Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume V, United Nations, 1969–1972

413. Telegram From the Department of State to All Posts¹

Washington, October 1, 1971, 0055Z.

180508. Subj: Chirep: Status Report and Action Program. For Chief of Mission or Principal Officer.

1. This message is to bring you up to date on Chirep situation and to help in focussing our further efforts. We wish to stress the very high priority given our Chirep initiative at highest levels of USG as well as our desire that Chief of Mission give this matter their continuing personal attention, even where host govt decision seems firm. The votes may be close, and continuing efforts will be required world-wide to win the battle.

2. Message is in three parts: Part I is brief description of current status of our initiative and what we see as likely scenario over the next few weeks; Part II provides breakdown of how we believe countries are lining up and what actions are required; Part III recapitulates in brief the principal talking points given in previous circulars on Chirep.

3. Part I—Current Situation and Scenario

A. Both the Albanian and US items are now included on UNGA agenda. Our resolutions (IQ and DR) are tabled under both our own and the Albanian agenda items. Texts were transmitted to posts by State 175244.² The Albanian agenda item will come up for discussion first, but the debate will be wide-ranging and will cover all three resolutions.

B. We expect the Chirep debate to begin shortly after conclusion of the current General Debate period, probably on October 18 or 19. We expect debate to be fairly lengthy, expect the Albanian side will probably attempt a number of parliamentary maneuvers, and believe actual voting will take place in late October or early November.

C. Aside from whatever procedural maneuvering our opponents may attempt, there will be four major votes: (1) a motion for “priority”, which we will make, to have the Important Question resolution voted on before the Albanian Resolution is voted on; (2) the vote on the IQ itself; (3) the vote on the Albanian Resolution; (4) the vote on our DR resolution. If we lose on the first vote (priority for the IQ) we will probably lose on everything thereafter. If we lose on the IQ itself, the AR would pass by a simple majority.

4. Part II—The Line-up

A. Following information on positions being taken by countries is believed current as of the date of transmission, and is analyzed under three headings: how we believe countries are lining up on the matter of having the Important Question resolution voted on ahead of the Albanian Resolution (shorthand term: priority for IQ); how they stand on the IQ itself; how they stand on DR.

B. Action to be taken by all posts:

(1) If posts believe their country is incorrectly listed below, this should be reported to Dept with info to USUN, Taipei, Tokyo, Wellington and Canberra.

(2) In the “Believed Favorable” and “Decided For” categories we list countries that have told us they will vote with us and those countries we believe will almost certainly vote with us even though they have not yet said so. Experience shows that shifts and slippages can still occur in this category, even where govt has assured us of favorable votes. We are not encouraging you to reopen the dialogue (although an occasional expression of gratification that they and we are together on this issue may be helpful). Nevertheless, posts should be alive to note any changes in attitude and take whatever action seems appropriate to reinforce host government’s original resolve. In any case, should you notice any slackening or nervousness or tendency to back away from previous expressions of support, this should be immediately reported. Since votes may be close, we need to keep tabs meticulously on the likely voting behavior of all UN members.

(3) Where countries are indicated as “Believed Unfavorable” or “Decided Against”, and where this is not patently unreasonable, posts should work by all available means to persuade host govt to abstain rather than vote against our resolutions, and abstain rather than vote for the Albanian Resolution.

(4) Where countries are indicated as leaning in favor, leaning against or uncommitted, posts must make every effort to obtain vote in favor of having the IQ voted on before the Albanian Resolution; vote in favor of the IQ itself; vote against the Albanian Resolution, and vote in favor of DR. This also applies to countries in the “abstain” category.

(5) Dept welcomes post suggestions as to best tactics in dealing with individual countries, including recommendations for a personal message from the Secretary.

[Omitted here are Sections C and D with lists of countries and their probable votes on the IQ and DR resolutions.]

5. Part III—The Arguments Recapitulated

A. Principal arguments in favor of our resolutions:

a. Dual representation is the only fair solution to the Chirep problem. The AR would deprive 14 million people of representation in the UN.

b. It is reasonable and realistic: Both the PRC and ROC exist. The UN should take cognizance of realities. This does not imply approval or endorsement of any legal position.

c. There is no need for the UN to rule on PRC and ROC claims and counter-claims, nor need UN action affect the position which any member takes in its bilateral relations with either entity. In terms of assisting movement toward a peaceful resolution of outstanding issues, the best contribution the UN can make is to serve as a mechanism which Taiwan and the Mainland can use to settle their problems peacefully. The extreme act of depriving the Republic of China of representation and driving it outside the UN would do the opposite.

d. If the ROC should be deprived of representation, this would be a dangerous precedent. Moreover, it would be something that the UN would probably be unable to undo (because once PRC is in Security Council, it would veto application of ROC as new member).

e. For neutrals: The Albanian Resolution is fundamentally unneutral because it would settle issue brutally in favor of the stronger side. Our resolution does not propose to adjudicate in favor of the weaker; it would simply recognize existing situation and leave question to be worked out in future.

f. For supporters of universality: Passage of the Albanian Resolution would be a retrograde step from point of view of those who espouse ideal of universal UN membership.

g. We are making a determined effort to win. We are very serious in our resolve. This is a matter of importance to the United States.

6. Principal Counter-arguments to Objections

a. “There can be only one China, and DR implies two Chinas (or one China, one Taiwan)”. Not so. DR not only makes no statement about two Chinas, leaving question entirely open, it explicitly states that the solution proposed is without prejudice to a settlement of the conflicting claims of parties involved. Japan, for instance, in announcing co-sponsorship for our resolutions, made ringing affirmation of its position that China is one and must not be divided.

b. “ROC should remain, but under name of Formosa”. It is conceivable that some day status of ROC may change, but we believe UN should be careful not to take a position on this. If it did, friends of PRC and ROC (both of whom are for “one China”) would combine to defeat any such resolution. In addition, a resolution which described the ROC as “The government of Formosa” would be more distasteful to Peking than our present resolution.

c. “You are creating a new member, and new members must be admitted under Article 4 procedure.” Not so, our DR resolution decides how China should be represented, it does not involve new membership. Admittedly, dual representation is unusual, but it is not unprecedented. USSR has triple representation.

d. “PRC will never come in under DR.” How can anyone be so sure? It would be surprising if PRC did not proclaim at present that it will have nothing to do with UN if DR passes since to do otherwise would lose votes for the AR; but after DR resolution passes the PRC will be confronted with a new situation. PRC has shown that it can be flexible when that suits its interests. (In countries where this might be helpful, you could call attention to speculative stories from Hong Kong that Chou En-lai might come to UN “to take seat and wage fight from inside UN for expulsion of the ROC.” It is also possible that PRC might take the Security Council seat only for time being. There are many other possibilities.)

e. “We are afraid that if we vote against them, that will make the PRC angry.” We wonder why friendly countries who are prepared to worry over the state of their relations with the PRC should not be at least as concerned about their relations with us.

7. Embassies should not hesitate to ask for instructions if anything in our position is not clear to them or if they hear arguments that are difficult to answer.

Irwin

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret. Drafted by Feldman and Herz; cleared by Fessenden, Moore, Davies, Brown, and Crimmins; and approved by Herz. Also sent to the POLADs for CINCPAC, CINCSO, CINCSTRIKE, CINCEUR, CINCLANT, USDOCOSOUTH, CINCCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFE, HICOMRY, USNMR SHAPE, COMAC, and HICOMTERPACUS.
2. Not printed.