84. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State1
1881. Bundy, Bennett and Mora met with Imbert at 11:45 a.m., May 21. Purpose was to get him to agree to indefinite extension of truce and to nail down prompt turn-over of Radio Santo Domingo to OAS. He treated us to quite a display of verbal histrionics designed to impress on us his determination stand fast on GNR and not accept Guzman formula.
Mora led off by asking him to extend truce beyond 24-hour period. Imbert reaction was strongly negative. He said rebels have this time agreed to cease-fire because they know they are licked. Arguments by Mora and Bennett that it is to his interest to project image of man of peace made no perceptible change in his adamant stand. Imbert said that only solution to Dominican situation is for rebels to surrender under full personal guarantees. Bundy said it was USG view that continuation of truce would be great contribution and refusal to go along [Page 214] would be a big mistake. Imbertʼs rejoinder was that he could clean out downtown in 2 days if US did not have his hands tied. He said that he had been tricked into truce. His colleagues had warned him, he added, that if he agreed to a 24-hour truce, he would find himself trapped into a longer one. Request now being made of him was “proof” they were right.
Bundy switched subjects by asking Imbert when we might expect him to turn RSD over to OAS as he had promised Bennett. Imbert replied he and people repairing station and that he wanted to make speech over RSD to Dominican people before allowing OAS to assume “control.” Bundy and Bennett said this not our understanding of agreement. Further discussion led Imbert to say he personally in favor of turning station over to OAS and so announcing in his speech but would have to get clearance from his “associates,” including military.
Turning conversation to US efforts to bring about a political solution, Imbert declared flatly “I will not accept an agreement with them. I will not enter into agreements with Communists … A return to the 1963 Constitution would be a fatal precedent.” He brought up how he had been urged by USG to leave private life to form GNR. He described struggle in DR as one between democracy and communism. He said he failed to see why USG, having urged him assume GNR role, was now trying to force him to deal with Communists. He claimed country was with him and rebels represented only 20 city blocks. Given this and Communist nature of rebels, he saw no reason why he should be asked to accept political formulas which ran counter to his personal convictions and to what Dominican people expect of him. He became so exercised at one point that he said if USG wants to pressure and betray him, he will denounce US before world opinion. “I will not accept political deals (componendas politicas) imposed by foreign government,” he concluded.
Bundy pointed out that Imbert knew full well that our policy is not to support communism, and we take lessons from no one on danger which communism represents. Bundy said our appreciation of military and political situation is frankly quite different from his. We do not think that either side can win by further killing. Our reading of what Dominican people want is continuation of truce and peaceful formula for political solution and not more bloodshed as implied in Imbert request that we allow his troops cross LOC to mop up rebel stronghold.
Recognizing that in Imbertʼs present state of mind it was not profitable to continue discussion, Bundy proposed that those present take time to reflect on views expressed. He told Imbert that he wanted him to know that: (1) we think it is very important that truce continue; (2) we desire to have RSD turned over promptly to OAS; and (3) we [Page 215] plan to continue working toward peaceful solution. Of these, Bundy noted, RSD problem was one needing immediate attention. On this it was agreed that: (1) Imbert would seek consent other GNR members and inform Bennett or Mora of response during course of afternoon; (2) we would promptly send technicians to repair facilities; (3) once in operation, Imbert would make a broadcast announcing he was turning radio over to OAS; (4) Mora would thereupon assume control over programming. Imbert said that he wants his troops to guard RSD even after OAS takes over.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received in the Department of State on May 21 at 10:28 p.m. and passed to the White House, DOD for McNamara, and CIA for Raborn at 11:30 p.m.↩