Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

325. Telegram From the Embassy in Haiti to the Department of State¹

Port-au-Prince, December 18, 1963, 6 p.m.

494. Following is our analysis background current GOH moves against U.S. personnel, supplementing comments contained Embtels 458, 460² and subsequent related messages:

(1) In light Duvalier present position of relative strength inside Haiti, marked by survival challenges and difficulties past nine months, and with new U.S. President, new U.S. Ambassador forthcoming U.S. election year and possible major OAS test upcoming on Castro, Duvalier may feel he in good bargaining position to extract resumption sizeable U.S. aid perhaps even on his terms. Murchison/Davidson interest in Haiti has been source of encouragement to Duvalier. While current GOH conduct represents change in tactics toward U.S. it does not in our view reflect basic switch in objectives such as turning away from U.S. toward Castro or Commie bloc.

(2) Duvalier may be encouraged on present course by similarity present situation and that 1960. Thus in first six months 1960 USAID projects, which had begun make real progress, brought to complete halt by GOH insistence on unilateral control over hiring and firing and other key aspects USAID program. During resulting long impasse GOH requested USG to withdraw top Embassy, USAID and USIS personnel, at same time forcing many key Haitian personnel out of joint projects. May be recalled that Castro also was growing problem at that time and major test OAS opinion on Cuba shaping up. U.S. moreover was in election year and racist Duvalier regime evidently thought, and still believes, U.S. attitude toward negro nations significant factor in U.S. domestic politics.

(3) In late 1960 with arrival new U.S. Ambassador and offer substantial U.S. aid Duvalier professed great satisfaction and relations improved. Haiti later attempted blackmail U.S. at Punta del Este and when annual review USAID program arose in early 1962 Duvalier again balked at accepting needed controls, leading eventually to phaseout program. Duvalier, however, undoubtedly recalls that tensions 1960 were followed in 1961 by his best year in terms U.S. assistance, when $14.1 million received in grants, including $6.0 million budget support.

(4) No doubt current GOH calculations contain some elements desperation arising from continuing deterioration economic situation. Earlier “intellectual” supporters now largely disillusioned, leaving mainly most venal TTM-types as basis Duvalier power. These still under control but evidently restive as payoffs delayed. Duvalier accordingly under some pressure produce resumption U.S. aid or, if this not immediately possible, some sign from U.S. which can be interpreted as foreshadowing resumption aid.

(5) Should however be noted that for Duvalier himself, intensely preoccupied with retention political power, problems of economic situation beneath him and even perhaps beyond his comprehension. He knows full well value of money in buying favors and protection but broader problems of economy he leaves to technicians. So long as they continue furnish him needed cash, and basic crops coffee, sugar and sisal continue assure some minimum economic activity, serious economic problems unlikely shake Duvalier resolve.

(6) Duvalier has made it clear over past year he intends remain in control of Haiti until he dies, that he will use any means to this objective, and will not tolerate any threat to his political control. Latter, of course, based primarily on fear, terrorism and threats even toward his close followers.

(7) On surface it may seem paradox that Duvalier would deliberately request removal of EmbOffs at same time he trying get aid.³ Explanation may lie party in distortions and miscalculations in Duvalierʼs thinking, as follows: new U.S. Amb shows U.S. recognizes Duvalier has successfully beaten down all challenges, is here to stay. U.S. must therefore make best of situation and try get Duvalier on side U.S. particularly since U.S. needs Haiti just now in OAS (Haitiʼs deliberate absence at COAS vote Dec 3 perhaps significant this respect). At same time, along with hopes for new era inspired by such possible misconceptions re U.S. motives, Duvalier may recently have begun to fear that arrival new Amb might signal new efforts unseat him. Seen in this light, USIS progress in arousing pro-U.S. interest among Haitian students and intellectuals was potentially dangerous (so GOH cracked down on Haitian writers identified with USIS and put in Blanchet as Min Info). At about same time Duvalier focussed on Haseyʼs presence in Haiti. This interest and Haseyʼs immediate departure after FonOff request may have suddenly made plot theory plausible to Duvalier, and led to stories now circulating that Amb is “another Lodge” (Embtel 492).⁴ This Duvalier attitude ambivalent: hopes for new era vs. fears of plot. By moving against selected Emb officers he hoped remove three key officers who would be highly useful to Emb in case plot theory correct, and could at same time test new era hypothesis at relatively little risk to himself. If U.S. acceded to request for withdrawal this would comfort Duvalier that new era theory right and enable him claim to supporters he in driverʼs seat vis-à-vis USG, while maintaining GOH public position that no problems now exist in U.S.-Haitian relations.

(8) Appears significant that in current gambit Duvalier really risking relatively little compared to what we would gain if successful. He has probably heard reports U.S. policy not changed, hence believes he has little to lose. He can, moreover, back off from this issue, if he decided to avoid showdown at this time, by saying he willing let affair pass “this time” as gesture good will toward USG and new Ambassador. With his own followers he can avoid loss prestige by saying privately “wait and see, it is only question of time,” meanwhile directing low-key or covert harassment and continuing work behind scenes for removal U.S. officials.

(9) On balance we conclude that Duvalier will not initiate PNG action immediate future or retaliate against me by delaying presentation credentials indefinitely. However, risk of either or both certainly exists, since Duvalier now perhaps more than ever capable of faulty judgment and irrational acts.

Timmons

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Haiti, Vol. I. Secret; Priority; Limdis.
2. Telegrams 458 and 460 from Port-au-Prince, December 12, 1963, reported Haitian Government interest in and inquiries about a newly assigned FSR officer, John Hasey, who previously served in Southeast Asia and the Congo. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1961–63, PER HASEY, JOHN and POL HAI–US, respectively)
3. Telegram 720 to Port-au-Prince, December 19, 1963, reported a conversation between Irving Davidson, a registered agent for Duvalier, and Department officers, during which Davidson produced a letter allegedly from Duvalier asking for the quiet transfer of four Embassy officers for conspiring against the Government of Haiti, and stating that the new U.S. Ambassador, Benson E.L. Timmons III, had made a bad impression and had displayed a “certain stiffness.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Haiti, Vol. I)
4. Telegram 492 from Port-au-Prince, December 18, 1963, reported Haitian Government skepticism and suspicions about Timmons. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1961–63, POL HAI–US)