93. Telephone Conversation Between the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann) and President Johnson 1
[Omitted here is approximately 4 minutes of conversation on Mannʼs illness; magazine articles critical of U.S. action in the Dominican Republic and specifically of Mann, Bennett, and Vaughn; a proposal for U.S. troop withdrawals from the Dominican Republic; and the possibility of a high-level OAS team, headed by the Brazilian Foreign Minister, to take over negotiations in the Dominican Republic.]
President: You donʼt think anything will come out of the negotiations with either side do you?
Mann: No, I donʼt. I think you summed up our feelings early in the game when you said you didnʼt think these negotiations had a 30 percent chance. I feel now just about how I felt then. I donʼt think theyʼre ready; itʼs going to take time. [Mann references a “piece of information” he sent to the President earlier that morning. President Johnson said he read it.]
President: I have grave doubts about Guzman and I donʼt know what weʼre finally going to do if he should accept all of our terms. I keep making them a little harder on him without getting rid of all the Communists.
Mann: I have a strong feeling that this is right Mr. President. Your instinct is right on that, and we ought to be thinking about—this is kind of a maneuver which is all right if we think of it that way and maybe trying to build something around somebody else when the time comes and under the OAS tent.
President: Okay, find anybody you might submit as a name?
Mann: There are people around there probably who are not either Balaguer or Bosch that you could build around. I think youʼll have to look pretty hard; I canʼt suggest anybody now. But somebody on the ground could find them. I donʼt think we ought to become married to this guy Guzman because I just donʼt trust Bosch to fight the Commies. And, what Iʼm afraid of is that Bosch is trying to get us to put him in power and to destroy the armies so that there will be nobody to bother him and then once he takes control I think we might be in deep trouble. [Page 231] Thatʼs my own feeling about it and that came out strongly when I was down there on the ground and everything Iʼve read since I got back tends to confirm this in my mind.
President: Iʼm also afraid that heʼll change the cabinet, if it werenʼt pro-Commie it would be after heʼs in there a month.
Mann: Thatʼs why I was arguing hard the other day for maintaining the armed forces under their present leadership. I donʼt mind if you move one or two men but not too many so we have something to fall back on once we get out. The only people we can rely on there now, Mr. President, on the Communist side are the officer corps of the Armed Forces. There just isnʼt anybody else that I was able to find down there that will give us any base at all to work against the commies in the future. Now weʼve got to do that on the one hand and on the other hand try to get them, I think we can, to quit throwing out governments that are not Communist. Weʼve got to get them to move toward democracy instead of destroying them.
President: Was there any justification for throwing out Reid [Cabral]?
Mann: No, not at all. Reid took over at an impossible time from a political point of view because Bosch had raised the cost—thatʼs a sugar economy—of producing sugar to somewhere around 9 cents. Some people say as high as 11. When the world price went down to 2.5 cents, he was in trouble just because he had to fire a lot of people, he had to impose austerity programs, he made the Generals mad by stopping their grafting, he made the rich mad by collecting taxes, and the poor people who donʼt understand much about this stuff only knew that times were hard. Now thatʼs what really got Reid. Heʼs a pretty decent guy. Most people that I talked to thought he had the cleanest, honest, best government theyʼve had in a long time. But, heʼs gone, and you couldnʼt bring him back. Youʼve got to start with a new face. I donʼt rule out the possibility of Balaguer although I think that would cause great trouble with Imbert. Imbert is afraid of Balaguer.
President: Why?
Mann: Everybody hates everybody down there; thatʼs the main trouble.
President: Why is Imbert afraid of Balaguer?
Mann: Because Imbert killed Trujillo and Balaguer was the Vice President under Trujillo and he thinks he [Balaguer] would let the Trujillistas get to him and kill him and his family.
President: How are we ever going to get Imbert out of power?
Mann: Once we get the OAS down to the [Dominican Republic] and we get the right political climate, I donʼt think itʼs going to be so hard Mr. President. If we donʼt rush it too fast, if we donʼt insult him [Page 232] so he thinks his honor is involved, if we play it slowly and firmly, weʼll find a way.
President: So you think the best thing to do is to just ride it out and just say that weʼre waiting on the OAS.
Mann: Thatʼs my judgment.
President: And say that we have achieved all of our objectives up to this point; weʼve stopped the shooting.
Mann: Weʼve done as much as we can to pave the way for the OAS. They are coming down; weʼre delighted; weʼre sort of turning over to them. This is going to work out better than most people think, I believe.
[Omitted here are closing remarks.]
- Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and Thomas Mann, Tape F65.41, Side B, PNO 2. No classification marking. President Johnson placed the telephone call to Mann. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.↩