Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

118. Minutes of a Meeting of the Senior Washington Special Actions Group¹

Washington, February 3, 1971, 2:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Southeast Asia Dry Season Campaign

PARTICIPANTS

• Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
• State
  • U. Alexis Johnson
• Defense
  • David Packard
  • Daniel Z. Henkin
• CIA
  • Richard Helms
• JCS
  • Admiral Thomas Moorer
• NSC Staff
  • Brig. Gen. A. M. Haig
  • Colonel Richard T. Kennedy
• WH Staff
  • H. R. Haldeman
  • Ronald L. Ziegler

Mr. Kissinger: How can we lift the embargo at least partially and how can we relate the Phase I operation to Chup?

Mr. Johnson: (Reads message from Berger—Tab B in meeting book.²) State went back Flash to Berger asking then to go with scenario we earlier recommended.³ The information is already moving from Saigon, thus it doesn’t matter. We should go ahead with briefings to Congress this afternoon.

Mr. Kissinger: The President wants to keep the specifics of our participation down. He wants no numbers—only general statement. Low level people should do the briefing. We must avoid a crisis atmosphere. It should be portrayed as an SVN operation in the old sanctuary areas. We are only doing what they can’t do. It must be kept in low key.

Mr. Johnson: I think it should be done by only Defense and State Congressional liaison people with no White House or military briefers. [All agree.]

Mr. Kissinger: They can start any time after this meeting.

Mr. Helms: Stennis called this morning for general briefing on Southeast Asia.

Mr. Kissinger: I would call it off if you can. Stennis is not aware of these operations.

Mr. Helms: It would have nothing to do with these operations.

Mr. Kissinger: O.K.

Mr. Helms: The briefing gives general background including enemy supply information.

Mr. Kissinger: What do briefers say when asked if there is anything else?

Mr. Johnson: What can they say?

Mr. Henkin: Rely on the Military Region I briefings. All on these lists were briefed on Military Region I.

Mr. Kissinger: The Secretary of State called Fulbright and Aiken.

Mr. Packard: Then they say this is all we have to give you—you already have been briefed on MR–1.

Mr. Kissinger: There should be No Comment on the projected length of the Chup operation. It will fall from the papers quickly. Can we get SVN to limit American newsmen?

Admiral Moorer: It would be better to let the water seek its own level.

Mr. Kissinger: Is there anything more on Chup?

Admiral Moorer: There is a message from Swank—he is concerned that he and Lon Nol are not informed.⁴

Mr. Johnson: The question of whether they were informed or not is not so important. The real question is does FANK know?

Admiral Moorer: The Cambodians know. We asked the question of Abrams—but they don’t get into the operation until Phase II of Chup. This may be a disconnect.

Mr. Kissinger: Who briefed the Cambodians?

Admiral Moorer: Tri briefed them.

Mr. Kissinger: Can’t we get Berger and Abrams to Thieu and Swank to Lon Nol? Maybe Lon Nol doesn’t want to make a statement.

Mr. Packard: He probably doesn’t want to look as though he has to call on the SVN for help.

Mr. Kissinger: Can’t we send MACV officers to brief Swank and possibly the FANK?

Admiral Moorer: I will work this out with Alex Johnson.

[Omitted here is discussion of the public relations aspects of the operations in which the group agreed to lift the embargo on the media’s release of information on Phase I of the Laos operation once the announcement on Chup was made in Saigon at 3:30 a.m., February 4, Washington time.]

[5 minute recess at 1500 hrs. Henkin & Ziegler leave. Meeting reconvenes at 1510.]

Mr. Kissinger: PRG says in Paris that they will fight on even if we enter Laos. They are always willing to show good will, however. Not let’s turn to the scenario for Tchepone.

Mr. Kissinger: We will notify Thieu immediately of the execute order when the decision is made. Why should we tell Souvanna ahead?

Mr. Johnson: Godley wants a “no comment” answer on the question of Souvanna consultations. The problem is to keep him protected. We have the 1962 accords and are assisting the SVN invasion without having let Souvanna know. We have to frame the U Thant letter carefully and should let Souvanna know so he can be as consistent as possible.⁵ Maybe, therefore, we do have to get to him early.

Mr. Kissinger: Would we inform him by official communication or through Godley privately?

Mr. Johnson: There is no advantage to the informal approach. We can separate the contingency letter approach without telling him.

Mr. Kissinger: How will we deal with Souvanna publicly? We can’t say “no comment” because that means yes. What do we say?

Mr. Helms: There is no way except to stand up to a white lie. Couldn’t we find some language which is not entirely untrue.

Mr. Kissinger: I think we all agree that we cannot reply he was consulted.

Mr. Packard: We have to say that we told him and regret that this action was necessary.

Mr. Johnson: This is a really serious problem.

Mr. Kissinger: The President has agreed to consult with Stennis.⁶

[Omitted here is discussion of the schedule for diplomatic, Congressional, and public notifications on the Tchepone operation. The group agreed that congressional consultations would begin on Sunday, February 7, except for the one with Senator Stennis. Kissinger noted that Nixon wanted “no high key reaction” in Washington, so the group agreed that no one would appear on television. They also agreed to allow Rogers and Laird to jointly appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 10 and for Laird to appear before the Senate Armed Services Committee if requested. Finally, Johnson volunteered to prepare a contingency study on what to do if Souvanna were overthrown.]

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–115, WSAG Meetings Minutes, Originals, 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Situation Room of the White House. According to a chronology attached to a memorandum from Howe to Haig, February 9, the meeting ended at 4:15 p.m. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 84, Vietnam Subject Files, Special Operations File, Vol. IV) All brackets are in the original with the exception of those indicating omitted material.
2. Tab B is telegram 1597 from Saigon, February 3, in which Berger reported on his meeting with Thieu in response to instructions in telegram 18204 to Saigon and Phnom Penh, February 2, asking Berger and Swank to inform their host governments that the Chup operation was scheduled to begin at 3 p.m., February 3, Washington time. The Department wrote that it was important that GKR and GVN spokesmen make clear that they had agreed at political levels to do the operation, but Berger reported that Thieu did not feel this was necessary. (Both ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 6 VIET S)
3. Not further identified.
4. In telegram 465 from Phnom Penh, February 3, Swank reported that the decision to begin the Chup operation “comes to us and to FANK as complete surprise,” and that “as far as FANK is concerned is still in planning stage and that movements of 2400 Khmer who were to participate in the operation are not contemplated for at least a week.” (Ibid., POL 27 CAMB)
5. According to a February 3 memorandum to Kissinger from Kennedy, briefing him for the meeting, the Department of State was supposed to have prepared a letter to U Thant for the discussion. No drafts were found. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–79, WSAG Meeting, Principals Only Vietnam 2–3–71)
6. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon met with Moore, Kissinger, and Stennis in the Oval Office, 1:36–2 p.m., February 3. (Ibid., White House Central Files) No other record of the meeting was found. Kissinger recalled that Nixon met with Stennis after he and Moorer had briefed the President on the operation and that once Stennis agreed, Nixon gave the execute order. Kissinger informed the principals at 6 p.m. (Ending the Vietnam War, p. 198)