Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

206. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, May 28, 1971.

SUBJECT

• My May 31 Meeting with the North Vietnamese

As you know, I am scheduled to meet with Xuan Thuy again Monday morning, May 31, in Paris.² I plan to use this meeting for two basic purposes:

• First, I will clarify the recent ambiguous statements by the other side in the Paris plenary sessions concerning withdrawals and the release of prisoners.³ Ambassador Bruce has already asked about these issues, but I think it is important that the record show that we have followed up vigorously (and privately) all possible leads.⁴
• Secondly, I will lay out our package proposal which includes our readiness to set a terminal date for the withdrawal of all our forces from South Vietnam as part of an overall settlement; an Indochina ceasefire-in-place; no infiltration of outside forces into the countries of Indochina; international supervision of the ceasefire and its provisions; respect for the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Accords; and the release of all prisoners of war.⁵

This package in effect separates the political and military issues. Our presenting it accomplishes three objectives:

• —First, by moving toward their position of a fixed date for our withdrawals, it should clearly establish if they have any interest at all in negotiations or if they will continue to insist upon the overthrow of the Saigon Government. We should get their preliminary response to the proposals at the first meeting, but a definitive reply may await a second session.
• —Second, I believe the package, with such provisions as ceasefire, no infiltration,⁶ international supervision, and POW release, holds many attractions for us. If we could negotiate something along these lines I think we and the South Vietnamese would be in a good position.
• —Third, if the other side remains intransigent, we will have laid out a forthcoming position and further improved our negotiating record. We could, at a time of our choosing, make our proposals publicly and strengthen our position both here at home and around the world.

Attached for your Approval at Tab A⁷ is a draft statement that I propose to make. In addition to questioning their recent public statements and making our proposals, it emphasizes that time for negotiations with meaningful U.S. participation has just about run out. I would make clear that these proposals represent the last chance for a negotiated settlement. In response to questions, I would, of course, reaffirm that we will never agree to their demand that we replace the Saigon Government leaders.

Ambassador Bunker has informed Thieu of our meeting.⁸ He told Thieu that we will follow up the other side’s recent ambiguous public statements in Paris and discuss the relationship between ceasefire, POWs, and the U.S. withdrawals. He reaffirmed that we will not agree to the other side’s political demands and stressed again the need for absolute secrecy about this channel.

Thieu made no objections and thought it a good idea to probe the other side’s views again. Hopefully, we will have some feel for the other side’s attitude so that you can discuss negotiations with Thieu in some detail at Midway.

Recommendation:

That you approve the draft statement at Tab A, including the new negotiating proposals.⁹

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 853, For the President’s Files—Lord, Vietnam Negotiations, Sensitive, Camp David Vol. VII. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Sent for action.
2. A tape recording of Nixon and Kissinger’s discussion of the upcoming meeting is ibid., White Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation 507–4.
3. At the April 29 meeting in Paris, the NLF offered to negotiate local cease-fires and Xuan Thuy issued a statement indicating that the DRV was willing to discuss a date for U.S. withdrawal and POW release and was prepared to hold private meetings to discuss these issues. (The New York Times, May 13, 1971, p. 44)
4. Nixon highlighted this paragraph and wrote the following: “Spend no more than 2 or 3 minutes on this. It is only for the record and the record probably will only come out in history books. Let Bruce do this. Record [undecipherable word] publicly.”
5. Nixon highlighted this paragraph and wrote the following in the margin: “Go directly and briefly to this major point first.”
6. Nixon circled “no infiltration” and wrote “negotiable” above it.
7. Attached but not printed at Tab A is the Opening Statement. Nixon wrote at the top of the first page, “Make the first two much brief[er] and to the point.” A revised draft dated May 29, of roughly two pages including greetings, salutations, and the administration’s view of the context of the meeting, is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 853, For the President’s Files—Lord, Vietnam Negotiations, Sensitive, Camp David, Vol. VII. It has a handwritten note at top indicating that Kissinger took it to the May 31 meeting.
8. See Document 184.
9. Nixon wrote, “OK,” on the approval line and underneath wrote, “With modifications as suggested.” Deleted from the opening statement was the following: “We understood from your Soviet friends that you were ready once again to hold discussions here,” a reference to Kissinger’s March 25 meeting with Dobrynin (see Document 165). In addition, during their May 24 meeting, Dobrynin told Kissinger that he was certain North Vietnam would release prisoners if the United States gave a specific deadline and he offered to check with them on this point. Kissinger said he would let him know if the administration was interested. The memorandum of conversation is in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–October 1971, Document 229.