168. Summary of Conclusions of a Meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group1

PART II

SUBJECT

  • Public Information Policy on Lam Son

PARTICIPATION

  • Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
  • State
    • Mr. U. Alexis Johnson
    • Ambassador William Sullivan
  • Defense
    • Mr. David Packard
    • Mr. Dennis J. Doolin
  • CIA
    • Mr. Richard Helms
  • JCS
    • Admiral Thomas H. Moorer
  • OMB
    • Mr. James Schlesinger
    • White House
    • Mr. H.R. Haldeman
  • NSC Staff
    • B/Gen. Alexander Haig
    • Col. Richard T. Kennedy
    • Keith Guthrie

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

1.
A NSC/State/Defense working group chaired by Col. Kennedy of the NSC staff will prepare by March 30 a statement on the contribution of Lam Son to the Vietnamization program. This statement should be designed to provide public information policy guidance to USG officials and should be based on the President’s television statements of March 222 and on the draft State Department paper circulated at the WSAG meeting.
2.
To assist in developing suitable press guidance, JCS will ascertain MACV’s intentions regarding future US military activity in the Khe Sanh area.
3.
State and Defense will instruct General Abrams and Ambassador Bunker to consult with President Thieu concerning the public information [Page 510] policy followed by the South Vietnamese Government in connection with Lam Son.3

[Omitted here are the minutes of the meeting.]

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–115, WSAG Meetings Minutes, Originals, 1971. Top Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Situation Room of the White House. Part I is Document 167.
  2. See footnote 3, Document 156.
  3. The request was sent in telegram 51947 to Saigon, March 27. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 153, Vietnam Country Files, Viet 11 Feb 71–28 Mar 71) Bunker responded in telegram 4508 from Saigon, March 28: “I think it fair to say that Vietnamese public reaction to Lam Son 719 went through three phases—an initial euphoria, followed by doubts in the latter part of February that the campaign was going according to plan, and finally, a resurgence of confidence in ARVN and pride in its accomplishments.” Kissinger forwarded Bunker’s telegram to Nixon under a March 29 covering memorandum. (Ibid., Box 85, Vietnam Subject Files, Special Operations 20 March 71)