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49. Minutes of National Security Council Meeting1

The Meeting started at 10:00 a.m. The following were in attendance:

  • The President
  • The Vice President
  • The Secretary of State
  • The Secretary of Defense
  • Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness
  • Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
  • Director of Central Intelligence
  • Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
  • Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker
  • General Andrew Goodpaster
  • Mr. Philip A. Habib
  • Mr. Richard Sneider
  • Colonel Alexander M. Haig

The President introduced the meeting stating there were three issues to be addressed:

1.
De-escalation.
2.
Mutual withdrawal and the related issues of residual troops in-country; and
3.
The provision of the Manila Declaration, i.e., the interpretation of the six-month clause.

The President stated that discussion would be held on these three points, following a briefing by Ambassador Bunker.2 Ambassador Bunker made the following points in explaining President Thieu's and the South Vietnamese Government's attitude on a negotiated peace settlement:

1.
The present offensive has demonstrated South Vietnam's growing confidence and conversely has highlighted the growing weakness of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese in a military sense.
2.
President Thieu now visualizes and accepts that there will be a transition from purely military operations into a struggle which will be conducted within a political framework. This transition in his own estimate of the situation is a further reflection of the growing strength of the Thieu Government. In Thieu's words, “A year ago, we could only talk in terms of military victory. Six months ago, we could talk in terms of a peace settlement. Today we can talk in terms of a political settlement”.
3.
The bombing halt of 31 March [1968] led to the realization on the part of the South Vietnamese that U.S. would not underwrite them indefinitely. This tended to crystallize South Vietnam's resolve and combined with the growing dynamism and forceful and sagacious leadership of President Thieu, great progress has been made (Ambassador [Page 166] Bunker emphasized that he knew of no equal to President Thieu within the ranks of South Vietnamese leaders).
4.

In the past two months, President Thieu has talked of a settlement in two terms:

a.
A general election which would permit the NLF to function as a party but perhaps under a different name.
b.
Acceptance by Thieu of private talks and also an acceptance of the possibility that the NLF would be included in such talks but with emphasis on conversations between the U.S. and Hanoi; but still recognizing the possible expansion of the talks to all four parties if required.

An alternate approach to the political settlement in Thieu's mind would include general elections with possible accompanying changes in the Constitution and the inclusion of international supervision of the election procedure.

5.
Concerning 4 above, Ambassador Bunker stated that he had warned Thieu on the issue of the NLF's fear of reprisals from the South Vietnamese Government and confirmed that Thieu had agreed to discuss this as well as a political settlement. Thieu indicated that perhaps an international supervisory commission could oversee this situation.
6.
Thieu has discussed the question of guarantees and has expressed strong concern that viable guarantees be provided to insure that the North would pay a heavy price for renewed attacks. At the same time, he recognized that South Vietnam's armed strength would be a major factor, together with outside guarantees in precluding the renewal of North Vietnamese attacks. In general, Thieu believes he could maintain his control of the government under the above circumstances because the NLF has been badly hurt in recent months and their infrastructure is in a bad state of repair.
7.
The Government and the people of South Vietnam now recognize the need for peace. At this point, the President asked when this shift in South Vietnamese attitude occurred. Ambassador Bunker replied that Thieu has known this for some time. Secretary Rogers asked “but when did it occur?” Ambassador Bunker answered to the effect that this has been true for several months. In December, for example, Thieu agreed to accept a greater share of the burden of conducting the war. He has admitted over the past six months that the people must get ready for political warfare. At the same time, he has had to bring the government along at a pace which he felt personally was best suited to the circumstances. He has managed this extremely well. The evolution has occurred primarily due to the growing strength of the government in both political and psychological terms.

[Page 167]

Secretary Rogers asked whether or not Bunker knew that Thieu was going to make his recent statement on private talks. Ambassador Bunker replied “no”.

The President commented, “I think the main point here is that the error made by the previous Administration was in beating the South Vietnamese over the head publicly to be more forthcoming,” commenting that he had informed a Congressional group last night that we had carefully avoided this approach in order to build the South Vietnamese's trust. The President asked Ambassador Bunker whether or not Thieu really trusts us. Bunker replied, “yes, and this is my main point. We have re-established trust since January and this, in turn, has been a major contributor to their willingness to come along with us on the peace issue. The principal factors in this phenomena have been your talk with Ky and our generally coordinated posture.”

Secretary Rogers interjected, “Thieu saw my statement before the Foreign Relations Committee and gave us his OK overnight.”3

The President turned the briefing over to Mr. Habib who reminded the Council that since his last appearance before him, the U.S. had received signals through the Russians that the North Vietnamese were anxious to move on private talks. He confirmed that the U.S. movement in Paris had been very deliberate and that as a result our relations with the GVN in Paris had improved greatly. Habib emphasized that the Plenary Sessions have not changed very much in tone and serve primarily as propaganda sessions and a forum for tentatively exploring new ideas. In these sessions, Habib emphasized, there continues to be a sharp contrast between the conduct and expertise of the NLF on the one hand and GRV on the other, the latter being far more skilled and polished.

Habib emphasized that the U.S. Delegation had accomplished much in the public forum in Paris through the maintenance of a businesslike stance, the avoidance of polemics, and the presentation of brief and specific proposals. Habib summarized that there had been two private meetings since January, the first primarily a protest meeting and the second dealing with substantive issues. Both private meetings were conducted with the full blessing of the GVN Delegation. During the second meeting, the U.S. concentrated on the issue of withdrawal. The North Vietnamese, on the other hand, came in with a Plenary Session type statement but in a private mood. Habib noted that much of that statement was used in yesterday's Plenary Session, [Page 168]confirming that it was clearly just the opening round in the secret forum. Habib judged that the North's opening statement was not surprising, and it emphasized:

a.
Complete withdrawal of U.S. forces,
b.
Requirement that we deal with the NLF,
c.
Charges of U.S. escalation, and
d.
Confirmation that they are willing to continue the fight.

The North Vietnamese made no specific proposal rather reemphasizing the four and five points and emphasizing participation by the NLF. They did not exclude the possibility of the GVN's participation in the negotiation; made it quite clear that they wanted to continue secret talks; indicated the probability that the bilateral track was acceptable and, in general, continued to give hints of some anxiety. On balance, it appears that we have rattled them in recent weeks, Habib maintained.

The President then asked, “is this just wishful thinking on our part”, to which Habib replied, “it might be but I think they want to talk and this is just the first of a series of secret sessions. In this regard, we left open the determination of the next meeting with the general language that “when either side has something to say”, the next talk will occur. Habib emphasized that the North Vietnamese nodded as this statement was made and nodded again afterwards. The North also emphasized the importance of secrecy.

The President asked what the implications were of the North Vietnamese side's rejection of Thieu's offer to go into secret talks. Habib replied that this rejection was not as rigid as it appeared in the press and that they actually placed their main stress on refusal to meet with the GVN, leaving the door open somewhat. Habib added “when their spokesman was pressed, they hedged and didn't attack the secret meeting as much as they did the other parts of Thieu's statements.”

The President then asked Ambassador Bunker whether or not the GVN would accept a role in four-sided talks which would place them in a position of tagging along with the U.S. Ambassador Bunker replied that when it comes to actual negotiations on the political side that the U.S. cannot do this in behalf of the South Vietnamese but that they will probably go along initially with a four-sided forum.

The President stated, “then it is very important how we proceed on this issue”.

Secretary Rogers then emphasized his concern that we were overly sensitive about this point, remarking that first we were concerned whether or not they would accept secret talks at all, but then when we asked Thieu, he readily went along. The Secretary of State then stated he thought the only thing that was really important is that the U.S. does not meet only with the NLF.

[Page 169]

The President asked Mr. Habib how long he thought the talks would go on, “18 months, two years? Do you see a Panmunjon situation developing here? Looking at this problem, how long are we going to be in negotiations with sub-threshold fighting continuing?”

Habib replied, “we think it will take some time but in very short order we will get to the heart of the thing in the discussions probably in a month or two.” Ambassador Bunker stated that President Thieu sees this year as the critical one. Providing the North sees no flagging in our determination; with such determination, a settlement should probably occur this year.

Secretary Rogers said, “yes, but suppose we lose out, can we start to turn over the fighting to the South Vietnamese?”

General Goodpaster replied, “this depends—we can move in this direction but it depends on what the South Vietnamese themselves do.” Secretary Rogers stated that we were told this years ago but we see no movement. “How can we convince the people after all of this failure?”

Habib stated, “the North reads this very carefully, based on how things are gong on the ground but also how they read U.S. domestic attitude. They are most sensitive to it. This is the basis for their current tactics. They are conducting a long, low-level attack and watching U.S. opinion concurrently.”

The President then asked, “how do we de-Americanize this thing in such a way as to influence negotiations and have them move along quicker?”

Secretary Rogers said “certainly pacification is a poor explanation.”

The President replied “in fairness I must say progress has been made, especially under Thieu. I can certainly defend it to that extent but I need some symbol.”

Ambassador Bunker stated, “our problem has always been a case of over-optimism in over-stating the issues. It is time that we tell the American people it is going to be long and tough.”

Secretary Laird remarked, “oh, we have been telling the people that. We told them there were going to be improvements in the South Vietnamese forces. There are only a couple of divisions that are worth anything. In several, there have been no improvement whatsoever.”

General Goodpaster asked who said this a year ago. The Secretary of State said, “we have been saying this for over a year and a half. What do we say now?”

General Lincoln said, “I think South Vietnam has improved its forces but it is not being reported, especially back here.”

General Goodpaster stated, “it is true that the 5th and 18th Divisions have been weak and continue to stay that way.”

Mr. Helms said, “yes, we have heard this story before.”

[Page 170]

Secretary Rogers stated, “we have to de-Americanize the war to safe-side a failure in the negotiations. We need discernible progress.” The President stated that timing is a problem. “We must move in a deliberate way, not to show panic. We cannot be stampeded by the likes of Fulbright.”

Secretary Rogers said, “but if we say we are going to be deliberate, the American people won't stand for it.”

General Goodpaster said, “I think we must remember that the money for the improvement of the RVNAF did not come until after Tet and progress has been substantial since that time. We have moved from 750,000 to 855,000 troops and the caliber of the force has improved. There can be no question about their improvement. The RF and the PF have grown quantitatively and qualitatively. The overall improvement has been substantial and we are, in fact, closer to de-Americanizing the war but we are not at the decision point yet.”

The President stated, “we need a plan. If we had no elections, it would be fine. Just like Great Britain in Malaysia, we cannot sustain this at current rates for two years. The reality is that we are working against a time clock. We are talking 6 to 8 months. We are going to play a strong public game but we must plan this. We must get a sense of urgency in the training of the South Vietnamese. We need improvement in terms of supplies and training.”

Secretary of Defense Laird stated, “I agree, but not with your term de-Americanizing. What we need is a term Vietnamizing to put the emphasis on the right issue.”

The President agreed.

The Secretary of Defense then stated that there are considerable problems on Phase II add-ons with respect to the Congress. They are not willing to pay for the sophisticated equipment, especially trucks. The Secretary had told General Westmoreland to visit the people on the Hill and explain to the people our problem.

General Goodpaster stated, “they must have mobility. The ARVN uses the road to a greater degree than we have to. For example, they are using cranes for all kinds of purposes.”

The President asked if the Viet Cong had cranes.

General Goodpaster replied that we are now at a time when we can plan for the first increment for our withdrawal but only based on a decision in the light of conditions at the time. Our view this time will be July.

The President noted that U.S. casualties were down this week and asked if the offensive was over. General Goodpaster replied, “not yet. The enemy has some forces it has not committed, primarily because they have not been able to get them in position but also because they have been extremely conservative in this operation.”

[Page 171]

The President asked whether there would be another offensive in May or June. General Goodpaster replied that it took 6 months for the enemy to get sufficiently built up to launch this one and infiltration is now down somewhat. This will probably result in a smaller offensive this May.

The President then asked why it would be so difficult to make our decision if this offensive has been so poor, “why won't we be able to pull the forces out?” General Goodpaster replied, “we want to look at the status of pacification, the improvement of RVN and you can't pull out troops in the midst of an offensive. Also, they could come across the DMZ.”

Habib stated “if we look at the record, we can see that over the year, the Viet Cong have carefully geared their military operation to the conduct of their negotiations. The enemy is willing to accept casualties for purely negotiating reasons. He will conduct his ground operations for political objectives in Paris.”

The President re-emphasized that the South Vietnamese must do more.

Ambassador Bunker said, “we must also remember that negotiations are themselves influenced primarily by what happens on the ground. They took terrible losses during the lull. Defectors were up, KIAs were high, the infrastructure was rolled up. They are already this year running close to last year's losses. That is why they are in Paris. They are suffering on the ground.”

The President asked the Director of CIA to give his views and to capsulize conditions in North Vietnam.

Mr. Helms stated that morale is now a factor in North Vietnam.

The President interrupted and said, “did you say this a year ago?”

Mr. Helms said, “no” and continued emphasizing that the morale problem developed since the bombing halt. Conversely, the offensive has generated some new discipline in the North since they have expected retaliation and are “policing-up” attitudes. There are differences in the leadership in Hanoi. Some agree with negotiating a solution; others disagree. On balance, CIA believes they can go the route if the Soviets and Chinese continue to support them at current levels. Also, they can continue for extended periods with reduced military operations. We believe they can carry on with their current manpower resources.

The President told Mr. Kissinger to discuss the de-escalation point. Mr. Kissinger stated there are two problems for discussion. The first is the game plan and the second, the issue of mutual withdrawal. Looking first at the game plan, a judgment is needed on how to move after one or two more private meetings. We can stress mutual withdrawal initially, plus the DMZ issue and then swing into the political issue. In the game plan proposed for consideration there is one main disagreement [Page 172]and that involves the issue of de-escalation. Whether or not we should do it is one aspect of the consideration and the other is if we decide to do it in principle, should we then be willing to negotiate it. On the issue itself, the alternatives are:

To consider it only in the context of mutual withdrawal. If we were to decide to negotiate it, we might get into endless discussion. We have a problem of defining it. If we were to adopt a policy of de-escalation, the enemy would lose much of the incentive for negotiating a settlement and the very act of talking about it is a time waster.

On the other side is the argument that de-escalation reduces casualties, strengthens our staying power. Perhaps these two sides are overdrawn but these are the diversions in the game plan.

The President then asked, “by de-escalation, does that mean our unilateral withdrawal.” Mr. Kissinger replied, “no.”

The President replied, “then it should be understood that this is not what we are talking about when we use the term de-escalation.”

Secretary of Defense stated, “I think General McConnell can talk to the Chief's position.”

Secretary of State interrupted, “I agree with the first point that de-escalation is not good but we cannot say this in public.”

The President stated, “I am afraid if we get into the issue of de-escalation, they will really go for our B–52. Then, we are in a jam.”

Mr. Habib stated, “from their standpoint they have been very general in talking about de-escalation. We would not have to propose this in any specific way. Most of the conversation on de-escalation is accusatory. I think we can afford not to raise it initially. But if they begin to move, we should listen.”

The President stated, “you wouldn't volunteer.”

Secretary Rogers replied, “yes, but we should not be negative on this subject of de-escalation.”

Habib stated, “I think we should hold off as Mr. Kissinger has said.”

The President stated, “no more talking about this. We are not going to give on this issue. On the other hand, if they raise it, what do you have in mind?”

Secretary Rogers stated, “I think we are in accord on this one.”

General McConnell then stated, “I agree with Position 2 with this caveat, if discussion of de-escalation does not include any limitations on weaponry or pacification.”

General Goodpaster added, “or Commander's tactics.”

Mr. Habib stated, “they have raised all of this but we have never answered.”

[Page 173]

The President stated, “on the withdrawal issue, I think the question is a moot one. Whether all U.S. forces are withdrawn or not is actually intertwined with what the other side does, especially if we are talking about bargaining and guarantees. We can take all of our forces out if they abide with the conditions. If they don't and we can't, that is fine, but if we can make the American people feel better on this issue, that is also fine.”

Mr. Kissinger stated, “there are actually two issues involved: (1) residual forces and (2) our public and private negotiating position. Here, the alternatives are, should we negotiate a requirement for residual forces or should we opt to the listing of a series of conditions which we know won't be met, while speaking as though all forces will be withdrawn?”

The President asked Ambassador Bunker what the South Vietnamese reaction would be on this issue.

Ambassador Bunker replied, we would like to leave this issue open. Thieu has already agreed to the six months provisions of the Manila formula but the key issue would be the withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces completely out of Laos and Cambodia and the provision of guarantees which are binding.

The President stated, in my view we should agree to total withdrawal of U.S. forces but include very strong conditions which we know may not be met.

The Secretary of State affirmed the President's position, commenting that if we insist on leaving U.S. forces there, we are going to run into difficulty. It would be much easier to provide a cover set of circumstances which would permit us to do it without claiming it as an objective at the outset.

The President said there is no doubt that U.S. forces will be in Vietnam for some time, something like a large military assistance group, but our public posture must be another thing. The type conditions that we should insist be met are: (1) verification, (2) supervision, (3) total withdrawal from Laos and Cambodia, (4) guarantees or assurances that the above have been done.

Mr. Kissinger then discussed two problems with respect to negotiations. The first is the time that forces would be in Vietnam after a settlement. The second is the issue of how we would treat the six months' provision of the Manila formula. Secretary of State interrupted and stated that he could see no reason why the U.S. Government should stick to the Manila formula. He stated we should have mutual withdrawal which would be total but with strong conditions. Habib added that we have said total withdrawal with conditions and we should not change now. We have told the Soviets this and the South Vietnamese have agreed to it. In terms of the six months' provision, we did say six months at Manila. The South Vietnamese were quite upset and the [Page 174]North Vietnamese were especially angry and we took the position that it would take us more time (six months) to get our forces out because of the nature of our problem.

The President stated we will not change our position on this issue. We will not outwardly back away from the Manila formula. At the same time, we will keep in mind that we can depart from it in a de facto way.

The President again emphasized that the conditions of withdrawal were the operative portions of any agreement. The President stated it will take a long time to withdraw U.S. forces completely and, frankly, I don't think it can be done within six months.

Habib added it should be understood that under the Manila formula, the withdrawal is phased. When we talk about six months, it means six months after the withdrawal by the North Vietnamese. This is what they understand. This is a sensible position and should pose no problem.

General Lincoln affirmed that this should be feasible.

The President said while we will not depart publicly from the Manila formula, we should not refer to it, simply let it fade away.

Rogers asked if the President meant we should not make any reference to the six months' provision.

The President replied, I want us to be hard in our negotiations but soft in our public stance. Habib said we have not touched on the six months' provisions recently.

The President said that is right, don't get all involved on this issue. If Thieu sees that they meet the conditions that we have established, then we should have no problems with the South Vietnamese. Actually, our negotiated positions to date have been much tougher than was the Manila formula.

Ambassador Bunker said that Manila has been a source of great confusion in South Vietnam and until recently, they thought we would not move at all until six months after the North Vietnamese were entirely out of South Vietnam. Now they understand our position. They understand that the withdrawal would be mutual and simultaneous but that we would have six months longer to complete our total withdrawal.

Again, the President emphasized that we should not get hung up on this issue and that we should emphasize to the South Vietnamese the conditions we will insist upon.

Habib stated that the North Vietnamese will be the ones that will raise this issue. The President replied then tell them we will be out when you meet the conditions that we have established. In other words, after you are gone and the conditions are met, then we will meet our end of the bargain.

General Goodpaster stated that he had three points he wished to make. First, that U.S. forces would need at least three months to get [Page 175]ready to start any withdrawals. Second, that U.S. forces would need at least six months to get the people and equipment out, emphasizing that people are needed to move equipment and, third, that after all combat forces have been withdrawn that they will need an additional three months to roll up equipment.

The President agreed. Habib stated we will need just such a plan, i.e., a withdrawal plan carefully phased to work with in Paris when we see some progress in the negotiations. Secretary Rogers said it is time that the military realized the kind of problems we have. Why do the military always talk about how much time it will take to withdraw, why do they always rattle the saber in public? This is what has caused our problem with the young people.

General Goodpaster asked that the group consider the facts. He pointed out that the U.S. was now in Phase II of the Vietnamization Program, a program designed to get the VNAF ready to handle the war alone. By mid-year, he stated, we will be nearly completed Phase II. By FY 70, our shortfalls will only exist in helicopters and special forces units. However, it takes until FY 72 for them to get the helicopters and for certain naval forces it will be as late as FY 73.

General Goodpaster emphasized that these problems must be recognized and agreed to furnish Paris with this information. He concluded by pointing out that Phase III which involved the logistics and self-sustaining capability of the South Vietnamese, was programmed for completion at the end of FY 72. In effect, we are talking about two years for the Vietnamese to be ready to take over. It is essential, he said, that we do not place ourselves at a tactical disadvantage at any one point in the process.

The President strongly endorsed General Goodpaster's position.

Dr. Kissinger again took over the conduct of the discussion and asked the group to consider the issue of verification, and the phased withdrawal plan, mentioning the possibility of withdrawal in a de facto sense without negotiations or withdrawal, dependent upon formal negotiations.

The President interrupted and stated he would like to make one more point with the individual involved. He asked Ambassador Bunker if there was anything he had heard here so far which would make his job impossible. Ambassador Bunker replied no.

The President then said that he doesn't like the old style used by the previous Administration of referring always to understandings. He stated that he wanted these things known and formally agreed to, not just indirectly understood. He wants this considered very carefully and when we talk about withdrawal of our forces, we should consider the location to which they will be withdrawn. Are we talking about Okinawa, Hawaii or Thailand or perhaps CONUS?

[Page 176]

The President said we need the answers to these questions. They are both political and practical. He said we should meet again in one or two months after these studies are completed. Habib said we need an agreement with the South Vietnamese on the nature of a withdrawal pattern and we will get to work on the issues of phased withdrawal and verification.

Bundy said it is easy to handle the phased withdrawal issue but verification becomes a problem. Who is gong to do it? Do we ask foreign governments to do it? We can prepare a plan but being sure it is complied with is another question.

Habib says we will need these papers shortly. We can only afford to have about two more private meetings before we are ready to talk turkey on withdrawal.

The President then asked Mr. Habib what the Administration could do in Washington to strengthen the U.S. Paris negotiating position. Habib replied, first and foremost, is to keep quiet. Not talking is the best solution. On the issue of de-escalation, there should be no discussion in the public forum.

Rogers interrupted and stated we have got to know what to say publicly. We are constantly being put into the position of commenting. We should probably refer to de-escalation in terms of withdrawal and restoration of the DMZ.

General McConnell stated that he would like to emphasize that when we consider withdrawals and certainly the military wants out as much as anyone, we should not put U.S. forces at a tactical disadvantage and, further, that the U.S. forces must have time to get the equipment out and to get the South Vietnamese ready to handle the problem.

The President reaffirmed General McConnell's position.

General Goodpaster added it should be understood that in practical terms we cannot de-escalate on the ground. We must understand this here at this table.

Habib then added, we must be equally mum on the issue of secret talks. We cannot talk about them publicly in Washington.

The President emphasized to all that this would be done.

Bundy stated that we now need a paper on political settlement, the elements of it, a paper on verification of withdrawal. Finally, we need an answer for the South Vietnamese on what type of guarantees would be provided. The latter is a very thorny area.

Secretary of State affirmed that there would be no talk about abandoning Manila.

The President thanked Ambassador Bunker and Mr. Habib for their contributions and the meeting was adjourned.

  1. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 82, NSC Meetings, Jan–Mar 1969. Top Secret; Sensitive. These minutes were based on notes taken by Haig that were typed by a White House secretary; Haig made corrections by hand to the typed transcript.
  2. On March 12 Nixon sent Kissinger a memorandum indicating he “would like to talk with Bunker within the next two or three weeks. I have been reading his cables and he seems much more concerned about attacks in South Vietnam than we are here. I have never met Bunker and I feel that because of the importance of his position I need to talk to him so that I can judge for myself what weight to give to his cables. Get him back here as soon as it is convenient so that it does not look like a crisis, but under no circumstances do I want his return delayed beyond three weeks.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Personal Files, Box 1, Memorandum for the President, RN Memos 68–12/69, Mar. 69) Nixon met Bunker in San Clemente on March 23 for an early Sunday morning meeting also attended by Rogers, Kissinger, and Goodpaster. (Ibid., White House Central Files, Daily Diary) No other record or time of this meeting has been found. The President, apparently accompanied by Bunker, Kissinger, Rogers, and Goodpaster, flew to Washington at 12:39 p.m. (Ibid.)
  3. Apparent reference to Rogers' statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 27, in which he described the U.S. and South Vietnamese negotiating position and the essential elements in an ultimate settlement. His testimony is in Department of State Bulletin, April 14, 1969, pp. 306–307.