187. Memorandum From William
G. Bowdler of the National Security Council Staff to the
Presidentʼ Special Assistant (Rostow)1
Washington, November 29, 1966, 2:30
p.m.
SUBJECT
- Our Meeting on the Dominican Republic2
At Tab A is the memo which you sent to the President summarizing
John Crimminsʼ cables and
containing the Presidentʼ reaction.3
Purpose of the Meeting
To review the Dominican situation in the light of recent trends toward
political polarization and to determine what steps we should take now to
arrest and reverse this trend.
Agenda for Meeting
What we want to accomplish at the meeting is to:
- —elicit up-to-date information on the political and economic
situation;
- —examine the options for reversing polarization, recognizing
that the only practical alternative is to try to keep the PRD from moving leftward and to
build up Balaguerʼ
Party;
- —discuss specific steps which State and CIA might take to translate our
“attitudinal” posture into action;
- —assign responsibility for preparation of an action paper and
a report to the President.
I suggest you follow the agenda at Tab B.4
Some Comments
According to Crimmins the
polarization crisis is less acute than appears in his cables. I
agree—but the problem is present, and it is easier to deal with now than
later.
[Page 440]
State and CIA have worked up a so-so
paper on short term courses of action (Tab C) to arrest the polarization
trend. On the attitude side it is fine. In terms
of what concrete steps we can take, it is not too
good. CIA tells me that they have some
ideas that have not been put on paper. We should get these on the
table.
The economic reporting from the Embassy has not
been full and sharp. Washington doesnʼt have a clear picture of the
present situation and trends. Crimmins is up here for this purpose. We need to pump
him.
Tab C
Washington, November 29,
1966.
Paper Prepared by the Department of State and
Central Intelligence Agency6
POSSIBLE COURSE OF ACTION—SHORT-TERM
- 1.
- We do not believe there is an imminent threat to DR stability but we recognize that
recent events, particularly within the PRD, if they continue on course, may result in polarization (Balaguer, the civilian right wing, and the
military on the one side, the rest of the country on the other),
a development to be resisted at all costs.
- 2.
- We do not know enough about Peña Gomez to know how extreme he
is or may turn out to be. We do know, however, that he is
combative, intensely nationalist, and anti-U.S. but is not
irrecuperable. He has stated he will leave the
secretary-generalship in the spring. There are no clear
indications of any possible successor.
- 3.
-
Boschʼ role is still
nebulous. It appears, however, that his influence has been
substantially reduced and now that he has left the DR will be reduced even
further.
- 4.
- We agree with Ambassador Crimmins that the splinterization of the PRD should be avoided and that
moderate elements of the PRD
should be encouraged to keep the party from moving too far left,
with the further point of trying to keep the party as
representative and broadly-based as possible.
[Page 441]
With the above in mind we recommend consideration of the following
course of action:
- 1.
- Implement Ambassador Crimminsʼ plan of action vis-à-vis Balaguer.
- 2.
- Impress on Balaguer
the importance of a loyal political organization to the
success of his government. Identify active and potential
leaders of Reformista Party at national, regional and local
levels. Assist (preferably in technical terms) PR in creating a going,
grass-roots political organization to support Balaguerʼ policies.
- 3.
- Improve our information on PRD leaders, identifying moderates, radicals
and any Communist infiltrators.
- 4.
- Assist moderate PRD
members to increase their influence on party affairs and
encourage them to remain in or rejoin the PRD to counter radical
influences.
- 5.
- Seek to diminish influence on PRD affairs of the more extreme radicals and
any Communist infiltrators.
- 6.
- Conduct systematic program to encourage moderates and
diminish radicalism in PRD
youth and labor sectors.
- 7.
- Encourage PRSC moderates
to diminish influence of hardliners and any Communist
infiltrators in the PRSC.
- 8.
- Indirectly assist Peña Gomez to obtain a foreign
scholarship if he wants one and a follow-on fellowship in
the U.S. if desired. Maintain direct and/or indirect contact
with him during his foreign training. Intensify exchanges
program to develop moderate leadership in the PR, the PRD and the PRSC.
- 9.
- [3 lines of source text not
declassified]
- 10.
- Review labor program to see how it can be strengthened in
order to prevent identification of significant labor
elements with the Communist left.
- 11.
- Make efforts to improve the quality of key figures in
regime. With this objective in mind provide Balaguer systematically with
reliable, unbiased information from all available sources
[3 lines of source text not
declassified].
- 12.
- Encourage the creation of a mechanism to receive and
evaluate complaints against the government including
complaints against improper actions by the security forces.
Encourage Balaguer to
come to grips with this problem and to take corrective
action when complaints are justified.
- 13.
- Try to impress on Dominican security forces the need to
distinguish between the Communist and non-Communist left and
between legitimate and illegitimate political activity. Help
them to identify moderate, constructive members of the
PRD and PRSC.
