Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

105. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic ¹

Washington, June 11, 1965, 9:54 p.m.

1427. For Bunker. We are in substantial agreement with ideas in your 2323.²

(1) We conclude it would be extremely difficult to hold general elections within time available this year, but we await your best judgment on best target date both for possible elections for constituent assembly and elections of constitutional government.

(2) Establishment of interim government at the earliest possible date is of highest priority. Economic problems of DR compounding at accelerating rate. Meaningful progress towards solution of economic problems impossible until political solution has been achieved. Positions of both USG and OAS (within DR and in world opinion) can be expected to become increasingly difficult as time passes and no political solution evolves. Danger of rapid emergence anti-US nationalistic sentiment in DR increases as time passes and no generally acceptable political solution is found. Same is true to lesser extent with respect OAS.

(3) Our preference at this time, like yours, would be for an apolitical government of technicians if this could be achieved. Most important slot would of course be candidates for single or plural executive. Names which occur to us offhand as well known to Embassy are Alejandro Gruillon, Rafael Herrera, Nicolas Pichardo, Bishop Polanco and Tomas Pastoriza. You will undoubtedly have other individuals in mind as well. In reference to cabinet, there may be some advantage in moving toward a consensus in selecting names which are respected by all groups even though they do have some political affiliation. At time Guzman formula was considered, following names appeared to fit this category: Milton Messina, Tomas Pastoriza, Hector Garcia Godoy. Here again you may have other individuals in mind.

(4) Composition of either type government at cabinet level and below will present obvious difficulties given human resources on which Dominican nation may call. Many of these officials will probably require technical support, regardless of type of government which eventually emerges. Question: Should USG offer and/or attempt to provide this technical support or should other OAS member governments be called upon? We tend towards latter course because: (a) if USG technicians are provided, USG will bear ultimate blame for inability to “solve” long list of insoluble problems DR faces; and (b) a truly OAS “solution” to current crisis should have as much OAS flavor as possible.

(5) The 1962 Constitution was reinstated at the time of the 1963 coup and is now in effect. However, one of the major conditions Bosch has established for political solution is reinstatement 1963 Constitution. This condition is unacceptable various Dominican groups including GNR. On the other hand there are obvious advantages from several points of view in using as much of 1963 Constitution as is feasible.

(6) We do not see how 1963 Constitution could be accepted in toto for simple reason it would not work in present situation without considerable improvisation and twisting of some articles.

(7) Possible alternative solutions would be (a) reinstate 1963 Constitution and then suspend all articles which are not applicable in present situation or which would present effective action against Communists, or (b) prepare basic law under which provisional government would operate until constituent assembly or group of experts could prepare new constitution which would become effective when promulgated, when approved by newly elected Congress, or approved by people in plebiscite. Require your comments on these alternatives. In meantime we will draft possible basic law using 1963 Constitution as point of departure.

(8) Since Dominican military and police will have responsibility for law and order in country, adequate safeguards will be required to insure that Dominican military police establishment will be apolitical and under control of and responsive to will of interim government and elected government which succeeds it. Individual officers will require special treatment such as assignment or leave outside country. Query: Should efforts towards restructuring of Dominican military establishment be held in abeyance pending inauguration of elected government, or will it be feasible to begin this task earlier?

(9) OAS presence would presumably continue in DR in some form until elected government is inaugurated. OAS supervision of elections taken for granted.

(10) We continue to believe Imbert must step down. Once Dominican military establishment has acceptable alternative which it can rally, Imbert should be much easier to deal with. FYI We continue ready to offer and help provide safeguards for Imbert and his family, provided he goes along with us when time comes. END FYI

(11) We agree that it is highly unlikely that Bosch and rebel group will accept solution mentioned above. Hopefully, once provisional government is established, non-Communist elements in the rebel group will find solution sufficiently attractive to cease organized resistance. We should be thinking now of proposals that can be made to non-Communist rebels to encourage them to accept provisional government including guarantees against reprisals if they remain in country, and safe departure for those who wish to leave. Best argument with rebels will be that they will have their chance to participate in free and fair elections. It will also be helpful to be able to show clear path to constitutional government and respect for as much as possible of 1963 constitution. We also believe there should be room in provisional government for non-Communists who have been sympathetic to rebels if they wish to serve.

(12) Provisional government should be committed to deal effectively with Communist problem. The most important single safeguard for dealing with Communists is solid agreement on cooperation between provisional government and OAS experts with whom in turn our experts could cooperate. This close cooperation in identification and surveillance of Communists is an indispensable requirement for us. Within this cooperation, two steps are involved: (a) agreement should be reached on the definition of “a Communist”; and (b) agreement should be reached on method of dealing with individuals so identified. On question of definition, we tend towards identifying Communists as members or known collaborators with MPD, PSPD, and extreme left wing of 14th of June movement. Provisional government should consult with OAS and USG on this. On question of disposition, our position is that Communists should be allowed to depart country voluntarily. We also believe those unwilling to go voluntarily should be rounded up and deported to a country of their choice provided arrangements can be made for their entry into country of choice. Otherwise, they should be sent wherever they will be accepted. But we repeat that this particular preferred solution is less important than basic pattern of cooperation on this problem.

(13) Once interim government installed and recognized, USG stands ready and eager to seek agreement with it on program aimed at relieving short-term economic problems and promoting rapid long-term development. We expect OAS–CIAP to play leading role.

(14) Finally, we are anxious for your current estimate of prospects for formation of interim government and time frame within which you believe it will be possible to get agreements necessary for its installation.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP. Secret; Immediate;Exdis. Drafted by Mann, Sayre and Crockett; cleared by Bundy and Vaughn; and approved by Mann. This information was sent under cover of a June 11 memorandum from Bundy to President Johnson. In this memorandum Bundy wrote: “Abe Fortas thinks less than nothing of the ‘Bunker–Mann’plan. He just does not think that a government of ʼtechniciansʼ can do the job, and his belief is that this phrase covers an intent to have a hard-nosed middle-of-the-road here, and that we have to be for progress, or against it, right from the start. That is why he strongly urges that we go back to the task of constructing a political government which would have the support of ʼconstitutionalistsʼ and which would not be violently opposed by the others.” Bundy closed the memorandum by asking if the President wanted the text sent in its current form. It was sent unaltered. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. II, 1965)
2. Document 103.