27. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State 1
1146. Joint State/Defense message. It is our combined judgment that communications equipment is most critical lack in current situation. Air force, navy, Wessin and Montas forces are at separate points and hours go by without direct contact.2
Attachés feel this the critical point and could well mean difference in results of present confrontation. Superiority of combined forces does not necessarily avail if it is separate, as here, in distinct pockets, with inadequate communications between them, and with each ground element facing leftist forces with heavy psychological propaganda of “peopleʼs struggle for liberation.” Equally serious, in attachésʼ opinion, is effect on morale of air force and others if we seem to deny them this item of equipment which, after all, has civilian as well as military uses. They are not asking for offensive weapons, merely means to talk.
While I regret as much as anyone that, once again, we have to rely on military solution for political crisis engendered by confused democratic left, all valid elements of which now either in asylum or hiding, as much from extremists who have come to dominate rebel situation, as well as from opposing military forces. However, plain fact of situation is that while leftist propaganda naturally will try to fuzz situation as fight between military and people, issue here now is fight between Castro-type elements and those who oppose it. We should be clear as to situation.
[Page 72]I do not wish to be over-dramatic, but if we deny simple communications equipment and opposition to leftist takeover here loses for lack of heart or otherwise, we may very well be asking in near future for landing of Marines to protect U.S. citizens and possibly for other purposes. Which would Washington prefer?
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/CAR Files: Lot 69 D 158, Dominican Republic, 1965. Confidential; Flash. Repeated to CINCSO and CINCLANT for POLADS and COMCARIBSEAFRON. Passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA.↩
- The request for 50 portable radio communications sets came from General De Los Santos, Dominican Air Force Chief of Staff, who wanted them for use by military forces and police in mopping up operations. (Telegram 1136 from Santo Domingo, April 28) In this telegram Bennett strongly recommended that the sets be made available from stocks in Puerto Rico and that they be flown to San Isidro that morning. At 11:05 a.m. Under Secretary Mann told Vaughn informally that he had decided against moving the walkie-talkies in at that time but was instead in favor of moving the walkie-talkies to the USS Boxer. (Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, Research Project No. 939, “The Response of the Department of State to the Dominican Crisis of April-May 1965,” pp. 15–16)↩