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189. Memorandum of Conversation1

PARTICIPANTS

  • Le Duc Tho, Adviser to the North Vietnamese Delegation
  • Xuan Thuy, Chief of Delegation
  • Mai van Bo, North Vietnamese Delegate General in Paris
  • North Vietnamese Interpreter
  • Two Other North Vietnamese Officials
  • Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
  • Major General Vernon Walters, Defense Attaché, American Embassy, Paris
  • W. Richard Smyser, NSC Staff
  • W.A.K. Lake, NSC Staff

After introducing those accompanying him, particularly Mr. Smyser (so that they would know he was no longer with the Delegation), Mr. Kissinger said that it had been very complicated coming to Paris from Washington. He had told the French he was coming but not why. President Pompidou had invited him to lunch, and he had accepted as it provided a good pretext for being in Paris. Mr. Kissinger said that he would therefore have to leave around 12:15 p.m. In principle, he said, he could return later in the afternoon if it seemed necessary. They could decide whether another meeting would be desirable at the end of the current meeting.

At any rate, Mr. Kissinger said, they should know that the Pompidou lunch is a secret. No one in the United States Government knew he was in Paris except for the President and Mr. Kissinger's associates here at the meeting. We would like to keep this meeting a secret. The other side had been very reliable in this regard. (The North Vietnamese smiled.) Indeed, they had been more reliable than some of Mr. Kissinger's colleagues, he said. (More smiles.)

Xuan Thuy said that Mr. Kissinger had asked for this meeting through General Walters to tell them something further than what he had said previously. With regard to another meeting during the afternoon, Xuan Thuy said that could be decided later.

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Mr. Kissinger said that it was always a pleasure to see them. He knew them better than he knew many other people, as he reads what they say with great care. In his communication to Xuan Thuy,2 Mr. Kissinger said, he had indicated that there should be a meeting if both sides were ready to speak outside the normal framework—not just us.

Mr. Kissinger said he would like to begin with a few observations. He wanted first to discuss with them the general attitude of the President with regard to negotiations at Paris.

On January 14, 1969, Le Duc Tho had had a conversation with Governor Harriman and Mr. Vance.3 He had said there were three ways to achieve a settlement. First, by good will; second, for us to try to negotiate from a firm position of strength—which would not work; and third, without negotiations, for us to try to gain military victory—which also would not work. Mr. Kissinger said that we are approaching the negotiations with good will and serious intent. The discussions he had with them should start from this assumption.

Of course, Mr. Kissinger continued, we all know that negotiations between our two sides are extremely difficult. It is difficult to decide what we are trying to achieve; and even agreeing on that, it is hard then to do it. Also, he said, the North Vietnamese have a long history of not being easy to negotiate with. (Mai van Bo and Xuan Thuy smiled; Tho did not.)

We recognize the negotiations are made harder by their distrust, Mr. Kissinger said, a distrust which is rooted in history. But he did not wish to discuss this history. If negotiations are to progress, we must surmount this mistrust. However difficult it will be to overcome this distrust now, it will be harder one or two years from now, or whenever we make peace. And sooner or later, we will have to make peace.

Mr. Kissinger asked if, as a professor on leave, he could next make a theoretical point. He had read that they believed they had been tricked in 1956 and that we were trying to trick them now. But we are not, he said, trying to do so—not because we are particularly benevolent, but because it would not be in our interest. We have learned that they fight when they believe they have been tricked. After a settlement, Mr. Kissinger said, they would be closer to South Vietnam than we. Therefore, we will want a settlement which is in their interest.

It was in this spirit, Mr. Kissinger continued, that he had come a long way to this meeting—in order to make one basic point. We all [Page 598]could sit here and use phrases like good will, or endlessly discuss issues along the lines of speeches we know by heart from the Majestic meetings. But the problem is how to bring the negotiations to a conclusion. For this, we need agreement on the objectives of the negotiations and a program of work.

Last August, Mr. Kissinger went on, when he had had a private meeting with Messrs. Xuan Thuy and his old acquaintance Mai van Bo, he had suggested a settlement in a specific period of time.4 For some reasons, the other side did not agree. Mr. Kissinger said that he believed we had all missed an opportunity. Now, we believe that the other side's situation is not better. Nor will it get better. We should now see if we can accomplish something.5

Mr. Kissinger said that when they had met in August, he had indicated he did not believe it was in their interest to make this Mr. Nixon's war, as once they had done so, it would be difficult for him not to try to win it. He had said that they were an heroic people, and no one knew the result of such a sequence of events. We would prefer not to test it.

When they had met in August, Mr. Kissinger said, it was reasonable for the other side to believe that our domestic situation would become more and more complicated. In the interval, our domestic situation had become stronger. Mr. Kissinger said he would explain why. The North Vietnamese in Paris see many Americans who are extremely sympathetic with their position. But in the last election, the big bloc of votes which could make a difference was not on the left, but on the right. Last October, when there had been a public opinion problem, the President moved toward these votes. Mr. Kissinger said that he was speaking in a good spirit, but it was important that the other side understand that the normal support of a Republican administration is on the right; the President can appeal to people whom President Johnson could not reach. Mr. Kissinger said that the Administration does not want to move this way, but the President may have to.

Mr. Kissinger stated we also believe that since August 1969 the situation in South Vietnam has become more problematical for the other side. We know that they may not agree with this assessment, but don't wish to argue it. We would simply say that nothing is to be gained by waiting.

Finally, Mr. Kissinger said, it is our judgment that the international situation has complications which may make Vietnam no longer the undivided concern of other countries and may mean that Vietnam will [Page 599]not enjoy the undivided support of countries which now support it. He would simply say that this was another reason why we believe there is nothing to be gained by waiting.

Mr. Kissinger said that he was saying this in a good spirit and with an attitude of trying to resolve the conflict—not from any attitude of hostility or intransigence. He was at the meeting to discuss whether they could agree on the objectives of the negotiations and a work program.

Many people, Mr. Kissinger continued, seem to believe that the negotiations are like a long, drawn-out mystery in which their side throws out faint clues and we guess at the solution which has eluded us so long. Minister Xuan Thuy, he said, is expert at making enigmatic declarations to visiting Americans, to make them believe that they are at the edge of something. Having read everything that the other side had said over the years, Mr. Kissinger held the opposite view. When they had something new to say, they made it clear. Therefore, Mr. Kissinger said, we believe we should speak frankly from a clear position. He hoped they could be clear in this channel.

Mr. Kissinger therefore wished to state two propositions: First, it seems to us that the other side wants as a condition of negotiations to be guaranteed political predominance, with us to rely on their good faith and self-restraint. On the other hand, to them, it may seem that we seek military predominance and would have them rely on our good faith and self-restraint. We believe, Mr. Kissinger said, that the task we have here is to see if we can resolve this difference.6

In order to make clear our position, Mr. Kissinger said, he would like to put forward some views of the President. Mr. Le Duc Tho once said that he thought the U.S. wants to drag out the war in order to strengthen the government in Saigon, and so we did not want to withdraw our troops. Mr. Kissinger said he was at the meeting to tell them that we agree to the principle of total withdrawal of American forces and there would be no American bases in Vietnam after the conclusion of negotiations. We prefer negotiations to Vietnamization and would choose the latter only if it were obvious that negotiations would not succeed.7

Secondly, he continued, we recognize that Hanoi has a special problem in placing their troops on the same legal basis as ours, since they do not consider them foreign troops and indeed have never [Page 600]admitted their presence in the South. Mr. Kissinger said that we respect their attitude, and are interested in practical, not theoretical, solutions.

With respect to a political solution, Mr. Kissinger said, there are two ways of dealing with it. First, after withdrawal of external military forces, the South Vietnamese could settle it among themselves. Secondly, if it is to be part of our negotiations, we would follow the following principles:

  • —The political solution must reflect the existing political realities in South Vietnam and we realize that neither side can be expected to give up in negotiations what had not been conceded on the battlefield.
  • —We believe that a fair political process must register the existing relationship of political forces.

The question then, Mr. Kissinger said, is how to proceed. We could proceed in this channel to discuss their ten points and our eight points.8 This was attempted at some private meetings.9 While we are ready to proceed this way, it was Mr. Kissinger's personal opinion that we would quickly arrive at serious disagreements. Therefore, he said, another way of proceeding might be to put aside their ten points and our eight points, and define some general principles—objectives—of what we might achieve. The details could be negotiated in the meetings between our delegations at the Majestic Hotel. If this procedure is adopted, we would be ready to send a new negotiating team which is not married to the old form of the negotiations.

We would approach such a procedure with a constructive attitude, Mr. Kissinger continued, attempting to take into account their concerns, and in the hope that this would be their attitude as well. We would also suggest setting a deadline of June 1 or July 1—we are flexible about the exact date—to let us know what we are working towards. The President had also authorized Mr. Kissinger to say that he would let Mr. Kissinger go on participating in these discussions.

Once we establish such a timetable, he said, we will do our best to maintain it, but progress depends on maintaining what we have done to date. Mr. Kissinger said that he would tell them in all frankness [Page 601]that an increase in violence would be inconsistent with this, would be to no one's advantage, and could have serious consequences.

At our last meeting, Mr. Kissinger said, Minister Xuan Thuy said that their side wants peace, not war. We feel the same way. The President will be in office another seven years. It is not necessary or desirable for either side to prove its courage any further. They have proved the great skill, tenacity, and heroism with which they could make war. Mr. Kissinger said he was at the meeting to see if we could make peace. We want a peace which both sides will wish to maintain; any other peace will not last. Strange as this may seem after all we have been through together, an independent, prosperous, and self-reliant Vietnam is in our national interest as we see it. In any historic period, we are not a threat to Vietnamese independence.

Mr. Kissinger said he would like to conclude by repeating something President Nixon had said in his speech to the UN: “The people of Vietnam, North and South alike, have demonstrated heroism enough to last a century. When the war ends, the United States will stand ready to help the people of Vietnam—all of them—in their tasks of renewal and reconstruction.”10

Mr. Kissinger said that he was at the meeting in that spirit, and expected it to carry over into our future relationship.

He then apologized for speaking so long, explaining that Harvard professors always speak for 55 minutes. (North Vietnamese smiles.)

(There was then a 10-minute break. Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy went off to consult.)

After the break, Mr. Kissinger noted that Joe Kraft had urged him to see Le Duc Tho, whom Kraft greatly admired. Kraft would probably soon write articles accusing Mr. Kissinger of being war-like. (North Vietnamese smiles.)

Xuan Thuy then said that since he had last met Mr. Kissinger on August 4, the negotiations between the U.S., DRV, PRG, and Saigon administration, at the Avenue Kleber, as well as the private meetings, had obviously deteriorated.

Mr. Kissinger had suggested at that time that we should reach a settlement by November 1st. But Xuan Thuy remembered that on August 4 Mr. Kissinger did not raise any concrete contents in his remarks. Mr. Kissinger had suggested that they open another forum between Xuan Thuy and the U.S. As for the North Vietnamese, they had put forward two concrete points for August 4. Xuan Thuy had said on that [Page 602]day that the U.S. should withdraw its troops rapidly within five or six months. Secondly, the formation of a provisional coalition government including three components had been raised. Since that meeting was concluded, the North Vietnamese did not see any response from the U.S. side. Therefore, between the two dates of August 4 and the end of October, if we had not settled any questions, it was not on account of the North Vietnamese side but because the U.S. did not give any answer to their proposals.

Then in November, Xuan Thuy continued, President Nixon gave a speech11 that the North Vietnamese have publicly qualified as a war speech. Public opinion has also considered it a war speech.

Mr. Kissinger asked: Whose public opinion? Xuan Thuy replied, “The U.S. and elsewhere.”

Mr. Kissinger said, “not in the U.S.” President Nixon's popularity has increased 20%, he noted. Xuan Thuy said that this was Mr. Kissinger's assessment. He was speaking of his own. Mr. Kissinger had a theory from Harvard, he said smiling, and he had one from Hanoi. Mr. Kissinger said that they should wait until he lectured at Harvard on public opinion in North Vietnam.

Xuan Thuy said that Mr. Nixon's November speech had put emphasis on Vietnamization, and belittled the Paris negotiations. Actually, he said, the policy of Vietnamization was applied before President Nixon made his speech. But in his November speech, he publicly announced emphasis on Vietnamization. Since then, the U.S. Government side made great publicity about the success of Vietnamization. This is its right—Xuan Thuy would not argue about that. But from their point of view, they could see that if Vietnamization does not bring any success, but the U.S. believes it does, this would be subjective thinking. If it is really not a success, and the U.S. says it is, that would be deceiving U.S. public opinion.

With regard to the Paris conference, Xuan Thuy said that since the August meeting, the U.S. Government had agreed to the retirement of Ambassador Lodge without naming a successor.

Now, he continued, Mr. Kissinger says that the U.S. really wants peace. He says that it is the real intention of the U.S. to withdraw all U.S. forces and military bases. But in reality, in practice, one doesn't see any evidence of this desire. With regard to troop withdrawal, the U.S. does withdraw troops, but this the North Vietnamese have characterized as withdrawal by driblets. It has no significance at all in comparison to the total of more than 500,000 men. Besides, many personalities Interpreter [Page 603]in U.S. political circles have publicly made known the U.S. intention to leave behind 200,000 to 300,000 troops. If the U.S. announced it will totally withdraw its troops without any reservation, but with the withdrawals going on for years and years, this too will have no practical significance at all.

What they would like to know, Xuan Thuy said, is when total withdrawal of U.S. troops—without leaving behind any troops or bases— will be completed.12

In the meantime, he continued, U.S. air activity has greatly intensified, as well as the spreading of toxic chemicals. Pacification operations and massacres of the civilian population have also been stepped up.

So they wonder, Xuan Thuy said, how we can say that we have been reducing our activities in South Vietnam. Moreover, reduction is not the act they are demanding. They are demanding the withdrawal of all troops, to put an end to the war.

Xuan Thuy said that in Laos, it is the same thing—the U.S. Air Force carries out activities throughout Laos with increased intensity. All this makes them put an interrogation point on the good faith of the U.S.

Moreover, Xuan Thuy continued, in his November speech President Nixon seemed to make a threat against them. Xuan Thuy had often stated, and even in the meeting on August 4, that threats have no effect at all on the Vietnamese people. It is not their intention to have a test of force with the U.S., because it is known to the whole world that the U.S. has more people and resources than Vietnam, and is technically and scientifically stronger. But the question is that they have to defend their independence, to defend their real freedom and the peace of their people.13

Xuan Thuy then recalled that Mr. Kissinger had said that public opinion in the U.S. and the world is now different from what it was in August, and Hanoi could not wait for it. This idea was expressed many times, Xuan Thuy said, by Mr. Cabot Lodge, and now Mr. Kissinger repeated it. Xuan Thuy had been answering that the Vietnamese people are fighting for genuine independence, freedom and peace. In fighting, they rely mainly on their own force, on their own line and policy, on their own spirit, on the cohesion and unity of the Vietnamese people. In the past, when fighting against other imperialist powers, it had been the same thing. They have been fighting U.S. aggression for tens of years. This is not a new fact. But the anti-war movement in the U.S. and the world began only a few years ago. Before the movements [Page 604]began, on what did they rely to fight aggression? Therefore, they don't wait for the peace movement in the U.S. But naturally, Xuan Thuy said, if the anti-war movements in the U.S. and the world support their struggle, they must be grateful to them.

Xuan Thuy said that what they are waiting for is when Vietnam will be really free, independent, and peaceful. As long as Vietnam is not free, independent and peaceful, the Vietnamese people have no other way but to fight for these objectives.

Xuan Thuy said that Mr. Kissinger had asked what could be our objectives. Xuan Thuy said he did not know about American objectives. For them, it is to carry on negotiations and come to real freedom, independence, and peace for Vietnam. To do so, the U.S. must stop reconnaissance flights over the DRV and stop bombing raids between the 19th and 17th parallels. As for South Vietnam, the U.S. should totally withdraw its troops and those of other countries in the U.S. camp, and put an end to all acts—chemical warfare, bombing raids, and massacres of the civilian population.

Xuan Thuy said that they have spoken about rapid withdrawal. Mrs. Binh had put it more concretely. If the U.S. agrees to withdraw in six months, concrete discussions could be held about the security of the troops as they left.14 As for the political program, Xuan Thuy said, they have proposed a coalition government including the three components. This would not be a monopoly of anyone—of the NLF, the PRG, or of the Saigon administration. It would belong to the people of South Vietnam.

Moreover, Xuan Thuy continued, in August Mr. Kissinger had raised the question of keeping the existing format at Kleber and establishing a new format as well. If so, the U.S. should have appointed a new head to the delegation, because Xuan Thuy had agreed to those procedures.

Xuan Thuy then asked if he could remark that Mr. Kissinger had had to make arrangements at home in order to come to Paris, which had involved him in complexities. He too had work at home, in Hanoi. He had been in Paris for two years, which shows that the North Vietnamese want peace too.

Now, Xuan Thuy said, with regard to a peaceful settlement of the Vietnamese war, if we thought the situation had deteriorated for their side and they thought it had deteriorated for our side, it would take much time to speak of this.

So, Xuan Thuy said, that is the fact of the matter. Mr. Kissinger had come a long way. They were prepared to settle the matter, Xuan Thuy [Page 605]said. If we wanted to talk, we should go straight into the heart of the matter, and find a solution.

Xuan Thuy said that he had listened to Mr. Kissinger's explanation, and found no great differences from last time. There are two main questions:

  • —The first is troop withdrawals, and Mr. Kissinger had not said when they would be completed.
  • —The second concerns the government. Mr. Kissinger still was saying that neither side could give up at the negotiation table what had not been conceded on the battlefield. The U.S. still placed emphasis not on troop withdrawals, but on settlement among the Vietnamese. This is the main thing.

For them, Xuan Thuy said, they think that if there is a settlement it should be a “package settlement.” It could cover how really to respect the right of the South Vietnamese people to self-determination and how to really end the war.15

And so, Xuan Thuy said, he thought that with regard to how to proceed in the negotiations, that is one question. We should go straight into the problem. Then the question of how to proceed can be easily solved. This is what he had to say about Mr. Kissinger's explanations. They would agree to meet again at 4:00 p.m. or 4:30 p.m.

Mr. Kissinger asked if he could make two or three points about what Minister Xuan Thuy had said, so that they could begin on a positive note in the afternoon. He said that he would speak with the frankness which is the only point of a meeting where he met with people of their level.

Mr. Kissinger said that Minister Xuan Thuy had stated that they made two specific proposals at the last meeting, to which we didn't respond. He would like to point out two things:

  • —Both had been made before, and did not require his presence in Paris.
  • —It is easy to make proposals demanding that the other side do something. This is not a negotiation. This, he believed, is the difficulty of our negotiations. Minister Xuan Thuy and others have said repeatedly that if we withdraw in six months, they will discuss the modalities. But we don't have to discuss this with them—we could do it on our own—and would not expect them to do anything about it. They would not—and could not—oppose our withdrawal.

Mr. Kissinger said that he was at the meeting to tell them on behalf of the President that we are willing in negotiations to fix a [Page 606]deadline for U.S. withdrawal, so that the other side can see whether all Americans have really withdrawn. All the discussions of how many troops will remain under Vietnamization are theoretical. If Vietnamization succeeds, we will withdraw the most. If it does not, we will be in an uncertain area.16

Mr. Kissinger said that we face an area of conflicting judgments. They believe our judgments are subjective. We believe theirs are subjective. The only way we can find out who is right is to continue the war. They have told us that they prefer not to do that. We feel the same way.

We read every word that Minister Xuan Thuy, Le Duc Tho and other North Vietnamese said with the greatest care. In reading the records of the negotiations in August, September and October, we came to the conclusion that nothing was happening. Certainly they made no effort to activate this channel after we had opened it in August, and this meeting was being held at Mr. Kissinger's initiative. Mr. Kissinger said we believe that the level of delegation we now have is adequate for the level of discussions now going on. As he had pointed out in his statement, when it appears that negotiations are on a new basis, we will put in new individuals who are not so committed by the patterns of the past.17

Mr. Kissinger then said that he would like to make one statement of fact. Minister Xuan Thuy had said that we have intensified our air activity. We don't care what they say publicly, but they should know in Hanoi that we have in fact made a reduction of 25% of the activities both of B-52's and of other aircraft. Their propaganda was up to them, but this is a fact their leaders should know. Mr. Kissinger then noted that he agreed with Minister Xuan Thuy—we are not talking about how to reduce the war, but about how to end it.

Mr. Kissinger said that he accepted with pleasure the proposal of Minister Xuan Thuy to meet at 4:00 p.m. We could then go to the heart of the matter, in a spirit of reciprocity, and not repeat what we already know and have said.

Xuan Thuy said he would like to add one word. With regard to what he had been saying, he had documents, records and proof. The U.S. had often said that the North Vietnamese were here for propaganda. If this were the case, Xuan Thuy said, they would have sent cadres who are expert at propaganda and would have had no need to send him and Le Duc Tho. Also, the U.S. had much stronger means for propaganda than the North Vietnamese.

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As a final word, Xuan Thuy said that he would like to speak about keeping secrets. Mr. Kissinger had spoken of this. So had President Nixon's letter to President Ho Chi Minh,18 and Ambassador Lodge had also recommended secrecy. Then President Nixon spoke of everything on November 3. Was this for propaganda? They, Xuan Thuy said, keep their word; they match their words to their deeds. The leakage was on the U.S. side.

Le Duc Tho said that Mr. Kissinger had spoken also of how to overcome mistrust. When our side did not keep so minor a promise, how could we speak of mistrust?

Mr. Kissinger said that if we made a catalog of grievances, he would not get back to Washington for a long time. He recalled that the North Vietnamese had published an exchange of letters between President Johnson and President Ho Chi Minh.19

As for the private meetings, a number of U.S. journalists were told by people on their delegation that we were not ready for private talks. This question therefore became part of the public debate.

In any event, Mr. Kissinger continued, they could be certain that any undertakings in this channel would be strictly protected. No one can fool Mr. Le Duc Tho and Minister Xuan Thuy twice. (Smiles all around.)

Le Duc Tho said that they have been fooled many times. Mr. Kissinger said, “Not by me.”

Mr. Kissinger said he recognized that anything Minister Xuan Thuy said was based on documents. Minister Xuan Thuy is a serious man. We have great respect for him. The difficult problems are not when falsehood confronts truth, but when two truths confront each other.

The North Vietnamese all smiled and Le Duc Tho exclaimed— “Philosophy!” Mr. Kissinger said that he understands Le Duc Tho is an expert in theory. Xuan Thuy said that actually Mr. Kissinger was a professor of philosophy at an American university, so his speeches always contained philosophy. Mr. Kissinger said that he does believe philosophy must precede practice, so he finds Marxism interesting. (More North Vietnamese smiles.)

Mr. Kissinger said that he would see them at 4:00 o'clock and regretted any inconvenience his having to go to lunch may have caused them. The North Vietnamese said that there was none.

(The meeting ended at 12:20 p.m.)

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 852, For the President's File—Vietnam Negotiations, Sensitive, Camp David, Vol. II. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. No drafting information appears on the source text. The meeting took place at 11 Rue Darthe, one of the residences of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in Paris. Kissinger sent Nixon this memorandum on February 25 and explained in an attached note that because the conversation was so lengthy, he had “indicated the most important remarks by a line in the margin.” (Ibid.) During the meeting, Walters translated Kissinger's remarks into French and the North Vietnamese interpreter translated the French into Vietnamese. The process was reversed when Le Duc Tho or Xuan Thuy spoke. (Walters, Silent Missions, p. 515)
  2. See Document 166.
  3. As reported in telegram 734/Delto 1173 from Paris, January 16. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 172, Paris Talks/Meetings, Paris Talks, Vol. I, Nodis/Paris Meeting Plus)
  4. See the attachment to Document 106.
  5. Kissinger highlighted this and the following paragraph for the President.
  6. The North Vietnamese did not understand the translation of this. Mr. Kissinger said that at Harvard, “heavy words” are often confused with profundity. Everyone laughed, and Mai Van Bo said that Xuan Thuy is not the only one to make enigmatic statements. [Footnote in the source text.]
  7. Kissinger highlighted this and the next two paragraphs for the President.
  8. The 10-point peace program was put forward by the National Liberation Front at the 16th plenary session of the Paris negotiations on May 8, 1969. The text of the NLF's 10-point program is in Stebbins and Adam, Documents on American Foreign Policy, 1968–1969, pp. 249–252. Nixon responded with an eight-point program which he enumerated in a May 14 televised address to the nation. The text of Nixon's eight-point program is in Public Papers: Nixon , 1969, p. 373.
  9. Kissinger highlighted the rest of this paragraph beginning at this point and the next two paragraphs for the President.
  10. Kissinger is quoting two extracts from the Vietnam portion of the President's address to the 24th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, September 18, 1969. (Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 725–727)
  11. Reference is to Nixon's Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam, November 3, 1969. (Ibid., pp. 901–909)
  12. Kissinger highlighted this paragraph for the President.
  13. Kissinger highlighted this paragraph for the President.
  14. The second of the NLF's 10 points of May 8, 1969.
  15. Kissinger highlighted this paragraph and the first three sentences of the next paragraph for the President.
  16. Kissinger highlighted this and the next paragraph for the President.
  17. Kissinger highlighted the last two sentences of this paragraph for the President.
  18. Dated July 15, 1969; See footnote 3 and 4, Document 97.
  19. On March 21 the DRV broadcast on Radio Hanoi the text of President Johnson's letter to Ho Chi Minh, February 8, 1967, as well as the text of Ho Chi Minh's response, February 15. Both are printed in Department of State Bulletin, April 10, 1967, pp. 595–597.