Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

210. Information Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson¹

Washington, January 16, 1968.

SUBJECT

• Dominican Situation

The IRG for Latin America met with Ambassador Crimmins yesterday to review the Dominican situation and decide what additional steps should be taken to bolster Balaguer.

Ambassador Crimmins expressed some surprise that his recent report had been viewed as sounding a note of alarm over political trends.² The message he wished to convey was one of continuing concern over the efforts of the opposition to undermine Balaguer, brought into sharper focus by the proximity of the May municipal election. There is no immediate threat to Balaguerʼs position, but we must remain alert to dangers and the need to bolster him wherever possible.

Crimmins reported that last Friday³ before leaving the DR, he asked President Balaguer for his assessment. Balaguer said he was not concerned about the situation and thought it was essentially normal for the Dominican Republic as it approached an important election. Crimmins thought this estimate a little too sanguine.

When asked about prospects for Balaguerʼs winning the election, Crimmins observed that the outcome of the municipal elections was not much in doubt. Balaguerʼs Reformist Party (PR) has the best political organization and with a little bit of effort he can win.⁴

The IRG agreed to explore these courses of action to bolster Balaguer:

Economic

1. Speed negotiation of the $30 million SA–PL 480 package for CY 1968 and advance our paperwork on disbursement so that money can flow promptly after signing of the new agreement.

2. Press for rapid IDB and AID processing of the politically important Taveras Dam loan so that it could be signed by February 27, the Dominican Independence Day. (IDB President Felipe Herrera has expressed an interest in going to the DR for the signing ceremony.)

3. Recommend that you again make a special allocation to the DR of the Puerto Rico and domestic sugar shortfalls and announce this in advance of the May 16 elections.

4. Amend the USDA letters of reimbursement to allow wheat to flow uninterrupted to the DR while PL 480 negotiations are underway.

5. Check to see how we might help the Canadian Falcon Bridge Co. secure the financing for its $150 million investment in Dominican nickel so that the announcement can be made prior to the elections.

6. Encourage Balaguer to decide on the bids already presented by Esso and Shell for building a refinery in the DR to pave the way for the announcement of another major investment.

Political-Military

1. Arrange a series of visits to the DR over the next four months to demonstrate confidence in and support for Balaguer, e.g.:

• —IDB President Herrera for the Taveras Dam loan signing;
• —New OAS Secretary General, after he is elected;
• —President Leoni, either on his way to or from the US, should he accept the invitation you made at Punta del Este;
• —Ships of countries participating in the Caribbean naval exercise “Springboard” (Canada, Ecuador, Colombia and possibly Venezuela, but not US or Brazil because of IAPF connotations).

2. Crimmins to review programmed levels of military and police equipment to determine whether the items are best designed to help satisfy the more urgent needs of the security forces and yet be consistent with our plans for modernization and reduction of force levels.

3. Continue and, if necessary, increase surveillance of potential coup elements (e.g., Wessin) and be prepared to place departure controls on them if Balaguer requests.

4. Hold the line on issuance of visas to notorious Trujillistas whose presence here would be prejudicial to our interests in the DR.

In addition to the foregoing actions [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] will:

1. Subject to 303 Committee approval, make [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] available to the Social Christian Party to keep them in the municipal elections as a validating force for the elections. (It is doubtful that Boschʼs PRD Party will participate.)

2. Press Balaguerʼs PR Party to be more aggressive in the election campaign which starts February 16.

3. Make renewed efforts to determine the whereabouts of Caamano who disappeared from his London post on October 24, 1967.

4. Try to learn more about Cuban intentions regarding the DR, since Caamano may be in Cuba and Castro may be looking to the DR as the place to recoup his Bolivian losses.

With alertness to the situation, the foregoing medicine and a little luck, Balaguer should be able to weather this rise in the fever chart unless he precipitates complications with decisions beyond our control.

Walt

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XVIII. Secret. A “PS” on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.
2. See Document 208.
3. January 12.
4. During a January 16 ARA–CIA meeting support for Dominican moderate forces in the May municipal elections was discussed. It was noted that Balaguer was not interested in building and maintaining the organization of his Reformist Party and until he responded to U.S. efforts to “vitalize him” there was not much the United States could do. “Sayre expressed his concern that in March or April, when it would be too late, Balaguer would suddenly awaken to the fact that his own prestige was involved in the municipal elections and would turn to us with demands that we do something.” (Memorandum from Trueheart to Hughes and Denney, January 18; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Dominican Republic 1968)