366. Action Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson1
SUBJECT
- Haitian Situation
Bill Bowdler met this afternoon with representatives of State, CIA and DOD to review the bidding on the Haitian situation.
The intelligence community has not been able to come up with a clear picture of what is going on at Cap Haitien. A landing of some nature did take place, but we have not been able to determine the size of the invasion force. The figure of 50–75 men is the one most frequently heard, but the reports of the aircraft used could not have lifted this many. Reports on the fighting vary with the source. The invaders claim progress. Duvalier says they have been contained and will shortly be liquidated. The latest report from Ambassador Ross is that everything appears normal and outwardly calm in Port-au-Prince. He has nothing on the situation in the north.2
[Page 846]The Duvalier Government has sent notes of protest to the OAS and the UN but it does not call for action by either body.
At this afternoonʼs meeting at State, the following contingency actions were noted, or agreed upon:
- 1.
- State, earlier today, asked FAA to put out an advisory that all non-scheduled private aircraft were to stay away from Haiti except those going to Port-au-Prince. PanAmerican notified State that it had cancelled its regular flight to the Haitian capital today.
- 2.
- The Caribbean Ready Force left Vieques, Puerto Rico, this morning on a training cruise to Panama. This will take it to the south of Haiti. At this stage, there is not sufficient justification to divert the Force toward Port-au-Prince. DOD is to furnish us tonight with the plotted position of the Task Force over the next 24 hours so that we will know precisely what its steaming time to the Haitian mainland will be.
- 3.
- DOD is stationing a patrol ship in the Windward Passage to act as a deterrent to the Cubans should they try to send forces into Haiti.
- 4.
- CIA is to determine the whereabouts of responsible civilian and military Haitian exiles in case it becomes necessary on short notice to put together a responsible government and get it into Haiti.
- 5.
- State is going through the same exercise with US officials with experience in Haiti in case we need to beef up our mission on a crash basis.
- 6.
- Our Embassy in Port-au-Prince has recently reviewed its emergency evacuation plans, but State is to ask the Ambassador to make sure that he is ready for fast implementation should the need arise.3
- 7.
- State is to prepare a policy paper recommending the action we should take in the event the invaders succeed in gaining control over a respectable piece of real estate and ask for the help of the United States and/or the OAS.
- 8.
- State has kept OAS Secretary General Plaza fully briefed on developments in Haiti. We are suggesting to him that he use the delivery of a Haitian Note on the situation to call for an informal meeting of the OAS Council. This would serve to give the OAS a basis for preempting collective action in the event the Haitians try to involve [Page 847] the UN.4 Galo Plaza had lunch with U Thant today. We do not know whether they discussed Haiti, and the roles of their respective organizations.
- 9.
- State has informed all of our missions in Latin America of the facts as we know them. State has given special briefings to the Venezuelan and Brazilian Embassies here since these are the two countries on which we would most depend for support in the event collective action becomes necessary.
I believe the foregoing actions are commensurate with the nature of the situation as we know it to be. I have your note suggesting a meeting of principals to go over contingency plans. If after reading the foregoing you still wish to have such a meeting, I suggest it be held late tomorrow afternoon. The participants should be Paul Nitze, Nick Katzenbach, Covey Oliver, Bob Sayre, Bill Bowdler, and myself.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Haiti, Vol. V. Secret; Sensitive. Handwritten notes on the memorandum indicate it was received at 7:23 p.m. and Bowdler was notified the following day.↩
- Not further identified. In a later telegram Ross reported on a meeting with Acting Foreign Minister Raymond, who stated that forces under the leadership of Haitians based in the United States had bombed Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien and “landed mercenaries” near the latter area during the morning of the previous day. Raymond asked the U.S. Government to investigate and interdict any illegal acts of Haitians based in the United States. Ross replied that the first news that both the Department and he had received about the invasion had come from Haitian Ambassador Arthur Bonhomme in Washington. (Telegram 813 from Port-au-Prince, May 21; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–9 HAI)↩
- Telegram 826 from Port-au-Prince, May 22, reported that the Haitian military had retaken the Cap Haitien airport the preceding day, that the small number of invaders had retreated into the countryside, and that, unless reinforcements arrived, “it would seem only matter of time before they liquidated.” Ross added that he had not made arrangements for the possible evacuation of American residents from Cap Haitien because it seemed unlikely that the invasion attempt would necessitate such action. (Ibid.)↩
- Telegram 5286 from USUN, May 22, reported that the Haitian representative had delivered a letter to the President of the Security Council requesting that the Council be convened so that “appropriate measures” could be taken to reduce the “state of tension which threatens peace,” but that he had no date in mind for such a session. (Ibid., POL 23–9 HAI/UN) Telegram 169444 to USUN, May 23, responded that the U.S. Mission should discuss the complaint with the Brazilian Security Council representative and seek to have him dissuade the Haitians from pressing for a meeting. (Ibid., POL 23–9 HAI)↩
- This option is checked.↩