Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

333. Telegram From the Embassy in Haiti to the Department of State¹

Port-au-Prince, July 27, 1964, 5 p.m.

188. Deptel 61.² Personal for Asst Secy Mann from Timmons.

1. Thought it might be helpful to you have following thoughts on GOH–USG relations while FonMin Chalmers still in US and before definitive replies are made to GOH on requests for T–28 aircraft, spare parts for weapons and emergency electric power generators.

2. Since last January, when decision taken that USG self-interest required an attempt to reach minimum level mutual accommodation with Duvalier regime, I believe considerable progress made toward this objective, as shown most recently by GOH vote at MFM. Our hand was never exactly full of cards, but ones we did have (resumption tourism, including naval visits and cruise ships; IDB water supply loan; resumption processing investment guaranties) proved useful. Backdrop against which this dialogue proceeded was of utmost importance. Duvalier, pathologically suspicious that USG playing with Haitian exiles against him, has repeatedly threatened in private get rid of me or entire Emb. On other hand, he restrained by what must be reluctance precipitate another serious incident in his relations with USG, with unknown consequences. Meanwhile Duvalier has directed that three major official requests be made through me to USG for various items of assistance (budget-support aid last Feb; electric generators last March; export licenses for T–28 aircraft last week, reinforcing earlier request to Dept), to which he has recd refusal of first and no reply to last two. In addition there have been number of unofficial approaches through Davidson, Orleans, Sherman, etc.

3. Basic question has been and continues to be whether USG policy objective (maintain position here in attempt influence Haiti on matters important to USG, such as OAS, and deny Haiti to Communists) can be successfully pursued much longer under present conditions, i.e., unless Duvalier gets something more from dialogue than it has yet yielded to him.

4. Problem has two aspects: (a) present items in dialogue, always “low-yield”, have dwindled further. Although no official instruction has yet reached us, there are seemingly well-founded indications that USG has again suspended processing investment guaranties (Embtels 94),³ and intends block any further IDB, IDA or IBRD loans to Haiti. If so, and with naval visits in suspense for several reasons, including recent exile incursion and subsequent suspension GTMOʼs support flight to PAP, virtually nothing would be left of original items except Grace Line cruise ships. (b) Meanwhile Duvalier injected into dialogue three items of his choice, as indicated para 2 above. In this context he undoubtedly attached very great importance to question of Haitiʼs participation in July 21 MFM. He must have gone through roughly same analytical process we did, as to what various courses of action would yield him. It presumably became clear to him that Haiti would not have swing vote, and that even if it had such vote, USG was in no mood bargain for Haitian support. In these circumstances seems evident he decided play it sweet and low for time being; hence elaborate little act of calling me in to receive copy of Chalmersʼ instructions, with request that these instructions be brought Pres Johnsonʼs personal attention, and low-key approach which Chalmers took with you on July 20, all preparatory to casting of Haitian vote with US in MFM. (If however Chalmers sees you again before leaving US, his tone may become more exigent, as has Raymondʼs with me.) Another factor has of course been exile incursion, and calculation by Duvalier that as long as he was under the gun he could best discourage oppositionists by attempting give concrete evidence that GOH–USG relations improving and he on side USG. MFM on Cuba was handiest subject for this purpose.

5. In short, what Duvalier has gotten in last eight months has been USG “neutrality” toward him (i.e., no official opposition to presidency for life), presence of an American Ambassador in PAP, widespread conclusion here and to some extent abroad that considerable détente achieved in GOH–USG relations (of which he has made useful propaganda capital), and some benefits in tourism, etc. No matter how much he would like strike out at US, he not likely abandon these advantages without close calculation, if past actions any guide. However, denial his outstanding requests (of which T–28s most important) could be enough tip balance toward some move by Duvalier against USG. Again on past form, target would probably be me. I find it difficult estimate odds here; I think that they run in favor of such a move, but could easily be wrong.

6. Present arguments against any extension of existing US assistance to Haiti, either economic or military, seem to me to be generally valid. Hemisphere considerations are important, and I am aware of depth of US public and Congressional distaste for Duvalier. At same time, reasons for maintaining strongest possible US presence are cogent, and I believe are becoming more so. If we continue deny all Duvalierʼs requests, we are essentially gambling that he will continue place such high value on lack of open USG opposition to him that he will not risk return to dangerous conditions of 1963. We should be able reinforce this by such items as interest you expressed to Chalmers in assisting movement Haitian exile leaders out of DomRep. An early acknowledgment of Duvalierʼs “message” to President would also work in same direction. To go further would mean approving one of Duvalierʼs aid requests, such as aircraft or budget-support assistance. This would almost certainly buy considerable time but also give rise to expectations of more to come.

7. Given all factors, including tight limitations on US policy toward Haiti at this time, I assume only feasible course is to continue present stance. There is one aspect that probably introduces a “cushioning” effect. If Duvalier does decide apply pressure on USG by attempt oust me, there likely be quite a bit of advance warning, since Duvalier allergic to PNG action except as last resort. This would enable new look to be taken at situation. Goes without saying that use of term “present stance” implies continuation of US policies embodied in original dialogue, including processing investment guaranties and willingness go along with loans to GOH by IDB and other international lending agencies in cases where Haiti meets criteria. Under Deptʼs instructions I made quite categoric statements to GOH on these items, and I fear that any change, which could not be concealed for long from GOH, would seriously complicate matters here.

8. We have also given thought to possibility that Duvalier might attempt kick up some public incident in pre-electoral period. Curtis and Warner believe this unlikely; I generally share their view but would place odds somewhat shorter than they do.

Timmons

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL US–HAITI. Secret; Priority; Limdis.
2. In telegram 61 to Port-au-Prince, July 26, the Department instructed the Embassy to inform Haiti that its requests for export licenses for the T–28 aircraft, arms, and parts were under consideration. (Ibid., FT 18–1 HAI–US)
3. Dated July 15. (Ibid., FN 9–3 HAI)