Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

252. Memorandum From Bromley Smith of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)¹

Washington, March 17, 1964.

1. The State memorandum² is not fully responsive to the Presidentʼs request, which was for “a plan for appropriate, strong, high-level warnings” on interference with our high-level surveillance over Cuba.³ There are several “open” circuits in Washington other than a State Department typewriter.

2. The warning should not be given in a note to the Cubans through the Czechs or even to the Russians.

a. A note calls for a reply from Castro which can only be unsatisfactory.

b. A note is a formal challenge in an area where we have been living under a tacit non-interference agreement. All the draft note does substantively is to remind Castro of this fact.

c. Castroʼs threats have been in public statements. We should not raise them to the formal level. Last June the Cubans sent us a note to which we replied. Should they do so again, we could make a formal reply.

3. The importance of non-interference of our surveillance is such that it should not be mixed up with the fishing boat and Guantanamo incidents. The State memorandum proposes the warning note be delivered along with routine replies to notes about these incidents.

4. The Russians should continue to be held responsible for Castroʼs conduct in connection with those aspects of the Cuba missile crisis which are still with us. Our surveillance arises out of Khrushchevʼs failure to get Castro to accept on-site inspection in Cuba. The fact that the Russians may be turning over “control” of the SAM sites to the Cubans does not relieve the Russians of their responsibility to ensure that these SAMs are not used against the U.S. reconnaissance planes. (It is inconceivable to me that the Russians would not retain ultimate control of these weapons by means of a “permissive link” device.)

5. Established channels used during the missile crisis should be used again to convey a strong, informal, direct warning, i.e., Tommy Thompson to the Russian Ambassador here. Castroʼs statement could be used as a peg on which to hang a reminder to the Russians that for us the surveillance of Cuba is an issue involving the USSR—that as the controlling power they are responsible for their satellitesʼ use of the weapon.

6. If the Russians deny their responsibility for controlling Castroʼs use of the SAM sites, or acknowledge that they have no capability to control these weapons now that they are being operated by Cuba, we are in immediate need of some serious planning about how to get out of what would be an intolerable situation.

7. As to recommendation 2 of the State memorandum, i.e., getting word to Castro through “black” channels, I am at a complete loss to understand what purpose would be served. To tell Castro that we would like nothing better than to have him shoot down one of our surveillance flights so we could retaliate is to issue the kind of a challenge that even a rational Latin has difficulty turning down. The whole proposal should be dropped.

BKS

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Overflights, Vol. II, 3/64–7/67. Secret; Sensitive.
2. Document 251.
3. See the attachment to Document 248.