Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

177. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State¹

Santo Domingo, May 25, 1966, 1759Z.

2537. Subj: Election Estimate. Ref: Deptel 1109.²

1. Since Embassyʼs previous analysis (Embtel 2416),² three trends have altered complexion election campaign, boosting Balaguerʼs chances but leaving outcome still not clearly predictable: renewed vigor and confidence PR campaign; all but formal collapse Bonnellyʼs MIN everywhere except possibly Cibao, with fragments gravitating to Balaguer without conditions; and failure Bosch neutralize communism issue or cleanse from PRD taint of involvement in swelling campaign violence.

2. In late April PR acquired second wind in campaign. Since then, with renewed confidence and reported infusion new funds, Balaguer has waged adept and aggressive campaign, striking Bosch and PRD most successfully on issues of communism and violence. In improving public relations effort, Balaguer has broadcast at different times on two national networks. Since early May has received near maximum exposure through series at least thrice-weekly radio talks, has stepped up campaign tours and is usually received by impressive crowds turned out by local PR organizations. Small parties allied with PR also making intensive use of radio, countryʼs key political medium. Great number PR vehicles working countryside, expensively printed posters and literature, and airborne Balaguer streamers all attest to PRʼs generous financial sources. Balaguerʼs personal appearances throughout Republic (in “saturation” style of US candidates) psychologically uplifting to backers and impressive to uncommitted voters. By contrast, Boschʼs avoidance of personal contact with public has cost his campaign some zest.

3. In past four weeks, Balaguer has fixed and held public attention on alleged PRD control sugar corporation (CAD) and government offices, gaining widespread acceptance of charge that CAD employees subject to political pressures and campaign levies and that at least some Cedula and Civil Registry personnel illegally equipping ineligibles with voting documents. Though PG has not taken any extensive corrective action, effect has been to put PRD on defensive and even to cause some important PRD friends (such as list in diario) to insist that PG take steps to dispel all suspicions of political misuse CAD resources.

4. As campaign reaches peak, PR has now pushed communism to forefront of its issues. Attacks of this sort increasingly leveled by battery of Balaguer supporters, including Lora, who has come to forefront as PRʼs hatchet man, thus freeing Balaguer from some of onus for mudslinging. Communism issue appears still of more concern to most of electorate than Trujillismo, though PRD leaders now hitting frequently and forcefully on Balaguerʼs Trujillo connections (and Bosch has subtly introduced it in several speeches). Bishopsʼ pastoral letter, intended to proclaim churchʼs election neutrality, provided ammunition for some (including priests according to Bosch) to spread notion that even church considers Bosch unsafe. Subsequent clarification by church leaders has not fully erased misinterpretation.

5. PRD campaign since last analysis has continued mount in intensity, and appears well-directed and adequately financed. PRD operatives in interior have stepped up efforts to turn out maximum of Bosch-inclined city voters and counter Balaguer head start in rural areas (while some PR organizers, sensing victory, show signs of complacency). At top of PRD, however, in past three weeks campaign has been less than spectacular. Difficult to judge effect on voter confidence of Boschʼs refusal to campaign in person or his statements that he does not want presidency, but it could hardly be encouraging to hard-pressed local leaders. Much of his radio time since last analysis spent on PRD program. Though discussion of roads, dams and irrigation projects is needed, subjects inherently lack drama and newsworthiness and allowed public attention to swing to more sensational comments of Balaguer and allies. Moreover, while Balaguer in person making specific promises which are appealing to local audiences and to key sectors (though not necessarily sound economically), Boschʼs economic speeches hold out depressing prospect of austerity, sacrifice and hard work on long road to recovery.

6. At particularly crucial time, Bosch has lost campaign initiative, particularly on issues of communism, violence and CAD. He may have planned stake recovery of initiative on major gambit of threatened withdrawal, but his move at this point seems to have had low and possibly even adverse political yield. Withdrawal threat has lost edge with excessive use. Growing public suspicion that PRD and sympathizers responsible for much of current campaign violence has undercut credibility of Boschʼs protests, weakened PRD stance as meek and persecuted party, and sowed doubt that all of isolated police-military actions against PRD unprovoked. At same time, many Dominicans have latent anti-military stain and Bosch accusations may have touched this nerve at important juncture.

7. PR has emerged from it all with strengthened claim to be party of peace and order—but with image as heirs of Trujillo also more firmly fixed in back in heirʼs minds; adjunct to communism issue, Balaguer has pressed claims that PR stands for order and popular confidence in contrast to climate of chaos and fear that accompanies PRD. PRD membersʼ sacking of MIN offices in Bani and 14th of June attack on PR caravan in La Romana have opportunely underscored Balaguerʼs claims and sorely embarrassed Bosch at moment he sought to re-establish PRD image as victim of police-military-reformista oppression.

8. Bonnellyʼs faltering campaign now largely restricted to Cibao, but even there it is not vigorous. MIN denials of rumors of deal have retained nominal support of cluster of small parties that launched Bonnelly, though cracks in alliance apparent. PLE has all but announced shift to Balaguer and other MIN leaders striving to get into Balaguerʼs camp—with conditions if possible, without them if necessary—before what remains of organization moves en masse without them. Discouraged by long wait, some MIN committees have broken up and others moribund. Though public has tended overrate MIN strength, drift of MIN backers to Balaguer brings his campaign psychological lift and sudden last-minute swing of group of parties behind PR if handled adroitly could help reinforce trend to Balaguer by creating impression among politically imperceptive of massive pro-Balaguer mobilization at critical moment in campaign.

9. Last analysis remains valid in concluding that large bloc of silent swing voters may well decide winner. Many of these of course will cast vote not on merits of candidates or issues but in hope of joining winner. Difficult gauge effect recent weeksʼ campaign interplay on uncommitted bloc who may vote issues. Must be supposed, however, that prospect order and stability remains highly persuasive consideration and Boschʼs failure to acquit himself on issues of communism and violence have weakened him, notwithstanding his repudiation of 14th June support. For this reason, we believe Balaguer has gained influence, perhaps transitory, in uncommitted bloc.

10. Election machinery has no deficiencies likely to affect results significantly. There is evidence that lagging Cedula issuance could operate against Balaguer—who again asked this week that Cedula requirement be dropped—by reducing rural and female turnout. On other hand, multiplicity of ballots and similarity of colors could result in some voting against PRD and PRSC by mistake.

11. Overall impression from this vantage point is that in past three weeks Balaguer has gained momentum that, if retained, could put him over. PRD still campaigning with strength and confidence, but loss of initiative at top level has slowed what showed signs of becoming accelerating bandwagon. With little more than one week remaining, Bosch used what he may have considered a bit trump card without successfully regaining campaign initiative or developing new issue. Result is discernible, even though faint, trend toward Balaguer among visible electorate. PRD is responding with increased expression of confidence and displaying no defeatism that might hasten migration to Balaguer, in fact, Bosch failure to follow hard-hitting line consistently (e.g., his return, after dramatic withdrawal bit, to important but unexciting issues of economic and social reform) is one of current major puzzles of campaign. We are unable decide whether Bosch, on basis his own judgments (which must be afforded healthy respect) has concluded he has little to fear, or whether he is doing little more than going through minimum motions to acquit his responsibilities to party. At same time, it possible he lying Doggo in preparation for final-week burst of activity. In this regard, some Reformista Party leaders uneasily wondering what dramatic last-minute surprise Bosch may have up his sleeve. Leaving aside such speculation, major questions remain whether recent trend toward Balaguer is more apparent than real and whether—assuming importance of appearances—Balaguer will be able transform it into victory in brief time remaining, where mistake or accidental bad break can heavily damage either side.

12. Our earlier generalizations about areas and sectors of Bosch and Balaguer support remain basically valid, but with conditions. Balaguer retains popularity among rural voters, but EmbOffs touring interior find sturdy pockets Bosch rural strength in some provinces. Where PRD organization diligent and effective, indications are Balaguerʼs earlier rural lead has in places been overcome. Similarly, some probes have revealed areas of Balaguer strength in and around cities, including some poorer neighborhoods of Santo Domingo. Sugar areas still lean toward Bosch, but not monolithically. Among salaried mill workers Bosch has heavy lead; but among cane cutters and colonos Balaguer has significant strength.

13. Rundown by area shows Balaguer with perceptible lead in southwestern and extreme eastern provinces. Bosch retains lead in national district and sugar provinces of La Romana and San Pedro de Macoris, though lead could be reduced by strong Balaguer trend in back country. However, in remaining two thirds of country, including populous Cibao, trends at this point hard to establish and prediction would be little more than guess. During recent visits to northwest, Cibao and northeastern provinces, EmbOffs had impression of slight Bosch edge, but Balaguer has drawn extremely well in appearances in those areas and very important silent Campesino vote there defies evaluation. In this last regard, caution advisable in assuming silent vote is usually pro-Balaguer. In areas in which military, police and patron are dominant influence, Bosch backers are inclined to keep their peace.

14. Taking into account all above factors and admittedly unscientific soundings by Embassy, at this point in campaign we now conclude very hesitantly that Balaguer has become the man to beat, principally because he has apparently gained the initiative, a matter of great importance with respect to influencing the large and decisive uncommitted bloc of voters. Events between now and June 1 may well change picture. As we have seen breaks of the race and invigorated Reformista campaign have closed gap. But as tight, hard fought race heads toward finish, inherent organizational superiority of PRD and Boschʼs undeniable color and charisma are still advantages that Balaguer has yet to prove he has fully overcome.

15. Emb requests most strongly and earnestly that contents this telegram be closely held and above all be kept from press.

16. Ambassador Bunker concurs.

Crimmins

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 14 DOM REP. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to Santiago de Los Caballeros and passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, and CINCLANT for POLAD. The telegram was re-typed and sent to President Johnson under cover of a May 26 memorandum from Walt Rostow who wrote: “The latest BunkerߝCrimmins estimate of the election outlook is attached. They believe that Balaguerʼs chances have improved during the past three weeks, but they are not confident enough about the gains to predict his victory.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XV)
2. Not found.
2. Telegram 2416 from Santo Domingo, May 8, analyzes the Dominican Republic electoral campaign. The Embassy concluded that there is no information to backup predictions and that the “political, economic, and social ingredients of campaign are intricate web from which one is well-advised to derive patterns cautiously.” The Embassy reported that the race “should be considered too close to toss-up, with Bosch probably being right now man to beat.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 14 DOM REP)