134. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State1
826. Joint State–Defense message. We have had several conversations with Garcia Godoy today on military problem. He invited Allen2 and me separately this morning and we went together to his house this afternoon accompanied by Connett. There have been other exchanges by telephone.
Garcia Godoy told us again this morning he considered resolution of arms collection and reintegration downtown area as his fundamental problem—until that resolved nothing else can go forward. Arrival of Bosch has given matter even more urgency than before,3 since he wants to stay ahead of Boschʼs maneuvering which he is convinced will go on unceasingly and to deny Bosch “refuge” of downtown section from which to operate. He considers Boschʼs presence can easily contribute to the perpetuation of separate zone downtown. When I pointed out that we had feeling not much had been done to prevent [Page 324] Boschʼs return at this time despite Bunkerʼs and my urgings, he admitted Boschʼs return inopportune but said he had no real way of stopping him, particularly in view provisions institutional act and his public position which is very much his personal philosophy that no Dominican should be barred from return to his country except in few extreme cases.
He expressed conviction that there will shortly be set in motion nationwide demand for action to be taken re military. He said he would prefer to stay ahead of this anticipated wave of public feeling rather than be forced by it. From practical point of view he made it clear he is convinced that arms collection and reintegration of rebel military will not be achieved as long as Rivera Caminero is Armed Forces Minister due unacceptability of latter to rebel leadership.
He therefore had in mind “package deal” to be announced in TV address this evening which would involve announcement of replacement of Rivera Caminero by Colonel Juan Esteban Perez Guillen, orders to Caamano to reintegrate rebel military officers tomorrow in accordance with formula to cover several categories involved; arms would also be turned in immediately and way would thus be opened for reestablishment normal police authority over downtown area.
I told him we all shared his view that reestablishment of control over downtown was essential. We also agreed on desirability of military changes. However I told him emphatically that timing gave us great concern. We had backed him and assisted in removal of Wessin, not without some embarrassment to USG. Wessinʼs removal while agreed on as a necessary step, had further unsettled military whose morale already low. Following conversation with him, word had been passed to military by Bunker of his understanding that President planned no further changes in leadership just now. Only this morning Rivera Caminero had met with other chiefs and large group of officers at San Isidro to quiet military concern by stressing leadersʼ full support for PG and intention to make every effort to see it through to elections. On both above accounts, abrupt change of Rivera now would be regarded throughout military as sell-out.
I question timing on additional ground involving Juan Boschʼs return yesterday. Bosch had made a violent speech demanding removal of 8 to 10 top officers of armed forces. If Boschʼs demagogic demand were followed on very next day by removal of Minister of Armed Forces, this would be regarded in US as simple cave-in to Boschʼs demand and would in my opinion merely stimulate further demands from Caamano side.
Further, and perhaps most important as regards effective settlement, this seemed to us an arrangement without any enforcement provisions as regards Caamanoʼs side of bargain. Caamano had made [Page 325] many promises and was already in substantial default on carrying out provisions of Act of Reconciliation. To make public sacrifice Minister Armed Forces in loose agreement which could not be enforced seemed to me to be a step which had considerable danger (in terms of effect on local and international opinion and on possible reaction armed forces) without any real assurance of obtaining objectives sought.
I went on to stress that my government, while sympathetic to his very difficult problems, was nonetheless concerned over some of trends developing. I mentioned again Washington concern over changes in the sugar industry for example. There had been little balancing action to numerous appointments made as result of pressures from constitutionalist side in both military and civilian posts. He acknowledged that he was unhappy about number of appointments but insisted the situation could be rectified once he had turned corner by dismantling rebel zone and establishing his authority therein. He continued express view that removal of Rivera Caminero was necessary to this end.
In afternoon meeting we argued that if he were determined to remove Rivera Caminero we must urge strongly that it be preceded by some fulfillment of obligations on constitutionalist side. We recommended specifically that Rivera Camineroʼs removal be made contingent upon completion of arms collection process, reintegration of constitutionalist military into armed forces, and establishment of provisional governmentʼs authority over rebel zone. A phased operation was discussed, with idea of achieving it in two or three days time. Caamano could be given assurance in advance that change would be made when operation completed and Rivera Camineroʼs cooperation to program might even be obtained. President prepared to assign Rivera to post in Washington in line latterʼs desire.
Garcia Godoy seemed to give considerable weight to our argument although still obsessed with his downtown problem.
On learning later in afternoon of Bunkerʼs planned return, Allen and I telephoned him separately to urge that no action be taken to put plan in action until there were chance for discussion with Bunker. He said he had already talked with Perez Guillen and Caamano but had made no definitive agreements. We have learned later [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that Perez Guillen told Army Chief of Staff that he had been called to President who had discussed with him ways to dispose of rebel military problem. Perez told Martinez Arana he had not been offered any post. Rumors have circulated downtown this afternoon, presumably through Caamano, of Rivera Camineroʼs ouster. However, we believe we have pulled Garcia Godoy back for moment and there will be opportunity for further discussion.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XI, 9/65–10/65. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, CINCSO, and CINCLANT on September 27.↩
- C. Allen Stewart, Director, Office of Caribbean Affairs.↩
- Juan Bosch, in exile in Puerto Rico, arrived in Santo Domingo on September 25. The Embassyʼs account of his arrival is in telegram 820 from Santo Domingo, September 26. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 DOM REP)↩