250. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1
SUBJECT
- Cuba—Miscellaneous
1. Warnings to Cubans and Russians about SAMʼs
I refer to the Presidentʼs memo to the Secretary (attached)2 requesting that warnings be given to the Russians and Cubans to deter SAM firings at our U–2ʼs over Cuba.
John Crimmins tells me that, a couple days ago, State completed a package for the Presidentʼs approval.3 The Secretary signed off and intended to bring the matter up at the luncheon meeting with the President on Tuesday;4 reportedly, he did not do so because other people were present. The State paper recommends that we send a warning note to the Cubans only; we would send it through the Czech Embassy so that the Russians would be sure to see it. Tommy Thompson feels that we should not send a warning note directly to the Russians.
It is hard to comment without seeing the State package but my own preliminary view is that the general guiding principle in this case must be that we should do whatever is most likely to restrain the Cubans from shooting down a U–2. Castro scares me because I think he is a man who can regard a threat as credible but still disregard the consequences if his honor and emotion are involved; the upcoming OAS action may be just the sort of thing which will rile him next. On the other hand, when the Russians regard a threat as credible, they appear likely to act accordingly. In short, I believe that we are most likely to prevent a shoot-down if our note to Castro is buttressed by a good strong pitch from Khrushchev to Castro; Khrushchev, after all, has real leverage over Castro.
If Tommy Thompsonʼs indirect approach to the Russians is most likely to result in a strong Khrushchev pitch to Castro, then I am for it. If, however, we are more likely to get the most effective Khrushchev pitch [Page 614] by sending a stiff note directly to the Russians, then other arguments, against sending a note to the Russians, should be very powerful to be over-riding. (Another consideration might be that we would want our position on a shoot-down to be clearly on the record vis-à-vis the USSR; especially, if one occurs.)
[Omitted here is a brief item on Morocco.]
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Overflights, Vol. II, 3/64–7/67. Secret.↩
- See the attachment to Document 248. A notation in the upper left hand corner in Bundyʼs handwriting reads “GC. Ask them where this is?”↩
- Document 251.↩
- March 10; no other record of this meeting has been found.↩