287. Memorandum of Conversation1

SUBJECT

  • Cuba

PARTICIPANTS

  • Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR
  • Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State

Ambassador Dobrynin came in to see me today pursuant to an appointment which he had made almost a week ago. He said he wished to talk to me entirely on a personal basis about Cuba. His remarks were rather vague but his purpose seemed to be to express concern about raids on Cuba, the training of emigrant groups in Central America and elsewhere, and some rumor that some Central American countries [Page 688] might take some forceful action2 before the end of the year. In the course of the conversation, he mentioned the Artime group and another exile leader whose name he said he thought was Olivo.

I said that as he knew we had expressed ourselves as being opposed to these hit-and-run raids and pointed out how embarrassing it was to us that a Spanish ship had been sunk.3 I said I had not heard of the rumor of a Central American-supported action before the end of the year, and did not think it was true. I said we had taken strict measures to prevent the use of our territory by these groups and understood that these measures had been effective.

When he expressed surprise that a Spanish ship could have been sunk in view of the air and sea power we had in the area, I pointed out that we could scarcely get into the position of escorting ships to Cuba in view of our overall policy. He said he could understand this. He indicated that the Soviet Government had remained relatively quiet about the activities directed against Cuba as they did not wish to inject this issue into the American political campaign. I said that in conclusion that while I assumed that all of our policies would be under review after the election, I did not believe there would be any change in our attitude toward hit-and-run raids on Cuba.

  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 30–2 CUBA. Secret. Drafted by Thompson and approved in S/AL on October 6. The meeting was held in Thompsonʼs office.
  2. J.C. King of the CIAʼs Deputy Directorate of Plans met with Nicaraguaʼs dictator, General Anastasio Somoza, on September 17 at Friendship Airport in Miami. King told Somoza that he “could count on a sympathetic understanding in Washington” if he dropped his support for Artime. (Memorandum for the record, September 17; ibid.) According to the minutes of a joint ARACIA meeting on October 1, FitzGerald said that Somoza told King he had information that Castro would attack the exile camps in Nicaragua and they would expect the United States to respond. FitzGerald saw this as a Somoza entrapment ploy. Mann “made it clear he wanted no such move on Somozaʼs part and directed that Somoza be so informed.” (ARACIA Weekly Meeting memorandum, October 1; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files)
  3. The Artime exile group had sunk a Spanish ship, the Sierra Aranzazu, in mid-September. According to the Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee of September 25, Secretary Rusk had assured the Spanish Ambassador that the United States would assist in the investigation of the incident. At the same meeting it “was generally agreed that the U.S. should not lend weight to the case against Artime and the findings should remain ‘as indeterminate as is plausible.’” (Ibid., INR/IL Historical Files, 5412 Special Group/303 Committee Records)