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  3. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana
  4. Document 262

262. Memorandum for the Record1

Washington, April 29, 1964, 4:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • Discussion with President Johnson—Wednesday afternoon—29 Apr. 4:45 in his office

PRESENT

  • The President and Mr. McCone

[Omitted here is discussion of the National Security Council, DeGaulle, and intelligence matters.]

4. I mentioned to President Johnson that I had discussed with Eisenhower the possibility of a Cuban shooting down a U–2. That Eisenhower first responded by indicating that he thought, under such circumstances, the offending SAM sites should be “taken out.” However, after considering the problem and reviewing a map, he expressed the opinion that perhaps it would be best to take out all the SAM sites, although Eisenhower did not go so far as to firmly recommend this action. President Johnson then asked my opinion. I stated I most certainly [Page 634] would take out several SAM sites in the vicinity and possibly all of them. President Johnson retorted he agreed and in fact, he favored taking them all out, indicating that the public opinion, UN discussion, etc. would be just as valid on one as on all and therefore we might as well dispose of the problem in its totality.

I then told President Johnson it was unnecessary to have a U–2 shot down, that we could operate the ECM equipment, but this had been steadfastly opposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The President asked that I discuss this matter with McNamara and General Taylor.

Note: Subsequently I reviewed this question with McNamara and Taylor and McNamara was of the opinion that JCS was incorrect for technical reasons and the use of the ECM on the U–2 would not compromise the plan to use the ECM on the B–52.

McNamara stated that the subject was very technical and therefore it was agreed to convene a technical group from Defense (headed by Fubini) and CIA (headed by Wheelon) who could examine all facets of the problem and hence McNamara and I would be in a position to make a firm recommendation to the President and the Executive Committee at a meeting scheduled for 12:00 noon on Saturday, May 2nd.

[Omitted here is discussion of North Vietnam.]

  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, Jan–Apr 1964, Box 6, Folder 7. Secret. Prepared by McCone on April 30.↩