143. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1

SUBJECT

  • Assessment of the Laotian Operation

Attached at Tab A is Ambassador Bunker’s back channel answer to my request for a blunt assessment of the prospects for success of the current South Vietnamese operation in Laos.2 Ambassador Bunker indicates that General Abrams fully shares the views in the report which makes the following points of particular significance:

  • —There are obvious risks in an operation of this kind in which the enemy understands that we are after his jugular. Without the supply lifeline to the south the enemy would be finished. For this reason, the enemy has brought in substantial numbers of forces and is employing heavy artillery and tanks. Although this makes the job tough, it is one that has to be done. President Thieu and General Vien, as well as General Abrams, share these sentiments.
  • —The operation has already demonstrated its value. Enemy southward traffic has been virtually eliminated on Routes 9 and 92 and greatly reduced on Route 914.
    • —The enemy has been forced to accept combat away from the territory of South Vietnam. We once fought the NVA 308th and 320th Divisions around Hue and Danang; now they are being fought in Laos. We once fought the NVA 9th Division around Saigon; now we are fighting it in Cambodia.
    • —The enemy has lost heavily in tanks, weapons, ammunition and other materiel. His POL pipeline has been cut.
    • —Even allowing for exaggerated reporting, an enemy casualty figure of 3,742 KIA, means that the enemy has suffered heavily. Combined enemy casualties for the two operations are 6,992 compared with 708 friendly KIA.
  • —The ARVN units have fought well and with the exception of the airborne division commander, who is apprehensive and mechanical, have been well led.3
  • —The Ranger Battalion which suffered such heavy losses inflicted three times the number of losses on the enemy. Their spirits are high and they are convinced they have defeated a regiment.4 Two battalions of the opposing enemy regiment appear to have been virtually destroyed and have disappeared from intercepts.
  • —With moves now in progress the ARVN will have a total of about 30,000 troops for employment in Laos. This strength is adequate, although the enemy has committed a large number of forces to the battle.
  • —U.S. support has been outstanding. Our air effort will be a deciding factor.5
  • —Changes in the original concept of operations have been necessary because of weather,6 the condition of Route 9 within Laos, and the Laotian terrain. Weather and enemy action have on occasion delayed evacuation of wounded and resupply operations. However, it is essential to maintain a flexible posture and adapt to fluid conditions.
  • —The character of the press reporting has been skeptical. Because they were under the impression that Tchepone was the principal objective, the reporters have concluded that the operation has bogged down. Steps are being taken to correct these misimpressions with more effective and frequent briefings.7
  • —There will be some bad moments but President Thieu and General Vien expect hard fighting and are prepared to take heavy losses. They are confident in the quality of their troops and in their ability to inflict heavier losses on the enemy.
  • —General Abrams and Ambassador Bunker are both confident that if we hold steady on our course the Cambodian and Laotian operations will have the impact on the enemy’s activities in South Vietnam and our troop withdrawals which we originally contemplated.

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 84, Vietnam Subject Files, Special Operations File, Vol. VI. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Nixon wrote at the top of the memorandum: “Tell him—from RN, ‘excellent—honest report. His worst enemy seems to be the press!’” Kissinger relayed Nixon’s comment in backchannel message WH1011 to Bunker, March 5, and instructed him to update his message and forward it through regular channels to Rogers and Laird so they could “benefit greatly from this assessment, modified of course to reflect that it has been prepared at your initiative.” (Ibid.)
  2. For Kissinger’s request, see Document 142. Tab A is a retyped copy of backchannel message 0341 from Saigon, 1220Z. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 84, Vietnam Subject Files, Special Operations File, Vol. VI)
  3. Nixon underlined most of this paragraph.
  4. Nixon underlined most of the first two sentences of his paragraph.
  5. Nixon underlined this sentence.
  6. Nixon underlined most of this phrase and highlighted it in the margin.
  7. Nixon underlined most of the first two sentences in the paragraph and “more effective and frequent briefings.”