289. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1
SUBJECT
- Cuba—Miscellaneous
John Crimmins, Des FitzGerald, Joe Califano, and I met to talk about miscellaneous Cuban problems. Here are some of the items which came up.
- 1.
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Aranzazu Incident—John Crimmins said that we have completed our “investigation” of the Aranzazu incident and that the Spanish have now asked us to give them our evaluation of the various reports we have furnished to them. John is now working on a paper of talking points he will use with the Spanish (he wants to keep it oral if possible). The general pitch he will probably want to use will take into account such facts as (a) that we want to give the Spanish the minimum necessary to keep them from thinking that we are trying to deceive them and (b) that the Spanish, themselves, probably evaluate Artime as the prime suspect. Specifically, such points as the following might be made to the Spanish: First, while we cannot rule out the possibility that the Cubans sunk the Aranzazu, it is probably more likely that the [Page 691] exiles did it. Second, there are a number of exile groups that have the capability of doing the job. Third, the most likely of the exile groups is probably Artime. But the fact that Artimeʼs boat was in Curacao would seem to rule him out; and even if this could be explained, we could still not prove that Artime is the culprit. Fourth, (if pressed) by a process of elimination, the attack would seem to have come from the Dominican Republic2 (the Spanish already strongly suspect this—see attached cable).3 In any event, we are sure it did not come from the U.S.
John Crimmins plans to clear his talking points with the Special Group before he talks to the Spanish.
- 2.
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Special Group Items—Des mentioned that a dissident group [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] inside Cuba have contacted Artimeʼs people; reportedly, they have picked Artime because they feel that anyone with his resources must have the support of the U.S. Government. Des feels that we should let this contact develop and, in this connection, he believes that the Special Group should permit the continuance of our support to Artime for another 60 or 90 days and, if absolutely necessary, allow Artime to make one more attack (more or less controlled by CIA) on Cuba. If we drop Artime precipitously, the dissident group in Cuba will assume that Artime is not worth contacting and their willingness to express dissidence may tend to dry up. In all of this discussion, Des emphasized that he is no great admirer of Artime and that the above is not an Agency device to keep Artimeʼs group alive. This item will probably come before the Special Group on Thursday.4
Des also mentioned the possibility of passing on to Dorticos, in an unattributable, deniable fashion, the message that, while the U.S. cannot live with Fidel Castro, it might well be able to live with Dorticos. Des feels that Cuba is in terrible shape, that Dorticos knows it, and that a move like this could conceivably produce a big dividend. At best, it will start Dorticos plotting; at worst, (if Castro finds out) it will help to sow some seeds of dissension and distrust. This item will probably come up at a later Special Group meeting.
- 3.
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Erosion of Cuban Economy—Des was very hopeful that Cuba will be in very bad economic shape by the end of 1965. [1 line of source text not declassified]; some of this is going in already, and some is on the way. Emphasizing the extreme sensitivity of the operation, Des said that the effect on large amounts of Cuban machinery could be brutal.
The point was made that there was, these days, a general recognition by the European missions in Cuba that the Cuban economic situation is grim and that, in fact, the isolation policy is not entirely a farce. To some extent, this realization coincided with the timing of the recent Cuban restrictions on credit.
- 4.
- British Channel to Castro—John Crimmins said that Patrick Gordon-Walker, in his meeting with Secretary Rusk,5 suggested that the British would be pleased to act as a middle man for a dialogue between the U.S. and Cuba. The Secretary has asked John to look into the desirability of this. The initial feeling of the group was that it was not a good idea. Among other things, if we want to establish a dialogue with Castro, there are better channels than the British.
- 5.
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Basic Review of Cuban Policy—The group agreed that, with November 3 behind us, we can usefully do some basic review work on Cuba. To this end, John Crimmins agreed to write a paper which would outline the major problems and the possible options, including accommodation. This will be ready in a few daysʼ time and will be distributed for comment. We can then decide where to go from there.
Des FitzGerald said we should consider the re-institution, in the near future, of the “unilateral”CIA-directed covert program which had scored a number of hits last year. The group agreed, however, that a decision on this should probably wait until some of the basic review work on Cuba had been completed.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Exile Activity, Vol. III, 1964, 1965. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.↩
- In a November 21 memorandum Crimmins noted that a “large number of FBI reports of interrogations of Cuban exiles in Miami and Puerto Rico” had been passed to the Spanish. Crimmins said that he would tell the Spanish that “We are quite satisfied” that the attack did not come from Jamaica or Haiti and that “we are certain it did not come from Puerto Rico.” (Ibid.)↩
- Telegram 519 from Santo Domingo, November 3; attached but not printed.↩
- According to Ambassador Thompsonʼs notes on the 303 Committee meeting on November 12, the CIA proposal was approved with Department of State support. (Department of State,INR/IL Historical Files, 5412 Special Group/303 Committee Records)↩
- Rusk and Gordon-Walker met on October 27 in Ruskʼs office; see Document 397.↩