Here is an important memorandum on the organization of this government
for foreign operations which Max
Taylor has prepared, pursuant to your instruction to him
of last September. He has gone beyond the field of counterinsurgency,
and I think he has produced a very constructive set of proposals. He has
also done a very workmanlike job of clearing them around the
government.
When you have had a chance to read his memorandum, I think you may want
to talk with him directly, and I would be glad to join if you want me.
It is quite possible that some new instructions along this line could be
made to fit in very well with a plan to continue my office on a somewhat
less visible scale. Max’s plan in essence is to throw the responsibility
at the State Department with enough White House participation to insure
Presidential control and to keep other agencies from declaring their
independence.
Attachment4
Washington, January 17,
1966.
Letter From the President’s Special Consultant
(Taylor) to President Johnson
Dear Mr. President:
In your letter of September 1, 1965,5
you directed me to review all governmental activities in the field
of counter-insurgency (i.e., the resistance to “wars of liberation”)
and make appropriate recommendations to assure our readiness to cope
with future situations similar to that in South Viet-Nam. Since that
time, I have been engaged in complying with your instructions,
assisted by four interdepartmental committees which have reviewed
the counter-insurgency activities of the government in the fields of
policy, organization, planning, training, resources and
intelligence. In order to permit an early reply to your directive,
the committees were given only two months to prepare their reports
so that, of necessity, their review has been of the nature of a
spot-check of the vast number of governmental programs related to
counter-insurgency.6
[Page 113]
At the outset, we agreed that the problem which we were examining was
inaccurately described by the term, “counter-insurgency” which
suggests primarily the military aspects of the final phase of a “war
of liberation,” and fails to emphasize the non-military preventive
aspects of the problem. To avoid this pitfall, we have defined the
purpose of our review as the evaluation of the adequacy of
governmental policies, procedures, programs and performance for
anticipating or coping with subversive aggression; i.e., the use of
political subversion, sabotage, terrorist activities and guerrilla
operations (singly or in combination) to overthrow a government
which the United States has a cogent interest to maintain. It is
considered that, in the normal case, the subversive aggression is
likely to be Communist inspired and to receive support from sources
outside the territory of the country under attack. A characteristic
of such situations is that, by their critical or potentially
critical character, they pose a requirement in Washington and in the
field for a sharper focus of interdepartmental attention and for a
closer coordination of interdepartmental efforts and resources than
would be possible by adherence to normal governmental
procedures.
Based on the foregoing statement of the scope of the problem, the
committees completed their reviews and have submitted their reports
to provide a basis for my recommendations to you. No effort has been
made to staff them among the interested agencies of the government
or to reconcile the occasional differences of view which developed
between committee members or between committees. I have been guided
but not bound by their conclusions.
This inquiry has developed many interesting facts bearing on the
effectiveness of governmental programs dealing with what I shall
henceforth call “subversive aggression” and its antidote
“counter-subversion”. There is no question but that a great deal has
been accomplished since the establishment of the Special Group
(Counter-insurgency) in January, 1962, in developing means and
procedures for defense against subversive aggression. However, there
is considerable evidence that the missionary zeal of the early years
has subsided to some degree and needs to be revived at a time like
the present when the Communist leadership, particularly in Peking,
is proclaiming a clear and serious intent to instigate further “wars
of liberation” in such areas of Asia, Africa and Latin America,
after their anticipated success in South Viet-Nam. The evidence of
their confidence in this technique gives us a strong incentive to
review and revitalize our own programs, and to bring our procedures
and resources into sharper focus on the problem.
The committees considered that they found numerous inadequacies in
government performance in the fields of organization, training,
resources and intelligence which they reviewed. Guided by their
comments,
[Page 114]
I have cited in
Annex 1 those areas in which deficiencies may exist which seem
important enough to call to the attention of the responsible
departments and agencies of the government. I shall limit my
comments in this letter to what I believe to be the basic
problem—the need to improve the executive direction, coordination
and supervision of interdepartmental activities overseas. A short
title for the problem might be “crisis prevention and management in
overseas affairs”, with subversive aggression regarded as a
particularly important kind of crisis with particularly exacting
requirements for prevention or management. Because of the intensity
of effort required to prevent or cope with subversive aggression, it
seems a reasonable assumption that procedures adequate for dealing
with it will also suffice for critical overseas problems which fall
outside the normally defined limits of subversive aggression and,
thus, should meet the needs of crisis management in general.
As we have learned from our experience in Viet-Nam, there are three
essential parts to coping with subversive aggression—the first is
the prompt and timely identification of the threat; the second, the
determination that the U.S. has a cogent interest in resisting this
threat; the third, a prompt and effective interdepartmental response
both in the country threatened and in the executive branch of the
government in Washington. Hence, in this review, I have felt the
need to examine closely the effectiveness of our Ambassadors and
Country Teams overseas and the working of the overseas coordination
function in the Department of State, since under the terms of
President Kennedy’s statement
of February 19, 1961,7 that Department is charged with the
coordination of the work of the government overseas. Finally, I
shall discuss the role of the Special Group (Counter-insurgency)
which was established by NSAM No.
124, January 18, 1962 (Annex 2) as an instrumentality of the
President for the purpose of “assuring unity of effort and the use
of all available resources with maximum effectiveness in preventing
and resisting subversive insurgency and related forms of indirect
aggression in friendly countries.”
Overseas, the Ambassador, assisted by his Country Team, is reasonably
well equipped to cope with his interdepartmental problems. A series
of Presidential letters to Ambassadors, the last that of President
Kennedy in 1961, have
clearly established the responsibility of an Ambassador to oversee,
coordinate and supervise all U.S. activities in his country, except
those related to military operations. Although this authority does
not make the Ambassador directly responsible for the
[Page 115]
success or failure in the aggregate of
the programs of his subordinates on the Country Team, it is probably
sufficient authority to guide the United States effort in normal
situations. I have doubts that it is broad enough in countries
seriously threatened by subversion. There is a strong case, I
believe, to review the role of the Ambassador, at least in critical
countries, with a view to making him the representative of the
President with directive authority over all agencies and activities
(less exempted military activities) in his country, subject to the
right of appeal of his subordinates to Washington. In this capacity,
he would be viewed as concurrently the representative of the
Department of State for political and diplomatic matters and your
representative as overall coordinator and general manager,
responsible for the success of all United States activities within
the limits set by the resources made available to him. As noted
above, his present responsibility for these matters does not extend
beyond overseeing, coordinating and supervising.
It would be comparatively easy to tighten up executive direction
abroad; it is more complicated in Washington where only the
President has full authority to adjudicate issues between the heads
of departments and to assure the coordination and unity of their
efforts. If the President and his senior advisers are to be
protected from the distraction of relatively minor matters, there
needs to be a filtration process at several points along the channel
of responsibility reaching from the overseas embassy to the White
House, for disposing of all interdepartmental matters not requiring
the action of the next higher authority. If we are to disturb
existing relationships as little as possible, it seems clear to me
that the Secretary of State, acting as the agent of the President,
should carry out this function of direction, supervision and
coordination of overseas affairs (less exempted military activities)
and should be responsible for the functioning of a
coordination-filtration mechanism analogous to the Ambassador’s
Country Team both at the level of the regional Assistant Secretaries
and just below his own level in the Department of State. I have
deliberately added to the responsibilities of the Secretary the
functions of supervision and direction in addition to coordination
because of the firm conviction that decisive directive action must
be encouraged—indeed insisted on—at all the focal points along the
channel of responsibility cited above.
In establishing the coordination-filtration mechanism, the first area
to consider for strengthening is that of the regional Assistant
Secretary of State (and perhaps also the Assistant Secretary of
State for International Organization Affairs) who, with his
supporting managerial apparatus, should perform the function of a
wide-viewing radar, sweeping and surveying the area represented by
the countries for which he is responsible. Working with the
Ambassadors of his area, he should be constantly on the lookout for
critical situations, anticipating
[Page 116]
their needs and verifying that adequate
interdepartmental plans and programs exist and are being implemented
in each of the countries of his responsibility. He should be quick
to spot and report the symptoms of subversive aggression. In my
opinion, to discharge those important duties he needs an
interdepartmental committee composed similarly to the Country Team
but with White House staff representation on which he could occupy a
similar position to that of the Ambassador on the Country Team. He
should chair this committee himself and have the authority to decide
all issues before the committee, subject to the right of appeal of
its members to higher authority. It is convenient to refer to such a
chairman as an “executive chairman” and the authority implied by the
title must be wielded aggressively if a committee like this one is
to be effective.
At present, the Assistant Secretaries, generally speaking, do not
have the assistance of such a committee which I shall tentatively
call the Regional Coordination Group (RCG) to assist them in taking
prompt interdepartmental decisions and actions. Thus, they must rely
largely on ad hoc meetings and informal staffing procedures to
achieve the necessary coordination.
Even if supported by an RCG, the Assistant Secretaries will always
have some interdepartmental problems—a limited number, we would
hope—which will have to be carried to the level of the President or
of the Cabinet for resolution. Again, as a part of the screening
process designed to protect the time of top officials we would like
to have a mechanism to dispose of as many of them as possible short
of the Secretary. I have found my greatest difficulty in reaching a
recommendation on this point but have found the suggestion of a
solution in the present functioning of the Special Group
(Counter-insurgency) mentioned above.
The strength of the Special Group (Counter-insurgency) has been that,
by the quality and seniority of its membership, quick and decisive
interdepartmental action was possible on matters brought before it.
Also, it has enjoyed the prestige of being a Presidential committee
which can obtain White House directives as needed to carry out its
purposes.
It is my view that the Special Group (Counter-insurgency) with a
broader directive and a new name, perhaps the Overseas Operations
Group (OOG), could be converted into an agency for supporting the
Secretary of State in discharging his broadened responsibilities for
the direction, coordination and supervision of overseas affairs
(less exempted military matters).
While it should report to the Secretary of State in his role as
coordinator and director of overseas affairs, to retain the
advantages of a
[Page 117]
Presidential link and to serve as a reminder of the Presidential
nature of the function being discharged, it may be desirable that,
like the Assistant Secretaries and Ambassadors, the chairman be
appointed by the President (although he could be concurrently an
official of the Department of State if such an arrangement were
desired). As in the case of the Assistant Secretaries, he should
have the authority of an “executive chairman” over the OOG. In Annex
3, there is a draft NSAM which
would effect the changes in Washington organization which have been
described above. I have deliberately omitted from the draft any
reference to the handling of sensitive intelligence matters which,
by their nature, will continue to require special consideration and
treatment. If, after appropriate coordination, such a NSAM is promulgated, I believe that a
new Presidential letter to Ambassadors should be issued at the same
time to set forth their duties and responsibilities under the new
arrangement.
There is a related matter of sufficient importance to mention in this
letter. It is the need for an agreed procedure for establishing and
maintaining a list of “critical countries” for use in assuring the
proper priority of attention by all agencies of government with
overseas responsibilities. At present, there are at least three such
lists kept in three different places, none of which bears the stamp
of formal governmental approval. I would like the OOG to be charged
with recommending such a list (after considering recommendations
from Assistant Secretaries and the United States Intelligence Board)
for the formal approval of the Secretary of State and with keeping
it up to date thereafter. Obviously, the term, “critical country”,
will first require a careful definition if we are to avoid a
dispersion of attention and effort over too many countries at any
one time.
A short summary of the foregoing proposal (Annex 4) is that the
President assigns responsibility for the direction, coordination and
supervision of overseas interdepartmental activities to the
Secretary of State as his agent, who will be assisted in discharging
this function by the Ambassadors and the regional Assistant
Secretaries of State acting in an additional role separate from
their functions as a State Department official; and that at these
three levels there be established a strong interdepartmental
committee on the Country Team model with an “executive chairman”
having broad powers of decision and discretionary authority to
settle all interdepartmental matters falling within his purview or
capability. It assumes that the requirements for focusing
concentrated interdepartmental attention on counter-subversion can
be met by these arrangements which will, at the same time, be
capable of dealing with other critical problems arising overseas
which fall outside the definition of subversive aggression.
A final comment bears on what the proposal is not intended to do. There is no thought of injecting some
kind of impersonal automaticity
[Page 118]
into the process of decision-making. It does
not affect in any way the individual, statutory responsibilities of
the key executive officers of the government but undertakes to
facilitate their timely personal intervention through the use of the
procedures proposed. For example, the President and his principal
assistants such as the Secretary of State and the Secretary of
Defense would have their personal representatives in attendance both
in the Regional Coordination Group and in the Overseas Operations
Group, serving as their eyes and ears and keeping them informed of
the issues under consideration. Thus, they would be kept aware of
the status of those issues so that they could intervene personally
at any moment.
Another purpose which might possibly be inferred but which definitely
is not intended is that this proposal is to
make it possible in the future for the United States to take a
larger share in the policing of the world. I am aware of Marshal Lin
Piao’s comment last September that one virtue of a proliferation of
“Wars of Liberation” would be to pin down and deplete our forces and
I believe that there is always a real danger of dissipating our
resources in this way. Rather than encourage such dissipation, I
would hope that the proposed procedures would give an improved
selectivity to our choice of areas and issues and, hence, to the
application of our resources.
At your convenience, I would appreciate the opportunity to discuss
the foregoing matters with you and receive your guidance as to how
to proceed hereafter.8
Respectfully,
