280. Memorandum for the Record1

SUBJECT

  • Notes on Luncheon Meeting attended by the President, Secretary McNamara, Secretary Rusk, McGeorge Bundy, Mr. McCone, in the Presidentʼs private dining room Tuesday—28 July 1964
[Page 676]

[Omitted here is discussion of Japan air routes and Vietnam.]

3. I reported on the withdrawals from Cuba following the substance of the attached memorandum. I specifically stated that we could not say positively that surface-to-air missiles had been turned over to the Cubans; there was no way to know whether or not the Soviets “kept a finger on the trigger”. I said that I believed that Khrushchev did not want a confrontation with the United States, that he knew such a confrontation would be created by a shootdown of the U–2 and that I would be very surprised if he felt sufficiently confident in Castroʼs ability and veracity to turn these weapons over to him unrestricted with all of the consequences if Castro should use them in an emotional fit of anger. I said that intelligence could not reveal the true situation, other than this we felt that all military units have been withdrawn from Cuba, that all equipment was now in Cuban hands, that the communications systems except for one Navy link were operated by the Cubans, and that the 1500 to 2500 remaining Soviets were military advisors.

[Omitted here is discussion of the MLF, the Chinese nuclear danger, and domestic politics.]

Attachment

Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency2

SUBJECT

  • Soviet Military Personnel Withdrawals from Cuba
1.
Since the missile crisis of 1962, some 20,000 Soviet military personnel have left Cuba in four major withdrawal periods, the peaks of which occurred in November 1962, March 1963, November 1963, and June 1964. About 5,000 personnel were withdrawn during each of these periods, the most recent period extending from early May to the present during which time 14 Soviet passenger ships sailed between Cuba and the USSR.
2.
At the end of 1963, as the result of an examination of the probable number of Soviet military personnel believed to have been withdrawn from Cuba since the estimated high of 22,500 troops in October 1962 and of the probable Soviet personnel strength in each of the [Page 677] weapon systems remaining on the island, we estimated that as many as seven thousand Soviet servicemen remained.
3.
Since that estimate was made, twenty Soviet passenger ships have called at Cuban ports, 14 of them in the last three months. Few military passengers were on the ships calling between January and April, and military personnel departures were probably offset by arrivals. Extra ships were scheduled beginning in May, however, and at least 5,000 Soviet military personnel along with a few dependents, agricultural technicians, and Cuban students departed Cuba for the USSR. No more than 800 passengers are known to have arrived in Cuba on these 14 ships, and almost all of these were Cubans who arrived on the last two ships.
4.
We believe that the last major withdrawal of Soviet military personnel has now been completed, and that only about 2,000 Soviet military technicians and advisors remain on the island. All Soviet communications links within Cuba (except for one naval link which will probably terminate operations this week) have been deactivated or turned over to the Cubans, and Cuban forces have apparently assumed full control over the operation of all Soviet weapons remaining on the island. No Soviet operational or combat units are known to be on the island.

[Omitted here is a discussion of specific ship movements and photographic reconnaissance flights.]

  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, May–Oct 1964, Box 6, Folder 9. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone on July 29.
  2. Top Secret; Dinar.