156. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State 1

1587. From Bunker.

1.
Full ad hoc committee met with Garcia Godoy for more than two hours this afternoon. President had just concluded session with Rivera Caminero at which he made “one last appeal” for cooperation in making changes in military high command. According Garcia Godoy, Riveraʼs answer was flat no. MOD explained that even if he might personally wish to cooperate, other officers would not permit him do so. Rivera warned that if President changed so much as one chief, armed forces would act throughout country and not “a single Communist would remain alive”. This reaction would be contrary to desires of chiefs but allegedly they would not be able control armed forces. Rivera added that chiefs had no choice but stay in office until after elections.
2.
Garcia Godoy said he could see no way out of impasse. Rivera had refused his offer turn government over to armed forces. MOD also insisted there would be no military golpe. Chiefs would simply ignore presidentʼs orders. Meanwhile, best cabinet ministers, governors and other government officials prepared resign at any moment. President said he could find himself without a government tomorrow morning. He would not act as mere “figurehead for military” and could, therefore, only resign. Garcia Godoy suggested that committee might wish discuss with Vice President Castillo possibility of forming new administration. [Page 367] He indicated, however, that he doubted Castillo would take over with chiefs still in place.
3.
Garcia Godoy dwelt at length on alarming possibilities of anarchy and violence if satisfactory solution not found. (Only solution he will so far admit to be satisfactory is removal of chiefs.) He recognized that resignation of PG would bring grave risks in that regard but thought this step would be better than permitting PG to become identified with military repression of civil populace. President repeatedly emphasized his conviction that rising wave of anti-military sentiment (Embassy [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] lack reports of such tidal wave in general populace) makes it impossible to continue status quo.
4.
We explored various possibilities with Garcia Godoy, including proposal that committee sit down with Bosch and Balaguer (with President perhaps present) to attempt hammer out agreement of two major parties to back PG and help devise formula to resolve crisis. President seemed lukewarm to that idea. In his view, committee could best help by trying to persuade Jimenez, Perez y Perez and Beauchamps to accept respective posts in replacement of Rivera, Martinez Arana and De Los Santos. Jimenez, according to Garcia Godoy, had first let it be known that he would accept but later sent word that his “brotherly” relations with chiefs made it impossible. We indicated our intention talk to military leaders but made no other commitments.
5.
There followed prolonged discussion with President covering same ground as in most recent conversations with Ambassador Bennett and me. We continued urge President hold back but apparently made no headway. Garcia Godoy said decrees had been sent to Radio Santo Domingo and broadcast of their contents could be expected this evening. (Decrees are presently—6:30pm local time—being read on radio.) If designated replacements refuse to take posts, President said he might buy time by delivering speech explaining situation and urging calm. As we left palace, Garcia Godoy was going back into session with cabinet.
Bennett
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XIII, 11/65–1/66. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received on January 6 at 8:30 p.m. and passed to the White House and DOD.