Office of the Historian

167. Summary of Conclusions of a Meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group1

Washington, March 26, 1971, 10:09–11:29 a.m.

PART I

SUBJECT

  • Intelligence on North Vietnamese Supply Movements

PARTICIPATION

  • Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
  • State
    • Mr. U. Alexis Johnson
    • Ambassador William Sullivan
    • Mr. Ray Cline
  • Defense
    • Mr. David Packard
    • Mr. Dennis J. Doolin
    • Lt. Gen. Donald V. Bennett
  • CIA
    • Mr. Richard Helms
    • Mr. George Carver
    • Mr. Paul Walsh
  • JCS
    • Admiral Thomas H. Moorer
  • OMB
    • Mr. James Schlesinger
  • NSC Staff
    • Mr. Wayne Smith
    • Col. Richard T. Kennedy
    • Mr. John H. Holdridge
    • Mr. Robert L. Sansom
    • Mr. Keith Guthrie

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

1.
Enemy Logistical Performance. The WSAG reviewed the CIA and DIA assessments of enemy logistical performance2 and agreed that both assessments indicated that the North Vietnamese had not significantly improved their logistical situation in 1970–71 relative to 1969–70. Therefore, the prospects, for 1971, at least, appeared to be for a continuation [Page 508] of the enemy’s protracted warfare strategy although occasional high points of combat activity were possible.
2.
Enemy Threat in 1971–72. CIA, DIA, and the NSC staff will jointly review the logistical assessments with a view to refining the data and preparing a projection of the enemy military threat during the next eighteen months. This projection should be broken down by geographic areas (Cambodia and the four military regions of South Vietnam) and should indicate the time frame in which the enemy could be expected to develop a capability to launch a major offensive in each of these areas. Estimates should be made using two alternative assumptions on U.S. air support: (a) slightly less than current levels and (b) 30% less than current levels.
3.
Progress Chart on Vietnam War. The Defense Department will submit by March 31 the final version of its comparative table of statistical indicators and other facts relating to the progress of the war in Indochina during 1969–71.
4.
Lam Son as Seen by Hanoi. The WSAG agreed that it would be useful to have an assessment of how the North Vietnamese evaluate the Lam Son operation. However, it was agreed that this analysis could be deferred until completion of the other studies requested at this meeting.

[Omitted here are the minutes of the meeting.]

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–115, WSAG Meetings Minutes, Originals, 1971. Top Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Situation Room of the White House. Part II is Document 168.↩
  2. See Document 166.↩