Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

62. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State¹

Santo Domingo, May 10, 1965, 0555Z.

1558. Pass White House. From Martin.

A. We have gone through two stages here since my arrival— (1) military cease-fire to stop slaughter; (2) formation of GRN as an entity to counter rebel Caamano “government.” Have now entered third stage: politico-propaganda struggle between rebels and GRN.

B. Rebels Today: Virtually impossible assess rebel situation with confidence. Nuncio and Mora and others believe Caamano realizes defeat inevitable and wants out but is virtual prisoner of hard-core Communists.

On other hand, sources equally reliable and in some ways better informed say that rebels are confident of victory. Is not impossible both views contain truth and change hour to hour.

I have opened several lines to Caamano and one to Aristy and am helping with quiet effort to arrange Caamanoʼs surrender or at least negotiation with Imbert. Am dubious, as of this hour, but intend pursue vigorously.

Unquestionably, rebels hold propaganda initiative principally through Radio Santo Domingo, and importance of this cannot be overstated. Rebels are organizing large (1200–1500 people yesterday) demonstrations center of town, with speakers emphasizing not Bosch but anti-Americanism, plus pro-constitutionality, anti-Wessin, and pro-Caamano. Rebels, well led, are succeeding in linking in minds of uninformed masses “constitutionality” with food and jobs. In short, rebels are working to consolidate political position as champion of masses against US military—San Isidro military-upperclass and middle-class government. And unquestionably, they are ahead of GRN in this propaganda political war.

C. GRN Today: I spent four days helping form GRN, running through scores of names and pressuring dozens of men to join it. Finding it impossible obtain truly broad-spectrum political group, took what we have. Needless to say, Ambassador concurred throughout. Imbert, though suspected of dictatorial ambitions, is symbol of DOM fight for freedom, since he assassinated Trujillo, and will not double-cross USG on truly basic issues. Benoit seems unusually reasonable, intelligent DOM REP military man. Postigo was close personal friend Bosch and has irreproachable reputation as civic leader. His personal sacrifice in joining GRN is enormous. Grisolia, though former UCN senator, is stable, reasonable, and cannot be bought. Zeller, though briefly in Reid government, is virtually unknown engineer. Basic advantage of GRN: it provides an entity to counter rebelsʼ “constitutional government” and it divorces USG from odious San Isidro old general group. Basic weakness GRN: it is attackable—and is under attack by rebels, who call it “Junta civico militar”—as simply another reactionary business-class “civico” government with military strong-man overlay.

To counter all this, Ambassador and I helped arrange, and attachés helped carry out, deportation today of old generals and tomorrow or tonight that of General Wessin y Wessin² who, rightly or wrongly, has become symbol of military opposition to constitutionality and aspirations of masses. (We have no desire to destroy DOM armed forces but to restructure it, and we have told Imbert he cannot put his stooges in and must deport one his closest friends among military. He has done latter today.) Believe removal Wessin will on balance strengthen GRNʼs political position. Later on, we can urge, and I believe GRN will carry out, reforms that will benefit people and strengthen GRN.

D. However, the basic political problem remains: the present revolt against the Reid government was, at the outset, almost surely an attempt by PRD leaders and others to reverse the coup against Bosch of September 25, 1963. At the time of that coup, the people did not protest. The ideas of social and economic justice which Bosch promulgated, however, mobilized latent and legitimate revolutionary aspirations of DOM people, particularly among young, they will not down. They are now being mobilized once more by rebels. GRN might meet this problem by instituting reforms and by divorcing self from discredited politicians and generals. Imbert can provide strong hand needed now. All this is good program temporarily.

Looking to future, however, we should consider these alternatives: (Note—all these possibilities assume no rebel surrender.)

1. Full support, including recognition soonest possible, of GRN for indefinite period. (Imbertʼs influential wife has mentioned four years.)

2. Acceptance of GRN as no more than interim phase in process of taking country to elections, and reconstituting it as soon as practicable by adding to it (or replacing two of its civilian members with) two men who, if not physically in rebel domain now, are unquestionably sympathetic to rebels; possibly obliging GRN to then adopt 1963 Bosch constitution and hold completely free elections (including by name Bosch and Balaguer) under that constitution on schedule December 30, 1966. (In order persuade pro-rebel men to join GRN, it would have to demonstrate its good intentions by deeds.)

3. Acceptance of GRN as interim government which would be followed by major OAS effort (commission of good offices), with our full support, to form politically broad-based or politically independent provisional government to take country to elections.

4. An in-between policy for now: All-out support for GRN short of recognition, meanwhile waiting to see of new political constellations or figures emerge, free of Communist domination, that might mobilize peopleʼs aspirations.

My previous experience with commitment to fixed election date or even totally free elections themselves convinces me that such commitment is dangerous in present circumstances. My previous experience with Bosch and Balaguer makes me equally unenthusiastic about them. Since alternative 3 has never been tried in hemisphere to my knowledge, I find it harder to assess but tentatively suggest that while it would help take US off the hook, even high-level OAS commission might find it impossible to form either a broad-based political coalition or an independent government here, given difficulties and deficiencies, so well known to me, in DOM people, and now so harshly exacerbated by recent events. More plainly, I doubt it would work.

Recent holocaust has disrupted if not destroyed old parties and political figures. I would hope new leaders and political groupings might emerge. I therefore recommend we adopt for short run (week or two) alternative 4 above to see if something or somebody turns up. In present unstable situation I suggest we should not get locked into any policy more firm than that. But we should spend that time seeking means of adding non-Communist revolutionary elements to GRN.

Of course, if Caamano surrenders, I recommend we recognize GRN quickly, first getting whatever commitments from it that we want.

E. US Troops: Even though cloak of OAS multilateral force helps greatly, recommend we get US troops out soon as possible and make every effort to avert full-scale military occupation, even under OAS auspices, unless nothing else can prevent Communist takeover. By “soon as possible” I would hope for six months or less—as long as it takes for a DOM Govt to restore order and for US to help it retrain and restructure its own armed forces.

F. Though it may be self-evident, I wish to emphasize that whatever DOM Govt emerges, we shall not only have to keep troops here but also and for much longer period shall have to continue playing strong political role here. Landing our troops prevented country from disintegrating totally. But troops can build nothing politically, and process of disintegration has gone so far that this country cannot alone reorganize its affairs for a long time without vigorous assistance.

G. My Own Plans: Subject to shifting situation and USG instructions, I am thinking of staying only few more days, until (a) Wessin leaves, (b) I have had opportunity discuss immediate courses action with GRN; (c) I have finished talking quietly to US newspapermen; (d) I have exhausted all really promising avenues of quick surrender or accommodation with rebels. End of Martin.

Bennett

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Received at 3:16 a.m. and passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, CINCSO, and CINCLANT at 4:20 a.m.
2. Bennett reported in telegram 1575 from Santo Domingo, May 10, that he and General Palmer had met with Wessin the afternoon of May 10. During this meeting Wessin said he would agree to step down now that his pre-conditions had been met—the resignation of seven generals and a Navy Commodore as specified in a May 9 letter he gave Bennett. (Ibid.) On May 9 Wessin gave Bennett a letter promising his retirement if other generals whom he specifically named would do the same.