64. Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of Defense McNamara and President Johnson1

[Omitted here is discussion not related to the Dominican Republic.]

President: Now, Bob, are we, are our military people, the brains that we have, meeting and planning and thinking of every step that might be needed to take so we got adequate contingencies? Letʼs assume that Abe goes out of business tonight and we know that they are building each day and increasing each day and getting stronger each day, and letʼs assume then that our people are fired upon, or weʼre attacked, or weʼre involved some way or we have to get the radio station. How we do it, and what we do, and whether we can go to get an OAS flag if we had to have it? Or do we just sit there and let events take place? Are we considering every possible thing that might occur and what we do about it?

[Page 148]

McNamara: I believe we are, Mr. President. We have laid out the plans. They are in considerable detail. The problem is that every one of them is bloody—and very bloody.

President: Yeah.

McNamara: For US and the Dominicans.

President: Yeah. Well, I think the time is going to come before very long when we have to kind of make up our choice to either let Castro have it, or take it. Itʼs—weʼre hoping that he doesnʼt have that much influence, but I rather believe he does.

[Omitted here is a query from McNamara regarding a meeting between Abe Fortas and Bosch the night before. President Johnson explained that this meeting did not take place yesterday but would later today.]

McNamara: Well, weʼre prepared militarily, Mr. President, every way, I believe, we can be.

President: Well, now suppose they—the Caamaño forces and Bosch and them say there is nothing we can do that we could accept. Then suppose that Palmer and Bennett and our other people, Mann, say we got to have the radio station. Have we thought about what we do and how we do it?

McNamara: Yes. Cy—I donʼt believe heʼs come back yet; he went to the 10 oʼclock meeting this morning2 and he and I agreed that we should set up a special group that does nothing but work on that radio station. Itʼs, at the moment, a split somewhat between CASCIA and Defense. But this is a small project that we ought to be able to, I think, take over ourselves, and that was my suggestion to Cy and heʼs going to work with the group on it this morning. President: Now, another thing I wanted to call to your attention. I donʼt think there would be any question that you will have some extensive grilling on what warnings you had from the services and from the CIA.

McNamara: Yes.

President: And I see from the columns in the New York Post yesterday, and others, that they are after the invisible government and they are after the CIA and they want to kind of make a goat out of it like they did with the Bay of Pigs thing. I donʼt know what the facts are, do you?

McNamara: Well, I know that we had enough warning as far as our military requirements were concerned Mr. President, because, based on, not so much the CIA warnings, but just the events that took [Page 149] place down there, you issued the orders to alert our forces in ample time for US to have them ready to move quickly and close promptly when you wanted them to and you got that.

President: Preceding that; preceding the Saturday3 take-over, did anybody ever tell you or did you ever envision that this was a very explosive thing?

McNamara: No.

President: That might blow?

McNamara: The answer is definitely no, Mr. President. And one of the reasons is that I rely primarily upon the Presidentʼs Intelligence Digest, the daily summary which you go, for my information. I have other sources as well that I dig into. But I use that as the primary checklist. And when I see something dangerous in there, then I go and get more detail on it through the other sources. But that, the Presidentʼs Daily—and checklist—Intelligence Digest, did not carry anything relating to the situation until either the 17th or the 24th, and then it was just an innocuous little item.4 So the fact of the matter is that we were not properly alerted through that means for the general political problem. But I differentiate here between the alert required to take effective action politically and the alert required to take action militarily. We got ample warning in what we needed for our effective military action, but we got it not from the CIA source, but from the pressure of events down there as reported in the press. And that was why on the Saturday preceding the Wednesday5—I donʼt recall the exact circumstances—but I know we talked to you about it and you said, “Go ahead and put whatever you think is required on alert.” We did it on Saturday and Sunday. And the result was, when we had to move Wednesday, we moved within a matter of—we closed within four hours after you issued the order. So militarily we werenʼt handicapped. Politically, frankly, I think we were very seriously handicapped by lack of notice.

President: Well, now, donʼt you think thatʼs something that you and Raborn and I ought to talk about pretty soon—what did happen there, and letʼs get it brought up to date and letʼs see what Bennett knew, if he knew anything before Saturday. Because we are going to have to tell them what we know, if anything.

McNamara: Yes, yes.

President: I have refused to make anybody a goat. And I have said that we held back to the last moment. Bennett said, “I will not recommend troops at this point, although they are firing on the Embassy.” [Page 150] But within a couple of hours, he said, “I got to have them to preserve life,” and we did it. And at that time, CIA told me that there were two Castro leaders involved. And a little later, they told me 8, and a little later, they told me 58. Do you remember now—in that room that afternoon—we met at roughly 4:30.6 I was 5 or 10 minutes late. We talked, we got the message delivered to us, the 3-something message delivered somewhere around 5.7 We actually made the decision around 6 sometime. Now, where was CIA in that picture? They werenʼt meeting with us, were they?

McNamara: No, they werenʼt.

President: Did they—they didnʼt participate in the decision?

McNamara: No, they did not.

President: Well, where did we get—we got—somebody told me that there were two Castro leaders and then there were eight.

McNamara: I think, Mr. President, that ….

President: We must have done that on the phone.

McNamara: Well, either on the phone, or about 7 when you had the Congressional leaders there.8

President: I know he did at that meeting.

McNamara: And I think he did it at that meeting.

President: Uh, huh. So the important thing is for me to see if I talked to CIA before that meeting.

McNamara: That, thatʼs right, sir.

President: Uh, huh.

McNamara: But Redʼs [Raborn] own analysis of what CIA had reported in these reports confirms the statement that I made a moment ago that you had not received anything other than a very brief notice in either the April 17th or April 24th Presidentʼs Digest, and I canʼt remember which it was.

President: Mac says it doesnʼt say anything except that thereʼs some problems.

[Omitted here is discussion on potential problems in Bolivia, Colombia, and Guatemala.]

[Page 151]

President: Now, if we donʼt have a political solution to this thing and we canʼt get any agreement from Caamañoʼs people, how long can we wait until he gets that powerful and he gets that sentiment up and he gets where he gets aid from Castro and maybe from foreign sources before we clean up that city?

McNamara: Well, Mr. President, I think weʼve got to get a political situation.

President: Well.

McNamara: I canʼt answer your question how long we can wait; but we can wait another 24 or 48 hours.

President: Oh, yeah, we know we got to do that.

McNamara: And in that period, we just have to move ahead. Itʼs not reducing our military capability to take over those rebels by waiting 24, 48, 72 hours.

President: I believe everyday you lose it. I believe you lose—I donʼt think you lose any of your capab—any of your strength, but I think they get a good deal stronger.

McNamara: Well, maybe.

President: They are going back to work now.

McNamara: Well, I think they get stronger politically, Mr. President, but militarily, they arenʼt getting much stronger, and therefore.

President: Well, do we know that? Do we know they arenʼt shipping them stuff?

McNamara: Well, we have a pretty fair check. I canʼt say that they are not getting any guns, but I can say they are not getting many. And I donʼt believe that the relative military balance is shifting very much day by day. Itʼs moving a little bit in there.

President: Should we move down there and suggest to them again—the suggestion somebody made yesterday—to try and buy up their arms?

McNamara: No, I think that is unimportant at this point.

President: All right.

McNamara: But I do think we ought to keep pushing on buying Caamaño and keep pushing on Bosch. We just have to get a political situation here.

President: Well, if they are controlled by the Castroites, they are not going to give it to you.

McNamara: I donʼt think they are. How the hell can 58 people control them when theyʼve got several hundred. I just donʼt believe the story that Bosch and Caamaño are controlled by the Castroites. I donʼt mean to say they arenʼt influenced, Mr. President, not at all. But I donʼt believe that 58 people—or 200 people for that matter—can militarily control, physically control, this other bunch.

[Page 152]

[Omitted here is brief discussion on The New York Times and its influence on the American people.]

McNamara: Thatʼs all Iʼm saying about Caamaño. And therefore, itʼs still worthwhile to push and work on him. And I havenʼt really dug deeply into who is talking to Caamaño—who is offering him the money and so on. But I think that maybe later today Cy or I ought to get into this.

President: I wish you would, with Raborn, and see if anything is being done.

[Omitted here is a short discussion on whether Martin had met with Caamaño the previous night.]

  1. Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and Robert McNamara, Tape F65.22, Side A, PNO 6 and Side B, PNO 1. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. President Johnson placed the call to McNamara; they talked for approximately 12½ minutes.
  2. Presumably a reference to a meeting of the Dominican Republic Task Force chaired by Bundy each morning at the White House. No record of this meeting has been found.
  3. April 24.
  4. [text not declassified]
  5. April 28.
  6. Reference is to an April 28 meeting, 4:45–6:01 p.m., among President Johnson, Rusk, McNamara, Ball, Bundy, and Moyers in the lounge off the Oval Office. (Johnson Library, Presidentʼs Daily Diary) In a telephone conversation with Raborn on May 12 at 4:05 p.m. (see Document 65) President Johnson recalled that they had talked about “Vietnam troops” at this meeting. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and William Raborn, Tape F65.23, Side A, PNO 1 and 2) No other record of this meeting has been found.
  7. See Document 32.
  8. See Document 35.