267. Memorandum for the Record1

SUBJECT

  • Discussion at NSC Meeting—5 May 1964

IN ATTENDANCE

Rusk, Ball, Johnson, Thompson, McNamara, Vance, Taylor, Bundy, Dillon, Mann, Attorney General and McCone

1.
McNamara reviewed the use of ECM equipment on the U–2ʼs, stating that doing so would not compromise SIOP;2 would give some protection initially but not over the long range; the Soviets know the principals of our ECM; ECM would not provide great protection to the U–2 but the degree of protection was open to question as it was obvious that ECM would not permit continued use of U–2ʼs to meet intelligence requirements. JCS objects for a variety of reasons and General Taylor discussed this.
2.
General Taylor stated that the JCS agree that the use would not compromise SIOP; pointed out 14 countries have SAMs and therefore [Page 647] compromise might be serious at some future time. Vulnerability was uncertain and was dependent upon the warhead, noting there were 100# and 500# warheads and that DIA had indicated 500# warheads were on the Cuban SAMs. (McCone said we had no intelligence on this.) Therefore JCS recommended against the use of ECM.
3.
Rusk raised the question of whether a new pattern of flights crossing the island, rather than flying the axis of the island, would reduce exposure. McNamara said this could be done by increasing the number of flights and therefore the danger.
4.
McNamara then advanced the idea of drones, stating they were awkward to use, of questionable reliability, limited in quantity, but raised an alternative intelligence means. ECM would make them less vulnerable but would compromise ECM.
5.
I then stated that drones were limited in number, were only six of two types operational and three in the works; altitudes were 54,000ʼ to 59,000ʼ versus 64,000ʼ to 72,000ʼ for the U–2ʼs; photography resolution equivalent to U–2 but area limited to 18-mile swath and 255 miles of linear coverage; that drones were vulnerable to MIG–21ʼs; that they could be identified by contrails and therefore I had reservations concerning their effectiveness. McNamara agreed and after some discussion the drone question was pretty well dismissed. The same is true of balloons as it was felt they represented more serious operational problems than drones. The Attorney General, Robert Kennedy, expressed himself very positively against changing to drones as it would represent an unacceptable retreat.
6.
We then turned to a discussion of the Oxcart. I stated that it was coming along well, giving the figures on the number of flights and the speeds but that all of our operational people, without exception, felt that we must not attempt to use it until it is completely debugged and this would take several months. Furthermore I said that at 2.2 Mach the Oxcart would possibly be vulnerable to SAMs though this was uncertain.
7.
Secretary Dillon then asked what the ultimate value of the Oxcart was. I stated that when fully operational it probably would be quite invulnerable except under miraculous circumstances.
8.
Thompson spoke the political situation, feeling that Khrushchev and Castro would be restrained during this year, recognizing our internal political situation.
9.
The President entered and Rusk and McNamara reviewed the conversations. The President commented that we were right back where we started.
10.
Rusk raised the question of UN on-site inspection. I agreed that properly planned and executed on-site inspection would be somewhat more dependable than in October 1962 because of our knowledge of the island gained through extensive photography.
11.
McNamara then recommended that we operate for a week with U–2ʼs at the rate of 2 to 3 flights a week on the assumption that Castro will not take offensive action. In the meantime we create ECM capability but not use it; finally we expedite our drone capability to give us an option but that we emphatically deny any intent to use them. McNamara noted some leaks about drones out of the Pentagon which disturbed him.
12.
The President inquired about expediting the Oxcart. I took the position we would do all we could to push the development and debug the vehicle but said that we were working against unexplored frontiers of aviation; that many felt unexpected problems were arising—some of which we can answer rapidly, but many have to be answered by methods of “cut and try”; and that the problem in hand would not lend itself to a “crash” program.
13.
There was no discussion of the Contingency Plan.3

[Omitted here is discussion of Laos.]

  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, May 1964, Box 6, Folder 8. Secret; Eyes Only. According to the Presidentʼs Daily Diary President Johnson joined the meeting in progress in the Cabinet Room at 12:25 p.m. and left at 12:55 p.m. (Johnson Library)
  2. Single Integrated Operations Plan; see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. X, Document 112.
  3. According to a May 1 memorandum from Califano to Bromley Smith, the Contingency Plan was a DOD–State Paper entitled “U–2 Flights, Cuba—Contingency Plans,” which developed a series of actions to be considered by the United States in advance of and after the shoot down or attempted shoot down of a U–2 reconnaissance aircraft over Cuba. The Contingency Plan is attached to Califanoʼs memorandum. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, May 1964, Box 6, Folder 8)