216. Intelligence Memorandum1
DOMINICAN PRESIDENT Balaguer AT MID-TERM
Summary
Since his inauguration in July 1966, President Balaguer has presided over the longest period of political stability since Trujilloʼs 31year dictatorship ended in 1961. In doing so, Balaguer has maintained a broad range of political freedoms, only occasionally resorting to arbitrary methods. His survival in office has perhaps been Balaguerʼs major accomplishment and has given many Dominicans hope that a relatively democratic government can provide stability, order, and a measure of economic progress.
This accomplishment is impressive by Dominican standards, but Balaguer nonetheless has so far been unable to create the political conditions that will ensure long-term stability. He has failed to promote the development of political institutions such as Congress, the [Page 522] judiciary, labor unions, and political parties that could provide a force for constitutional stability. The Trujillo period and its turbulent aftermath created hatreds and animosities that are still major political burdens. Intransigent opponents, unable to reconcile themselves to being out of power, continue looking for an opening to topple the government. Although the countryʼs economic prospect is somewhat improved, Balaguer has not given high priority to politically difficult but essential economic, social, and military reforms. US aid is still vital to financial stability and even a moderate rate of economic growth.
During the last half of Balaguerʼs term, political activity will increasingly focus on presidential elections to be held in mid–1970. Pre-electoral maneuvering seems likely to bring latent political conflicts to the surface, and it is not at all certain that Balaguerʼs successor—assuming the President does not run again—will be able to move into the presidency in a stable political environment. Balaguerʼs major challenge during the next two years, therefore, will be to establish the conditions needed to demonstrate that his administration is more than an interregnum between periods of chaos and instability.
Balaguerʼs Strengths …
1. Balaguer has been able to maintain the backing—or at least the tacit acceptance—of most of the political sectors that supported his candidacy in the 1966 elections. His generally conservative and cautious policies have avoided alienating the military and the politically influential upper and upper-middle class. In addition, US support, made manifest through conspicuous political actions and a major infusion of economic aid, has served to bolster the President and discourage his opponents.
2. Balaguer continues to profit from the reaction of the majority of the Dominican political community to the violence and instability of the 1965 “constitutionalist” uprising. Most Dominicans have accepted Balaguerʼs overwhelming electoral victory in 1966 over Juan Bosch as a popular mandate for peace and order. Although Balaguer has failed to generate strong popular enthusiasm, his performance has generally been accepted and no major challenges to his rule have developed. He has retained and expanded his support among moderates, the church, and business elements, and the victory of his Reformist Party in the municipal elections last May was on the whole an endorsement of the President.
3. Balaguer has generally proved to be an astute political tactician with a sound understanding of Dominican political psychology. He has employed a variety of political stratagems to maintain and broaden his support while keeping his opponents off balance. Balaguer has been conscious that most Dominicans respect dominant—at times even authoritarian—leadership. Operating on this assumption, he has issued [Page 523] veiled warnings to political adventurers and has used government power in a forceful and at times unrestrained manner to harass and intimidate dissidents. He has kept the left and right from uniting against him and has sought to stimulate divisions in each sector. Balaguer has attempted to give his government an image of “national unity” by appointing to government positions a broad spectrum of politicians ranging from right-wing to center left. In so doing, he has bought off some opponents and has exiled potential troublemakers to overseas diplomatic posts.
… And His Weaknesses
4. Balaguerʼs performance as President has not been without serious negative aspects that have been exploited by his opposition. Balaguerʼs style of governing bears many of the hallmarks of Trujillo, in whose government he served for many years. In addition, Balaguer is so strongly influenced by the traditionalism and primitive nature of the Dominican political environment that he tends to be insensitive to the need for change and modernization.
5. Many of his supporters display political thinking shaped under Trujillo and are considerably more authoritarian and conservative in outlook—as well as much less honest—than Balaguer. Out of loyalty and an inability to place his faith in others, however, Balaguer has put many of these partisans into influential advisory posts and important positions in the security services. The presence of these “trujillistas”—as they are labeled by their enemies—and their occasional arbitrary behavior have served as a constant goad to those who opposed Trujillo and also have provided a ready source of political ammunition for the left and right. Of additional concern has been the increased interest the Trujillo clan has shown from exile in Europe over the last year in Dominican politics and in maintaining ties with some Dominican politicians.
6. Many leaders of the Reformist Party (PR), including Vice President Lora, have been seriously disenchanted by the Presidentʼs failure to build up the party through government patronage and funds. They are also critical of some of his policies and resentful of their lack of influence in shaping them. The combination of the PR, which appears to have strengthened its grass-roots organization despite the Presidentʼs indifference, and “trujillista” government officials provides a potential danger to Balaguer and may prove difficult for a moderate successor to dislodge.
7. Balaguerʼs administrative style and government appointments have not been a source of strength to his administration. By and large he has appointed aides on the basis of politics and old friendships. Balaguerʼs undistinguished appointments and his tendency to centralize authority in his office have weakened the already inadequately staffed [Page 524] government ministries, forcing the President to take on the almost impossible task of overseeing even minor policy decisions to ensure their execution. His subordinates, in turn, buck even trivial matters up to the President for a decision. Balaguerʼs failure to give adequate guidelines to the actions of the police and the palace intelligence staff has been especially damaging politically and has been effectively exploited by the opposition. Balaguerʼs governing style consequently has produced a more conservative image of his government than is warranted by the Presidentʼs own political values.
8. Balaguer has proved to be relatively insensitive to public opinion, has displayed a distrust of the press, and has often dismissed even well-intentioned criticism as malicious and politically inspired. Reflecting the Dominican predilection for the politics of annihilation rather than compromise and conciliation, Balaguer has frequently reacted to opposition attacks by stimulating unnecessary antagonism. One of Balaguerʼs most damaging blind spots has been his slow realization that the appearance of government “repression” and “terrorism” upset many moderates and gave credibility to opposition charges of “neo-trujilloism.”
The Intransigent Opposition
9. Balaguer has had to expend considerable effort to stay one step ahead of the elements on the left and right who have been unable to reconcile themselves to his assumption of power and who have been antagonized by his manner of rule. The left and the right have issued a continuing stream of hostile and frequently inflammatory propaganda that has kept political tensions high. Balaguerʼs opponents, however, have been unable to form a common front. The divisions between them have remained deeper than their hostility to Balaguer.
Dominican Revolutionary Party
10. During most of Balaguerʼs term the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), dominated by its more radical elements, has maintained a militant position of “revolutionary and nationalistic” opposition to the President. It has accused him of “neo-Trujillo” practices and “systematic repression” of his opponents, and has stridently criticized US support of his government. The PRD has issued frequent warnings that unless Balaguer adopts a more acceptable course, it will be in the vanguard of the “inevitable revolution.” Early this month, one PRD leader seemed to go even further toward radicalization, saying that the partyʼs goal is “a struggle of national liberation in order to achieve revolutionary power by any means.”
11. Despite its posturing, the PRD has not—as many Balaguer supporters believe—engaged in serious conspiracy or made efforts to organize a popular uprising. The party has, however, kept in contact with [Page 525] Communist and right-wing opponents of Balaguer to discern their strength and intentions. Prior to the election in May 1968, the PRD seemed on the verge of cooperating with the extremist Dominican Popular Movement in a campaign of violence to press voters into complying with the PRD strategy of electoral abstention. At the last minute, however, the PRD leadership—under pressure of more moderate party elements—pulled back and only minor violence occurred.
12. The PRD has based its policies in part on the conviction that Balaguer would eventually succumb to a right-wing military takeover. In addition, the partyʼs efforts to discredit Balaguer and to maintain an atmosphere of political tension seem at times to have been aimed at encouraging others to conspire. The activities of party elder statesman Juan Bosch—who remains in self-imposed exile in Europe—have also pushed the party into a more radical and more anti-US position.
13. Balaguerʼs efforts to isolate and discredit the PRD and undermine its support among organized labor and the government bureaucracy have also encouraged radicalism. Despite a few half-hearted efforts he has made to reach some sort of accommodation with the PRD, Balaguer has said that its leaders “are little more than Communists.”
14. The PRD probably realizes that present conditions differ considerably from those existing in 1965, when it had the support of some military elements in toppling a very unpopular and narrowly based government. The gradual erosion of the partyʼs popular support and the deterioration of its organization have limited its capability for antigovernment action. In addition, a significant current of relatively moderate PRD opinion resents the influence of Bosch, is unwilling to renounce democratic methods for Boschʼs authoritarian and radical notions of “popular dictatorship,” and dislikes the idea of breaking all links to the US. The “moderates” have served as a brake on the radical leadership and have frequently forced Party Secretary General Jose Francisco Pena Gomez to pull back from extreme positions.
15. Over the next few months the PRD will have to begin to define its position in regard to the 1970 elections. If the PRD is to remain a significant Dominican political force and avoid further radicalization, it must moderate its line, develop constructive alternatives to Balaguerʼs policies, and find a popular candidate. At present the party seems uncertain of its course and has adopted a wait-and-see attitude, at least until the US political picture becomes clearer. Despite his angry denunciations of “US interventionism,” PRD leader Pena has said that future US policies toward the PRD will determine whether the Dominican Republic enjoys a “peaceful transition” in 1970 or whether “we will have a violent revolution.” The PRD evidently hopes that a new US administration will be less committed to Balaguer.
[Page 526]The Extreme Left
16. Dominican Communists have steadily lost ground under the Balaguer administration as a result of an intensification of ideological and tactical factionalism and intensive government harassment. The total membership of the countryʼs three “major” and three minor extreme leftist groupings appears to have declined from about 1,000 in late 1966 to an estimated 800. Communist activity has been limited to anti-Balaguer propagandizing and sporadic, relatively ineffective violence and terrorism. Although the Dominican Popular Movement and the 14th of June Revolutionary Movement, both influenced by Cuban and Chinese doctrine, have stressed their intention to lay the groundwork for protracted guerrilla warfare, their efforts at promoting rural insurgency have been systematically and effectively disrupted by the security forces.
17. The extreme left remains influential among urban students, particularly in lower and middle-class neighborhoods in Santo Domingo, and at the Autonomous University of Santo Domingo UASD). Although Balaguer has expressed deep concern over Communist influence on youth, he has been unable to develop an effective alternative appeal. Balaguerʼs show of force at the USAD in February 1968, however, demonstrated that he would not tolerate extremist-inspired violence among students.
18. The continued absence of “constitutionalist” leader Francisco Caamano, who mysteriously disappeared from his London military attaché assignment in October 1967 and apparently went to Cuba, has remained an unsettling influence. The PRD has disassociated itself in advance from any rash adventure by Caamano, and differences have developed among the Communists over supporting a possible Caamano-led and Cuban-backed attempt at insurgency. The widespread belief that Caamano has linked up with Castro has discredited him among many Dominicans including dedicated “constitutionalists,” while Balaguerʼs cancellation of Caamanoʼs military commission last May appears to have satisfied military pressure for action against their one-time colleague. Although the return of Caamano could serve to unify some of the Dominican extremist factions, it seems very unlikely that he could pose a major threat to the government.
The Right
19. Although Balaguer has devoted considerable effort to undermining the left, he has always believed that the major potential danger to his rule was posed by the right-wing and conservative elements who dominated the governing Council of State in 1962 and who pushed for the militaryʼs ouster of Bosch in 1963. Balaguerʼs suspicion of these elements have undoubtedly been heightened by their successful efforts to maneuver him out of power following the assassination of Trujillo [Page 527] and by their sponsorship of the candidacy of Rafael Bonnelly in the 1966 presidential elections.
20. Many of these rightists have been frustrated by their inability to influence Balaguerʼs policies and have sensed a threat to their own positions in the emergence of “trujillistas” in important government positions. They became particularly alarmed following the assassination attempt in March 1967 on Antonio Imbert—one of the two surviving members of the plot to assassinate Trujillo—which they blamed on elements in the government. The rightists, however, have remained unorganized and unable to reestablish their influence with the military. Indeed, some have even accepted government sinecures or remained benevolently neutral toward Balaguer. In mid-May 1968, however, Balaguer stirred up his opponents on the right with his threat to audit all government expenditures since Trujilloʼs assassination. This has intensified dislike of Balaguer among rightists who profited handsomely from their government “service.”
21. The right gained a new ally in late 1967 with the formation of the Democratic Quisqueyan Party (PQD). The immediate goal of the nationalistic and vehemently anti-Communist PQD has been to mobilize public support to urge Balaguer to permit the return from exile of General Wessin, the military leader who opposed the “constitutionalists” and who is now in Miami. Although PQD leaders have asserted their fealty to constitutional government, many Dominicans fear the party will become a vehicle for anti-Balaguer plotting.
22. Balaguer has said he will permit Wessin to return when political conditions are sufficiently stable and will allow him to be a candidate in the 1970 presidential elections. In the meantime, Wessin, frustrated over the ban on his entry, has become increasingly personal in his attacks on Balaguer. Wessin has made some direct public appeals to the military for support for his cause but so far does not appear to have been very successful. The President reacted to these appeals in March 1968 when he placed restrictions on military contacts with politicians and his intelligence operatives have been successful in creating dissension within the PQD.
Balaguer and the Military
23. Balaguerʼs ability to keep his opponents at bay has depended on his relationship with the armed forces—the key Dominican political interest group. Balaguer entered office with the strong backing of the military, who deeply distrusted his leftist opponent, Juan Bosch. Balaguer keeps a wary eye on military sentiments in making policy decisions and appears to have satisfied most officers that he will adhere to the national interest as they see it. Balaguer has been aided by a slowly growing apolitical spirit which is being nurtured in the military by the defense minister, Major General Perez.
[Page 528]24. Balaguer has retired or assigned overseas a number of officers whose past loyalties have been to Wessin or to civilian right-wingers, and he reorganized the military in September 1966 to break up the power of the armored unit Wessin once commanded. Balaguer, with the complete support of the military establishment, has systematically retired officers who joined the “constitutionalists” in 1965. Officers whom he trusts, such as the ambitious and opportunistic Colonel Nivar who commands troops in the capital area, have been moved into key posts. At the same time, Balaguer has maintained a delicate balance between antagonistic military factions, although Minister of Defense Perez and Nivar have frequently been at odds.
25. Military discontent appears to be of relatively minor significance and has not been focused on Balaguer. Some officers have grumbled that Balaguerʼs tight purse strings restrict armed forces operating expenditures. Others have been irritated by Balaguerʼs efforts to contain blatant military corruption. Some officers have complained that Balaguer is too lenient with the left—including the PRD and the Social Christians.
26. Balaguer has been reluctant to press a thorough going program of military reform for fear of possible political consequences. He has reduced military manpower by about seven percent and military expenditures by about 14 percent, but the 18,500–man military establishment remains larger than seems needed to maintain external and internal security. The military itself has resisted US efforts at streamlining, and foot dragging has hindered the effectiveness of the MAAG program.
27. There has been a gradual but steady improvement in the capabilities of the police, particularly after Balaguer appointed the relatively competent General Alvarez police chief in September 1967, and of the Department of National Investigations DNI), the governmentʼs formal intelligence service. The security forces still show a tendency to overreact, fail to sift rumors from fact, frequently fail to distinguish between the Communist and non-Communist left, and have an overzealous attitude toward the governmentʼs real and imagined opponents. Despite these shortcomings, they appear capable of overcoming any likely security threat as long as they remain politically united.
Economic and Social Problems
28. President Balaguerʼs preoccupation with political stability, his emphasis on achieving financial stability, and his traditionalistic outlook have created drags on economic and social development efforts. Despite more than $100 million in US aid during Balaguerʼs first two years, at the end of 1967 the economy had not yet regained the peak level of 1964. With population growing at an annual rate of 3.5 percent, per capita income has probably shown a small decline [Page 529] under Balaguer. Both unemployment and underemployment remain high.
29. Although Balaguer recognizes the need for more rapid economic growth, his primary economic objective since taking office has been the restoration of domestic and international financial stability. His austerity program has trimmed noninvestment government expenditures and held total spending to a level that can be financed by domestic revenue and foreign aid. This conservative spending program has helped keep prices essentially stable, but has hampered economic recovery. Important steps have been taken to rationalize the operations of the state-owned industries—particularly the important state sugar corporation—and their financial position has considerably improved.
30. Government efforts have somewhat eased the countryʼs balance-of-payments problem. Exports have been diversified and expanded, and the increase in imports has been held down. Despite these promising developments, the countryʼs international payments position remains dependent on US assistance.
31. Balaguer has refrained from major economic policy changes that would involve substantial political risk. Although devaluation would help to hold down imports, Balaguer has avoided such action because of the probable outcry from importers and the Dominican conviction that the pesoʼs parity with the dollar is “sacred.” There has been some increase in tax collections, but the President has moved slowly in punishing tax evaders. Although the sale of government-owned industries would probably lead to better management, Balaguer had demonstrated a sensitivity to the political criticism that would attend such a move.
32. Balaguerʼs style of administration has hampered economic development. The Presidentʼs centralization of authority in his office over even minor budget allocations, his failure to appoint competent officials, and his distrust of technicians and economic planning have imposed serious limitations on the governmentʼs ability to modernize and have had a detrimental effect on implementation of the the US aid program. Many of Balaguerʼs personally selected investment projects have been designed more for political showmanship than for economic impact.
33. Despite these flaws, there are positive factors that offer some ground for optimism. Investment by private Dominicans and foreign businesses—which had been badly disrupted by the political chaos that preceded Balaguer—has shown increasing vigor, and gross private and government investment is up considerably. US-aided efforts at agricultural diversification, while not producing results quickly as originally hoped, are gradually strengthening this key sector. The apparent end of a serious year-long drought should also spur agricultural production for export and domestic consumption.
[Page 530]34. Although there has been some increase in criticism of Balaguerʼs economic policies—particularly the austerity program—there is no indication that discontent has reached a point where it would jeopardize political stability. Nevertheless, unrest among labor, the unemployed, and businessmen, particularly those hurt by government import restrictions, must be continually monitored by Balaguer. Perhaps the most significant political impact of Balaguerʼs economic policies will be felt by his successor, who will probably inherit many of the same deepseated economic problems that have proven politically burdensome since Trujilloʼs demise.
35. Balaguer campaigned on the slogan “neither injustices nor privileges” and has subsequently committed himself to some important social reforms, but on the whole his government has had a paternalistic and conservative orientation. In education, for example, Balaguer has not assigned sufficient priority to financing needed changes. Although he seems to have remained a symbol of hope for the countryʼs large rural population, he has come under criticism from campesino groups and progressive churchmen for moving too slowly in agrarian reform and rural improvement. One promising development has been Balaguerʼs commitment to a program of family planning which may eventually lead to a reduction of the 3.5 percent annual population growth.
36. Balaguerʼs conservative labor policies have produced a potentially dangerous vacuum within organized labor. Balaguer has taken the view that labor should remain aloof from politics—despite the fact the government dominates the economy—and he has done nothing to encourage the growth of effective unions. Although his policy has reduced organized Communist labor strength significantly, it also has stunted the growth of democratic unions. The austerity program—which includes a freeze on wages designed to compensate for the rapid increase in labor costs that occurred in the immediate post-Trujillo period—and the governmentʼs lack of sympathy for legitimate labor grievances have produced growing labor discontent. In response to mounting pressure for a relaxation of the wage freeze, Balaguer announced last month that he would examine the austerity program with an eye to making modifications later this year.
37. A major vulnerability of the Balaguer government is its lack of appeal to left-of-center urban students and youth, organized labor, the urban unemployed, and left-wing middle-class intellectuals and professionals. Balaguerʼs pragmatic and austere style, his generally conservative policies, and his association with the Trujillo regime have contributed to his alienation from these sectors. Although discontent has led to minor strikes and demonstrations in the Santo Domingo area, the problem has not become critical. Nevertheless, tension between the government and sectors influenced by the PRD and the extreme left [Page 531] could lead to spontaneous unrest and become a major problem in a period of political crisis.
The Prospect of the 1970 Elections
38. Balaguerʼs attention will be drawn increasingly to the 1970 elections despite his continued concern over short-term political stability. Although Balaguerʼs intentions with regard to his own candidacy are not completely clear, he has publicly said that he “does not aspire to re-election.” If Balaguer did choose to run, he probably would have the edge over any potential challenger. He would have to contend, however, with the strong aversion of many politically influential Dominicans to the concept of a second term, as well as left–and right-wing allegations that his intention is to perpetuate “Trujillo-style” one-man rule.
39. In advancing either his own or anotherʼs candidacy, Balaguer will have to choose between his present right-of-center political base in the Reformist Party (PR) and a more moderate political coalition that would be better attuned to the need for a broad array of political, economic, and social changes. There has been considerable speculation among Dominican politicians that Balaguer will support liberal former provisional president Hector Garcia Godoy, who is now ambassador to the US. Balaguer may attempt to establish a political coalition behind Garcia Godoy that would include liberal PR elements, moderates in the PRD and the Revolutionary Social Christian Party (PRSC).
40. If a middle-of-the-road coalition is to develop, it seems likely that the PRSC will be in a position to play a key role. The PRSC was greatly encouraged by its showing in the recent municipal elections when it quadrupled its vote and for the first time won elective offices. During the Balaguer administration, the PRSC had moderated its previously radical line, engaged in spirited but on the whole constructive criticism of Balaguer, attempted to broaden its support at the expense of the PRD, and made cordial overtures to the US Embassy. Balaguer has expressed admiration for the Social Christians, even remarking that the PRSC is the only hope for the evolution of a two-party democratic political system.
41. As presidential elections approach, political tensions almost certainly will increase. Both the right and left are sure to believe they are deeply threatened by either Balaguerʼs continuation in office or the emergence of Garcia Godoy as a moderate alternative. The military remembers with deep distaste Garcia Godoyʼs term as provisional president when he exiled key officers who had fought against the “constitutionalists.” Vice President Lora, whose political outlook is markedly authoritarian and conservative, seems likely to use the Reformist Party to mount his own presidential drive. Elements of the anti-Balaguer right, in turn, may push the candidacy of exile General Wessin. In short, [Page 532] the 1970 elections may well unearth the latent Dominican political antagonisms that have been hidden under the relative tranquility of the Balaguer administration.
The Future
42. Balaguer will probably be able to continue to hold a firm grip on power without having to resort to extreme authoritarian measures. He has so far shown himself able to avoid the serious errors or major miscalculations that could jeopardize stability. His acceptance by the military seems relatively firm, and he will probably be able to count on the continued support of a broad sector of other influential political groupings. Nevertheless, the continued existence of deep political antagonisms, which are at time intensified by the Presidentʼs actions, and the unyielding opposition of the right and radical left make for continuing political tension that could result in a serious challenge to his government. Should the 61–year-old Balaguer suddenly disappear from the scene—either through assassination or for reasons of health—prospects for stability would be considerably dimmed under his constitutional successor, Vice President Lora.
43. Balaguerʼs position will remain dependent on continued US economic and political support. Should the opposition consider a new United States administration less committed to Balaguer, it would probably step up its efforts to exploit the Presidentʼs political vulnerabilities.
44. Balaguerʼs dependence on the military and other established social groupings will continue to limit his willingness and ability to press for politically difficult social and economic reforms. He may be able, however, to fulfill some of the commitments for reform he has made and may benefit from a moderate upswing in the economy.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XVIII. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence of the CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, and coordinated with the Office of Economic Research, the Office of National Estimates, and the Clandestine Services.↩