416. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 1
Washington, October 8, 1971, 1357Z.
185067. Subject: Chirep. Ref: State 180508.2
- Request you raise Chirep issue in way you consider most appropriate with Permreps (i.e. individually or at Permreps’ lunch), and emphasize overriding importance US ascribes to favorable vote on US resolutions in UNGA. In these discussions, you should draw as appropriate on arguments outlined in reftel. As reftel indicates there will be four key votes at end of Chirep debate: (a) priority for the IQ; (b) the IQ itself; (c) the Albanian Resolution; and (d) our Dual Representation resolution.
- FYI—We are reasonably certain of support on all four votes only from Belgium and from Luxembourg. In addition, we are hopeful Greece and possibly Turkey will eventually decide to vote with us on priority, on IQ and on DR. Several members, notably Norway, Denmark, UK, France and Canada, believe themselves committed to support the Albanian Resolution and oppose IQ. In their case we are working mainly on obtaining support for priority for IQ although there is small chance that pressure in some cases will induce abstentions on IQ as well. Portugal may be persuaded to support the IQ, particularly if it is thinking of voting in favor of Albanian Resolution this year as we suspect (in their special case we might accept this as a trade-off). Dutch position still uncertain but we believe that they are leaning toward abstention. We should work on Dutch for affirmative vote on priority and on the IQ itself. We are hoping to persuade Iceland to vote in favor of priority for the IQ and for the IQ itself. We are attempting to persuade Italy to vote with us on all resolutions. End FYI.
- We of course have been raising issues on continuing basis in all NATO capitals at highest levels and will continue to do so until vote. While some Permreps may consider Chirep issue peripheral to NATO affairs, expulsion of ROC could have destabilizing effect on security situation in Pacific. One purpose of your efforts will be to demonstrate extent of our concern, as shown by our effort to press our position in every available forum. Some NATO countries have impression we not making maximum possible effort. This impression is entirely incorrect [Page 828]as demonstrated by number and level of our démarches.3 Thus raising subject in NATO context will be yet another indication of US concern and should relay back to NATO capitals fact that we seeking all possible help from Allies and are determined to obtain favorable vote.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret. Drafted by Samuel B. Bartlett; cleared by Feldman, Fessenden, and Floyd; and approved by Herz. Repeated to USUN and to all NATO capitals.↩
- Document 413.↩
- Telegram 182445 to all posts, October 5, reviewed tactical considerations and sent detailed instructions for démarches to host governments, including advice to excerpt the portion of Secretary Rogers’ October 4 speech before the General Assembly on the Chinese representation issue. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM) For text of Secretary Rogers’ speech, see Department of State Bulletin, October 25, 1971, pp. 437–444.↩