ought to remember that they had large stockpiles in Cambodia. Cambodia is an anomaly. We believe the model doesn’t work perfectly because of uncertainties about the stockpiles down there. We think the date for achieving an offensive capability should be earlier.

Gen. Bennett: We differ with CIA on the size of the stockpiles, on the residual supplies from Sihanoukville and on the amount they can get through to Cambodia.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me raise one important question about probable outcomes. As I understand it, we will be short 44 battalions at the low level of U.S. troop withdrawals. That is about 26,500 troops.

Mr. Smith: That’s in the OSD table.

Dr. Kissinger: Everyone ought to agree on the facts. I don’t believe OSD has any independent means of determining them.

Gen. St. John: We all agree, give or take a battalion or so, with regard to the basic force ratios. But the arithmetic doesn’t take into account the quality of the troops—such things as leadership and training.

Dr. Kissinger: I don’t care about the exact numbers. You say that the most probable strategy is protracted warfare. If they have the force levels you cite, why is it that the most likely strategy is an MR 1 offensive?

Gen. St. John: Because we have the capability to move the general reserve into the region.

Mr. Packard: That judgment is more than a purely military evaluation. From a strictly military standpoint, it is easier for them to concentrate everything in MR 1; and MR 2 would be an easier target than MR 1. When we say an offensive in MR 1 is not probable, we are basing our conclusion on other than military factors.

Dr. Kissinger: If they carry out any of these other strategies, would they be doing so at the cost of reducing the intensity of protracted warfare? As I understand, they don’t have to choose between Case 1 [protracted warfare] and the others.

Gen. St. John: That’s right.

Dr. Kissinger: Why do you believe that the most probable strategy is Case 1 as opposed to some of the others?

Gen. St. John: They would probably want to husband their resources. If they shoot their wad earlier, they would perhaps suffer later because of our own capabilities.

Dr. Kissinger: You have pointed out that our capabilities are not great at that [the projected residual U.S. force] level.

Gen. St. John: When we talk about capabilities, we are talking about all friendly forces. This includes ARVN. Our estimate, of course, doesn’t preclude periodic high points.

Dr. Kissinger: But they wouldn’t be shooting their wad with an MR 1 offensive or even a combined MR 1/MR 2 offensive.

Mr. Walsh: I think that’s right.

Gen. Bennett: They have the capability from the standpoint of logistics and personnel to carry out Case 1 [protracted warfare] starting in the October–December 1971 period. They could initiate a high level of activity in MR 1 or MR 2 right after January 1972. Furthermore, they have the capability to carry out protracted war along with one of the other strategies.

Dr. Kissinger: Can they do this without sacrificing their offensive capability in 1973?

Gen. Bennett: Yes, sir.

Gen. Westmoreland: It would water down their 1973 capability somewhat.

Dr. Kissinger: Then the basic decision for the enemy is between protracted war, which we know we can handle, and taking on the additional logistical burden necessary to support one of the other strategies. If they made the extra effort, they could possibly hurt South Vietnamese morale and have a significant effect on our elections. Protracted warfare is the case least likely to affect U.S. opinion; whereas, some splash of enemy military activity would be the thing most likely to have an impact. They might want to try to influence U.S. opinion before 1973.

Gen. St. John: We put protracted warfare first [as probable enemy course of action] but we don’t put an offensive in MR 1 far behind. I realize that may sound like we are weaseling.

Dr. Kissinger: I don’t want to go through every paper. Are there any significant disagreements with the JCS paper? I know that OSD feels that the ARVN forces won’t be in Cambodia next year.

Gen. Karhos and Mr. Packard: I don’t think that is so.

Dr. Kissinger: Is there any disagreement with the JCS analysis?

Mr. Packard: There are two things I should mention. We think that the estimate of enemy capabilities may be a little conservative. As for the necessity to maintain air sortie levels, we prefer to look at this question in terms of capabilities rather than fixed levels.

Dr. Kissinger: What do you mean by capabilities?

Mr. Packard: Let me show you a picture. (Shows Dr. Kissinger a photograph of an area bombed by B–52s.) This shows a block in the Laotian Panhandle before and after being bombed by B–52s. It looks as though the bombing was not very effective. We ought to concentrate on effectiveness as regards our air effort.

Dr. Kissinger: We asked for an air interdiction study, which we have never gotten. In the absence of a study, there is a natural interest in hanging on to what we have.

If we can step up our bombing efficiency, I have no disposition to oppose such steps. Can we get the air interdiction study?

Mr. Packard: We are looking at various ways to improve our capabilities. We have done what we can to provide the South Vietnamese an air capability.

Dr. Kissinger: Does anyone disagree with this [the JCS] analysis?

Mr. Johnson: I have no reason to question it.

Gen. Westmoreland: I think that it has some weaknesses. It is quite obvious that MR 1 is the problem area, but I don’t think the answer is to move the general reserve up there. This would be costly and time-consuming. We do indeed have to be prepared for enemy surges, but what is needed is more troops permanently on the ground. Time is of the essence if we are to do something along this line. We have to do it while the U.S. troops are there. We expected to set up something before now, but nothing was done. The answer is to send in cadres by taking the fourth battalions from the three divisions in MR 3 and the three in MR 4.

Mr. Johnson: Do you have the manpower there [in MR 1]?

Gen. Westmoreland: Some is there, and some will probably have to be recruited. There are a lot of RF and PF troops that can be recruited. More troops can be supported in MR 1.

Mr. Johnson: How much help is it to trade RF and PF units for ARVN units?

Gen. Westmoreland: We need both. It might be necessary to lower the minimum age to 15, but that has been done before. It is absolutely essential to have more strength on the ground.

A second comment I have is that there is a tendency to write off the ROK forces. On pacification, we can anticipate some fraying around the edges, but this will not necessarily be disastrous. We need to look at logistical support for additional forces in the North. That is something that has to be addressed and planned for. I am not sure sufficient attention has been given to it.

Dr. Kissinger: I take it no one assumes there will be an attack across the DMZ.

Gen. Westmoreland: (to Gen. Bennett) You don’t rule that out, do you?

Gen. Bennett: No, we don’t.

Mr. Packard: What you are thinking about [as regards increasing South Vietnamese forces in the North] is making trade-offs with forces in the South.

Gen. Westmoreland: Yes. I don’t think that South Vietnam can support an army larger than 1,100,000.

Mr. Johnson: At a U.S. force level of 50,000, would the fixed-wing and chopper capability be available to support the ARVN forces? If this support is reduced, are we not overestimating ARVN capabilities?

Mr. Packard: You are going to have substantially less chopper support.

Gen. St. John: We calculated through CY 72 and deemed the airlift that would be available adequate. 1973 is another matter. There will be decreases in airlift and even less chopper support.

Mr. Johnson: What about choppers for troop lift?

Gen. Karhos: The ARVN has about 500. Our force is considerably larger.

Gen. Westmoreland: They are going to have to use more trucks and APCs.

Mr. Packard: We have about 5,000 helicopters.

Mr. Johnson: And they will be left with 500?

Dr. Kissinger: When will this be?

Gen. Karhos: I have that figure. Next year, the South Vietnamese will have 864 helicopters. If you take out 364 on the basis of attrition and floats, that leaves 500.

Dr. Kissinger: As against 5,000 now. In that case, how do we get the strategic reserve to I Corps?

Gen. Karhos: There are other aircraft available.

Gen. Westmoreland: For now, U.S. airlift is available, including C–141s. Later they will be able to use their own air force, which has C–123s and C–119s.

Gen. St. John: The table on Page B–7 [of the JCS paper] explains the situation.

Dr. Kissinger: Can we see what the helicopter, tactical air, and close air capabilities will be at the 50,000 [residual U.S. force] level?

Gen. St. John: Based on current plans, it would be as indicated in Table B–7.

Mr. Packard: We would still have about 50 C–130s. That would be adequate.

Mr. Johnson: As far as choppers are concerned, we are actually going to reduce South Vietnamese capabilities.

Dr. Kissinger: Why are we so determined to reduce choppers?

Gen. Westmoreland: Gen. Abrams has held back as many as he thought he could afford.

Mr. Packard: This table is not complete. The total number of some types of aircraft is still undetermined until we decide what we think our force structure will be.

Gen. Karhos: I think the helicopters would be among the last things to be taken out.

Dr. Kissinger: Another table [Table 3 to Tab D to Annex B] in your paper shows that helicopters will be dropping fairly quickly. They will go from a total of 50 [U.S. and VNAF] squadrons to 17, if U.S. forces are cut to the 50,000 level; and at that level only one of the squadrons will be American. The table also shows a decline in U.S. squadrons from 36 to 31 to 25 at the next two increments [force levels of 184,000 and 150,000] in troop withdrawals. For the succeeding increment [150,000 to 100,000] U.S. helicopter squadrons will drop from 25 to 12. I would rather sacrifice a few cataloguers and lose some equipment.

Gen. Westmoreland: There has been some correspondence with MACV on this.

Gen. St. John: We’re just trying to balance off our competing requirements.

Dr. Kissinger: The President’s objective is to hold the situation together and not to have the most beautiful logistical plan of which history informs us.

Gen. St. John: We have instructions to get at least $21 billion worth of equipment out of the country.

Dr. Kissinger: Whose instructions are those? If the situation comes unstuck, we will lose a lot more than equipment.

Gen. Westmoreland: I sent a message to MACV on this a couple of months ago. Maybe we should review the matter again.

Dr. Kissinger: Assuming there is no further discussion on the basic assessment, I think what we need is an analysis of the worst case and the probable case. It is the worst case that is going to kill us. Of course, it should be a realistic worst case, and not a nightmare situation. We should have two models for reduction of U.S. forces. One should provide for a smooth logistical phasedown. The other should be designed to enable us to be in the best position to meet the worst case. The price we would pay if there is a collapse would be out of all proportion to any supply losses that may occur.

We have to get this wrapped up by the end of the next week. We don’t want this to be a RAND type of study that never gets used. (to Mr. Smith) Could you have your working group pull together all of these studies and do an analysis of the worst and probable cases? We need to present this in a form so that the President can make a decision. The study should tell the President; “If you want to get down to a U.S. force level of 50,000, this is the way to do it. If you want to minimize the risk [of a collapse in Vietnam], this is the course of action to follow.”

(to Mr. Packard) You were at the meeting where the President said that he wanted to keep the helicopters there.⁸

Mr. Packard: I think we can work out various ways to get down to a level of 50,000.

Dr. Kissinger: Let’s get this done by next week in the form of choices for the President. Otherwise it will be too late.

Gen. Westmoreland: I would like to make the point that we need the air sorties. The picture that Dave Packard showed you may give a false impression. Normally we don’t use B–52s in this role. They aren’t good for saturation bombing of roads, but we have to hit such targets as truck parks.

Mr. Packard: That is what you say you do, but that is not what the pictures show. I am not against B–52s. But if people see we are using them this way, they will send us to the closest nuthouse. Let’s use them for the right kind of targets.

Mr. Schlesinger: (to Gen. Westmoreland) You mentioned that the Vietnamese can’t go above a level of 1.1 million for their armed forces. In your judgement, if the economic resources could be found, could the Vietnamese forces be expanded?

Gen. Westmoreland: I am not a student of the Vietnamese economic situation. I used to be, but I have been away from it for a long time. I believe that there is an economic restraint [on the size of the armed forces], but in my opinion they have exceeded their manpower capabilities.

Mr. Schlesinger: If we could find another $100 million for security assistance, would that affect your judgment?

Gen. Westmoreland: I was talking about a trade-off involving about 15,000 men.

Mr. Packard: I think the number could be higher. We have a problem about whether we can get the resources to support them, and also whether they can support themselves. This all adds up to taking a look at improving capabilities.

Dr. Kissinger: We also need to consider alternative ways of meeting the various shortfalls. To rely on the strategic reserve while cutting mobility is dangerous.

(to Mr. Packard) Are we getting that air interdiction study?

Mr. Packard: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: Our previous studies showed that the various outcomes were extremely sensitive to threats against the supply lines in Laos. We asked for plans to maintain a threat against the supply lines and thereby tie down enemy forces. Again, if I understand correctly, the sensitivity of the whole logistical scheme to a Lam Son type operation is enormous.

Gen. St. John: That’s right.

Dr. Kissinger: But we didn’t receive a plan for interdiction operations in Laos. Can we get that from whoever prepares such things?

I understand that there is a group just back from Cambodia, and that their report shows that we have one year to fix the situation in Cambodia. What is the status of all of this?

Mr. Smith: The team is back, and they have submitted their report to Secretary Laird.

Dr. Kissinger: When will we see it?

Gen. Karhos: It is due to you by June 1.

Dr. Kissinger: Okay. We will take a look at it when it gets here.⁹ This gets us to the question of the ROK forces.

Incidentally, I am assuming that we will have alternative RVNAF improvement packages to go with these [worst and probable cases].

Mr. Schlesinger: Let me mention that we have $100 million in the AID budget which we can’t squeeze into Vietnam. Thus, there are funds available there for development of additional forces.

Gen. Karhos: AID just told us we couldn’t have $16 million for the Vietnamese police.

Dr. Kissinger: It is lucky you can’t get a C–5A for that price.

Mr. Helms: By all means let’s help out the police.

Gen. Westmoreland: Beefing up the police would help offset the battalions deactivated in MRs 3 and 4.

Dr. Kissinger: I have every confidence in the ability of this group to spend $100 million.

With regard to the ROK forces, we have two issues: their deployment in Vietnam and the timing of their redeployment from Vietnam. Given the manpower problem, I believe we shouldn’t stress getting these forces out of Vietnam even if they don’t fight well. (to Gen. Westmoreland) What do you think?

Gen. Westmoreland: I am afraid the time has passed for moving them to the DMZ area. I think we ought to go to the ROKs and say that we want an elite, mobile task force of about 8,000–12,000 men to operate along the coast in MR 2 and that we will give them modern equipment. The force could be used in the highlands. It would be understood that when needed, they would move.

Dr. Kissinger: Would you ship back all the rest of the Koreans?

Gen. Westmoreland: The [the remaining Korean] capability would be even less than now.

Mr. Johnson: This is a completely new alternative.

Dr. Kissinger: As I understand it, the force ratios in MR 2 are already precarious. How is it possible to remove the ROKs?

Gen. Westmoreland: I think it would be best to have the force there.

Dr. Kissinger: Why does MACV want them out? For elegance of redeployment planning? That is a G–4’s way of looking at things.

Gen. Westmoreland: Once our forces are out, the Koreans can’t be supported in the manner to which they are accustomed.

Mr. Packard: The point is that they are not very effective and it would be best to redeploy them as we go.

Dr. Kissinger: The point is that they are doing something. Why live so dangerously? We are going down to 50,000, and we pull out the Koreans. How many ROKs are there?

Gen. Bennett: 45,000 to 47,000.

Dr. Kissinger: Where in God’s name are the South Vietnamese going to get the forces to replace them? Isn’t it doubly effective to keep them in MR 2?

Mr. Packard: They are not effective where they are.

Dr. Kissinger: They are covering two provinces.

Mr. Johnson: Thieu is anxious that they remain. Why—whether for political or military reasons—I don’t know.

Gen. Westmoreland: I don’t know why we should be in a hurry to move them. The alternative is the course of action I mentioned.

Dr. Kissinger: That is your second choice?

Gen. Westmoreland: My first choice would be to do both—that is, maintain the full strength of the Korean force and also create a mobile force.

Dr. Kissinger: How much more [than just having a mobile force] would that cost?

Gen. Westmoreland: It would cost. But it is too late to do that.

Mr. Johnson: Why?

Gen. Westmoreland: It is too late politically. We can’t sell such a proposal without paying a high price.

Mr. Johnson: We haven’t tested the waters yet. I think there is a connection between U.S. forces in Korea and maintaining Korean forces in Vietnam. If we reach a decision to keep the Koreans (and I am sympathetic to that), I think we will have to agree to maintaining U.S. forces in Korea through 1973.

Dr. Kissinger: If an enemy offensive has an adverse psychological impact on the South Vietnamese, and if this is all combined with a simultaneous withdrawal of all outside forces, the results could be catastrophic. We ought to get a paper for the President so that he can make a choice. We should pose the three alternatives: (1) moving the Koreans out along with our forces, (2) keeping the Koreans through 1972 and phasing them out in 1973 (this is what the GVN and Bunker endorse), and (3) Westy’s [Gen. Westmoreland’s] alternative of a phase-out plus constitution of a special task force.

Mr. Johnson: Part of the problem is the uncertainty about the cost of the better alternatives. We need a decision that we can broach this with the Koreans. The cost figures we have are astronomical.

Mr. Whitehouse: I wonder about moving one division to I Corps. Bill Sullivan believes that might be useful. The minimum cost solution might be to have one division in I Corps and one in II Corps.

Mr. Johnson: What does the military think?

Gen. Westmoreland: I have always believed that would be desirable. Gen. Abrams’ assessment of it has been affected by political and economic factors. He says we can’t afford it.

Dr. Kissinger: One price we can’t afford is to have the whole situation unravel next year.

Mr. Packard: The Koreans are not controlling much now.

Dr. Kissinger: If we pull the Koreans out and everything goes to pieces, it will turn out that they have controlled something. It is not a case of keeping them there for five years. One more year is what we are talking about.

Gen. Westmoreland: They contribute a certain amount of control by sitting on Highway 1.

What we are talking about, then, is maintaining the Korean forces for one year.

Mr. Schlesinger: And possibly moving some of them to I Corps.

Dr. Kissinger: That would be a nice refinement.

Mr. Packard: Maybe we ought to get an assessment of this.

Mr. Johnson: We are perfectly willing to test the water on moving one division to MR 1.

Mr. Selden: That would make it more difficult to remove our forces from Korea.

Mr. Johnson: If we approach them on this and they accept, we can’t move any troops from Korea in 1973.

Mr. Packard: It would be logical to move them to MR 1.

Mr. Negroponte: The GVN’s official rationale for wanting to keep the Koreans is to meet the threat in the coastal region of MR 2.

Dr. Kissinger: There is one thing we need to prepare for. If the war continues next year, the other side is going to make a hell of an effort. One incentive for them to keep going through 1972 is the hope of bringing off a repeat of 1968. Pulling our troops out of Korea in 1972 could be less important than having the Koreans in Vietnam.

Mr. Packard: We ought to go back to Gen. Abrams and ask him to assess their utility, leaving aside political and economic factors. Then Alex [Johnson] can take some soundings.

Dr. Kissinger: As long as we don’t take the Koreans’ refusal to move as an excuse to get their troops out of Vietnam.

Mr. Johnson: We haven’t had any conversations on this with the Koreans. We have no basis for judging what their reaction would be.

Dr. Kissinger: We should try to get all these issues moved to the President by next week.

Mr. Whitehouse: With regard to the best and worst probable cases, I take it that an MR 1 offensive is considered to be the worst.

Dr. Kissinger: We don’t know. We have to see the results of our analysis.

Mr. Whitehouse: I see. It is wide open.

Mr. Packard: Why do these matters all have to be settled by mid-June?

Dr. Kissinger: We don’t want to turn this into an esoteric exercise, where others let us analyze while they make the decisions. I know that strategy.

Mr. Packard: We never do anything like that.

Some instructions will be needed on this.

Dr. Kissinger: Like what? On bombing levels?

Mr. Packard: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: As long as we have the capability, we can always cut down.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–112, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1971. Top Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Situation Room of the White House. All brackets are in the original.
2. See Document 203.
3. See Document 192.
4. The summary and Annexes A and B are attached but not printed.
5. See Document 174.
6. Subsequent to the meeting it was confirmed that the time period applicable to air sortie rates is CY 72. [Footnote in the original.]
7. See Document 192 and footnote 2 thereto.
8. See Document 169.
9. See Document 212.