Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

113. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic¹

Washington, June 28, 1965, 9:56 p.m.

1542. For Bunker and Bennett. Except as modified in this message we are in agreement with Embtel 2628.²

1. Elections. We are prepared to accept your judgment that most generally acceptable course would be six months moratorium on political activity to be followed by three months of campaigning and general elections nine months after Provisional Government inaugurated. However, our preference would be to delay elections for as long a period as would be generally acceptable, hopefully at least 12 months.

2. Urgency of solution. We agree time is of the essence and that every effort should be made to constitute a provisional government this week.

3. Military. Agree that support of Dominican officer corps essential to having a viable provisional government. Believe direct conversations between OAS and military should be continued as appropriate. Restructuring of military establishment and changes in armed forces leadership desirable but agree that it is not practicable to achieve this now. We would hope provisional government could make a start but this is a problem for resolution later. Recent violence in the interior and OAS dependence on Dominican military for maintenance of order is additional reason for not introducing at this particular point in time conditions which would weaken and divide the military. We agree in this connection that reincorporation into armed forces of officers removed some time ago and some of those who went over recently to rebel side is impracticable. We are encouraged by Riveraʼs statement (Embtel 2635)³ that enlisted men and lower ranking officers in rebel camp can be reincorporated into armed forces.

4. Caamano Group. We agree that OAS should stand firm against demands for no-deportation guarantee, legal recognition of 14 June Movement and laws which would impede dealing with problem of communist subversion.

5. Question of Communism. The objective of preventing communist takeover in DR remains essential US objective. In view of weakness and division in non-communist ranks it is most important that person emerging as single President of provisional government clearly understand communist problem and that he be determined to deport or otherwise immobilize leading communist personalities in all three parties and prevent three communist parties from participating in electoral process. We therefore consider selection of provisional President as most important.

6. President of Provisional Government. Hector Garcia Godoy would be acceptable to us if OAS committee decides to propose his name. OAS Committee should however get clear and detailed commitment from him or any other alternative provisional presidential candidate on question of communist subversion. Principal members of provisional cabinet should likewise be selected with need for clear-cut anticommunist posture in mind. USG can and should help in identifying communists.

7. Inter-American Force. Agree that decision on when to withdraw Force should be left for negotiation with Provisional Government. Timing would obviously depend on circumstances not yet clearly foreseeable.

8. Imbert. We share your estimate of value of Imbertʼs services at a critical moment in crisis and agree with approach Bunker is taking in trying to get Imbert to understand he can now step aside with honor and dignity for himself and his family. Better than USG making statements, giving decorations and issuing invitations, from Imbertʼs point of view, would be for OAS to obtain commitment from Provisional Government to issue as its first official act statement about Imbertʼs services similar to approach already made by Bunker in his conversations with Imbert. Provisional Governmentʼs statement could also make reference to any equally helpful effort by rebel side.⁴

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Mann on June 28, cleared by Bundy and Vance (both in draft) and Vaughn, and approved by Mann.
2. Document 112.
3. Telegram 2635 from Santo Domingo, June 28, reported a private meeting held on June 27 between Bunker and Rivera Caminero, GNR Secretary of State for Armed Forces. Caminero assured Bunker that the Armed Forces were interested only in the welfare and future of the Dominican Republic and were prepared to stay out of politics. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. VIII)
4. Printed from an unsigned copy.