Attached is a list of the actions indicated during the National Security
Council meeting on Saturday, January 25, 1969 dealing with Vietnam. The list
has been coordinated on an eyes only basis with the principals and has been
agreed to by them.
With your approval, I will prepare appropriate implementing instructions
where required.3
Attachment
LIST OF ACTIONS RESULTING FROM MEETING OF THE NATIONAL
SECURITY COUNCIL ON JANUARY 25, 1969
Vietnam in General
The President directed that CIA prepare
an analysis of how each of the nations in S.E. Asia would view the
Vietnam options outlined in the NSC
paper considered on the January 25 NSC
agenda.
The President asked to see the November NIE which contains an analysis of S.E. Asian reactions to
various settlement options in Vietnam.
The Assistant to the President asked for an analysis of recent casualty
statistics to reflect comparisons between friendly and enemy casualties,
resulting from (a) friendly initiated actions and (b) enemy initiated
actions.
The President requested an updating on the military situation in Vietnam
focused on possible enemy initiatives during Tet so that he will be
prepared to respond quickly to recommendations for appropriate U.S.
responses.
[Page 43]
Associated with review of U.S. contingency actions in the event of an
enemy Tet offensive, the President wishes to see the contingency plan
which has already been prepared outlining the proposed U.S. response to
an enemy attack on Saigon and/or other major South Vietnamese population
centers.
The President requested that the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff provide
him with a report on current plans and programs for the improvement of
South Vietnam’s internal security capabilities with emphasis on the
development of indigenous police forces. The report should include
information on the current U.S. organization for accomplishing this
task, to include an analysis of the qualifications of our responsible
officials at each level in the U.S. organization.
The President emphasized that he wants absolutely no public or private
criticism of the GVN by U.S.
officials.
The President registered his concern for insuring that the U.S.
Government continue to apply pressure on the GVN to replace incompetent ARVN leadership, especially in the III Corps area of SVN.
Paris Negotiations
The President emphasized that he did not want the U.S. to initiate any
discussions on ceasefire in the Paris negotiations. It was agreed,
however, that a U.S. position on the issue must be developed should it
be raised by the other side.
The President wishes that unilateral (U.S.) troop withdrawals not be
proposed by the U.S. side in the Paris negotiations. The President
approved continuation of U.S.–GVN
discussions currently underway in Saigon involving possible selected
U.S. troop reductions in conjunction with increasing GVN military capabilities but emphasized
that they be held on a strictly close-hold basis. For the present,
public discussion of U.S. withdrawals or troop reductions in Vietnam
should be limited to mutual withdrawals in the context of Paris
negotiations.
The President wishes the issue of de-escalation not be included on the
list of U.S. negotiating items in Paris.
The President approved the inclusion of Prisoner Exchange in the initial
U.S. Paris negotiating position.
World-Wide Issues
The President requested recommendations as to whether or not the U.S.
should seek to reestablish relations with Cambodia to include whether or
not the President might take such an initiative through a note to
Sihanouk.
The President wishes to be advised at an early date on the possibility of
a transition to an all volunteer Army.
[Page 44]
The President requested that the Secretary of Defense provide him with
his views on the Draft issue.
[Omitted here is a short paragraph on future contacts with the Soviet
Union.]
