205. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State1

1108. Subj: Political Situation Uneasy.

1.
Two weeks—and especially this last, very active week—of intensive rumor-mongering and speculation concerning possible intentions of Wessin movement and alleged USG shifting of its focus and support from Balaguer to Wessin have produced local political situation best described as uneasy. Our vigorous public and private efforts dispel any impression of changing USG attitude appear to have achieved little significant or at least measurable success. By way of illustration, Vice Pres Lora considered it necessary raise what is being said concerning US posture during dinner with Emboffs Nov 16. Lora, who was strongly and categorically assured of straight-line US support for Balaguer, professed not believe rumors himself but said he wanted us know effect they seemed be having in key areas including palace.
2.
A. Present campaign has probably contributed to process of erosion in some areas of Balaguerʼs civilian (and possibly military) support, which process seems have been developing for some weeks and particularly since Wessinista PQD presented request for recognition as political party to central electoral board late last month. PQDʼs assertion [Page 490] that it presented 125,000–150,000 signatures in support its claim to legal status seems have impressed many and, as reflected by wide variety Emb contacts, may be widely accepted at face value. To a man, however, some 25–30 non-Wessinista Emb contacts (including Lora, Col Nivar Seijas, PRD dissidents and moderates, and PRD leadershipʼs official channel to Emb) profess to view alleged PQD strength decidedly in Golpista terms and only very secondarily in electoral terms. They seem impressed at least as much by rumors concerning PQDʼs intentions as by their individual estimates its actual or potential strength. And in these rumors highly imaginative allegations concerning US posture weigh heavily.
B.
As Dept. is well aware, Doms in and out of office, of high or low estate, have in recent years demonstrated inordinate sensitivity to every nuance, real or imagined, of USG policy. This unhealthy attitude, which is the price we pay for our heavy influence and involvement, is exploited constantly by political elements, sometimes positively but more often negatively. This chronic sensitivity has become acute in the past few weeks, basically because of Wessinista upsurge but also because of unsatisfactory economic conditions and, to a probably minor degree, apprehension over the Congressional cuts in aid funds. The result has been that rumors of a less than positive US attitude toward Balaguer have received wider currency and created more apprehension—even in relatively sophisticated circles—than at any other time since Balaguer took office.
3.
We are continuing efforts counter these allegations, many of which concern charges made or echoed by relatively responsible elements that US slowing down or diminishing aid to Balaguer in preparation for changeover to Wessin. Past week or two have seen public charges that there is serious friction between Emb and Balaguer on aid matters, aid is inadequate, aid will be cut, technicians withdrawn, or even entire USAID Mission to DomRep terminated. Amb plans deal as forthrightly as possible with issue in his long-scheduled address to American Chamber of Commerce Nov. 22. We can reasonably expect that this address will have dampening effect on current speculation, but are not sanguine that, in view limitations created by appropriations situation and current policy guidelines provided Emb (on, e.g., PL–480 negotiations), its effect will be long-lasting.
4.
Spiraling issue of Wessinʼs return, with alleged US acquiescence therein, may be approaching a climax. We have indications from US and GODR sources that Wessin and his supporters planning major move for his return Dec 1. Balaguerʼs position unclear. He stated last July he would permit Wessinʼs return if sufficient popular clamor for it developed, and has recently acknowledged Wessinʼs eligibility participate in forthcoming elections, Wessinʼs name, however, is still on [Page 491] GODRʼs prohibited list, and Pres is reported to have privately indicated indecision to Emb contacts. He told Garcia Godoy, according to latterʼs statement to Amb, he is uncertain about how to deal with situation and reportedly told Col. Tejeda Alvarez that Wessinʼs return at this time would create divisions in armed forces, a point also mentioned by Garcia Godoy. Garcia Godoy told WRB2 he had replied to Pres that he as yet had no recommendation to make as to best way handle situation.
5.
In conversation with Amb subsequent to his talk with Garcia Godoy, Pres stated he not unduly concerned about Wessinista threat. At same meeting, however, Pres betrayed unusual sensitivity about fact that some military and civilian elements had interpreted routine political contacts by our Consulate in Santiago as US support for PQD. Pres insisted, in response Ambʼs statements, he fully understood our position of support for him, but incident, in our judgment, betrays a certain amount of jitteriness and lowered morale on part Pres. With respect his morale, should be remembered we have hit him with very gloomy analysis 68 B/P and fiscal prospects without indicating, for reasons well known to Dept., what, if anything, we are prepared to do to help. We have also discussed with him in direct terms GODR delinquencies on certain aid-financed activities (ODC and AG Bank), although Pres stated he would meet all commitments, he may well feel that he is being squeezed at a time when his political problems are mounting. (In pertinent illustration of continually spiraling talk on aid issue, El Caribe Nov. 18 prominently front-paged Balaguer comment to press on ODC problem under negative headline “Pres Points Out Case of Discrepancy (with US) on Aid.”)
6.
Balaguerista elements contacted in past two weeks, including Lora and Nivar, hold that Wessinʼs return should be authorized before pressures build to point that Pres would patently be surrendering to them, and they profess belief there is still time undercut this pressure. They also profess conviction that Wessin, once here, would “demartyrize” self in relatively short period (2–3 months) and that situation would thus regain its previous if precariously balanced level.
7.
Net effect Wessinʼs return or even his remaining abroad extremely difficult to assess. Even if we discount his own ability carry out his messianic political aspirations, Wessin appears fast becoming rallying point or symbol for disaffected political and business elements covering a broad spectrum who for variety of perhaps contradictory motivations and doctrines see in him potential instrument for upsetting present unsatisfactory (to them) status quo. And there is reason [Page 492] believe Wessin still able command some loyalty in armed forces, particularly at lower levels. Whether his disruptive capability varies in direct or inverse proportion to his proximity is question as yet unanswerable, and we are impressed that neither Balaguer nor Garcia Godoy, who in combination probably represent some of best political thinking available here, as yet feel confident of ability make proper decision.
8.
Without being alarmist, Emb considers it appropriate alert depart to developing situation and to feeling of concern held and expressed locally. It is interesting and perhaps significant that PRD is newly receptive to contacts with Emb, and one PRD spokesman tells us Pena Gomez wishes Emb know he is “very preoccupied” about situation. In apparent (if true) reversal of long-standing position, Pena Gomez allegedly told PRD legislators recently that party would defend GODR against coup attempt. Since then however, he has spoken publicly of PQD for first time over party radio program Nov. 17, stating PQD ranks being swelled by those seeking escape “terror” of GODR, and he restated official PRD position adopted last March that party would support neither coup effort nor govt and that it would fight only if attacked.
9.
Present situation appears both uneasy and fluid. Political antennae are clearly out to determine where USG sentiments really lie and who looks like a winner. Our interest will clearly be served by whatever action transmits msg which will be unmistakably interpreted here as vote of continuing confidence in and support for present constitutional govt. Although we are aware that, under present circumstances, we are obliged keep to general, unspecific and unquantified statements on assistance, Amb in his speech and Emb officers in their contacts will continue endeavor transmit such msg.
Crimmins
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23 DOM REP. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Santiago de los Caballeros.
  2. Presumably a reference to WGB, William G. Bowdler.