117. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State 1
310. From Bunker and Bennett. Deptel 164;2 Embtel 306.3
We fully share Departmentʼs impatience for definitive solution and concern over attitudes of government officials and public in OAS, as well as over trend of public opinion in U.S. Unfortunately, it is difficult convey to those not intimately involved here just what a slippery and complex situation this is and what a cross-hatching and interrelation of competing pressures there are. As Department is aware from previous attempts settle the Dominican problem, there are key elements on both sides who do not want a solution. They are looking for victory and/or satisfaction of personal pride at any cost, up to and including complete ruin of the country. Bringing people like Imbert and Aristy to accept any compromise, let alone bargain in good faith, is no easy job.
Problem is particularly complicated by fact we are limited in means with which to achieve settlement. As we see it, our options are as follows: (1) We can use force or allow Imbert to use force against Caamano and company. (2) We can bring about Constitutionalist collapse by making life unbearable in Caamano zone—turning off water, closing checkpoints, etc. (3) We can cut GNR off from virtually all funds, using IAPF to close Banco de Reservas and lock up Central Bank. (4) We can continue as we are doing, forcing pace of negotiations in order reduce issues to essentials and then come forward with proposed final solution. (Our strategy and timing are covered in ref Embtel.)
In our judgment use of first two alternatives would create worse problems than we now face. OAS and world opinion in general would presumably react strongly against such measures. In addition, we [Page 289] would be left with Imbert. Neither Garcia Godoy nor anyone else we have found acceptable to liberal opinion here or abroad would be likely to take job under circumstances, even if Imbert could be forced out.
Suddenly cutting off all funds for government salaries (which we could have done early in game) might be just as bad from point of view our own vital interests. Unless GNR collapsed rapidly, allowing quick installation provisional government, we could have situation in which military would go without pay for some time. If this were to happen there is impression armed forces would not hold together for long. It is our understanding that maintenance of armed forces in being and continue integrity of officer corps are prime objectives, particularly in view arms distribution by rebels to all and sundry and extremist exploitation of that distribution. At least we clearly do now want to leave that field to Caamano and friends.
We realize that fourth alternative—one ad hoc committee is now pursuing—takes time and offers no hard guarantee of final success. Nevertheless, there seems no other feasible way to proceed. As explained in reftel, negotiating process should be completed by end of this week. Committee will then come forward with final proposal, at same time exerting maximum pressure by all means available and with full support of Embassy. In order force acceptance it may finally be necessary to threaten or even use measures comprehended with our first three alternatives. Before doing so, however, it is important to be certain that our proposal is before Dominican and world opinion and that both sides have a chance to accept it.
During recent visit to Washington, Bunker estimates solution could be reached in two to three weeks. Committee has been delayed by arrival of Latin American colleagues here a week late, by withdrawal of Read Imbert and company. Despite these and other difficulties we are still hopeful we can finish up soon. As explained in ref Embtel, we hope see provisional government installed by middle of month at latest.
We would, of course, welcome any suggestions Department might have as to how we can move process along faster.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. X, 8/65–9/65. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Passed to DOD, CINCLANT, CIA, CINCSO, and the White House.↩
- Document 115.↩
- Telegram 306 from Santo Domingo, August 1, described the current status and future course of the negotiations that Bunker believed had been reduced to dealing with the “hard essentials,” i.e., the composition of the Armed Forcesʼ high command, future of constitutionalist military personnel, and amnesty/disarmament procedures. Bunker felt the situation was further complicated by Imbertʼs continuing “resistance to formation of a provisional government,” but that he nonetheless intended to move ahead quickly on obtaining as many concessions as possible from both sides. Bunker concluded that a “combination of pressures accompanied by a reasonable proposal for a final solution would turn the trick and allow [the United States] to install a provisional government by the middle of [August] at the latest.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XIII)↩