As you know the President asked for task force reports on Guatemala,
Bolivia and Colombia.2
As I mentioned in a meeting at the White House while I was still on your
staff,3
ARA had set up a committee to study the
counterinsurgency problem in several countries. When I returned to
ARA, the first country I tackled was
Guatemala. We had three or four meetings with Defense, CIA, USIA
and State participating. The actions outlined on page 6 are essentially
those proposed by the Ad Hoc Committee, but they have been brought up to
date.
The assessment is current.
As I understand it what the President wants to know is the current
situation and what the United States should be doing to help maintain
and improve the situation. I believe the attached paper provides this
information but would appreciate your reaction as to whether you
consider it adequate.
Mr. Vance thought we should also
go into all the contingencies should the present Peralta government fall. I would agree
that we should do this if we thought that the government would fall
within the immediate future. However, the situation in Guatemala is such
that we do not anticipate any sudden or violent change down there in the
near future, that is, the next 60 or 90 days. Accordingly, my own
feeling is that an attempt to determine contingencies at this time would
not be a very profitable exercise. We have, however, asked CIA to come up with a list of all of the
leading personalities in the political arena in Guatemala with an
indication of their political complexion. As soon as this is done and
discussed with us here in State, it would become an annex to the
attached paper.
Colombia and Bolivia are slightly different stories. On Colombia
especially, I think we will want to give serious consideration to
contingencies. We are working on those papers and hopefully will have
them to you next week.
In the meantime, after you have looked over the Guatemala paper I would
appreciate an indication from you that we are heading in the right
direction.4
REPORT ON GUATEMALA
Assessment of Current Situation
A. Political
The present regime began governing after the overthrow of Ydigoras
with a fairly broad degree of public support. It was avowedly an
interim government and announced that it would return to
constitutionality and free elections as soon as feasible. In 1964, a
time table was announced which called for the promulgation of a
constitution in March 1965 and elections to be held within six
months from that date. A Constituent Assembly was formed consisting
of most important middle-of-the-road parties. The regime inspired
confidence among the business community for a considerable period
and was helped in this regard by a fairly vigorous campaign to
reduce the grosser aspects of corruption so evident in the Ydigoras
government.
Over the past twelve months, however, the regime has gradually lost a
part of its original support. This loss has been caused primarily by
Peralta’s failure to
adhere to the original time-table for return to constitutional
government and uncertainty over his intentions. The promised
constitution was not promulgated in March, and until recently there
had been growing indications that Peralta intended to seek to perpetuate his regime
until at least 1967. In this atmosphere, an important left-of-center
political party (PR, headed by Mario
PID and the right-of-center
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MLN, was participating in the
Constituent Assembly, has resigned in a bloc from the Assembly and
is now in full opposition, because the Assembly refused to prohibit
leaders of past coups from being presidential candidates.
There have been severe strains within the two parties remaining in
the Constituent Assembly because of political maneuvering by several
potential presidential candidates attempting to get Peralta’s official sanction as the
government candidate for future elections. The resulting progressive
deterioration has given rise to fears that splits within the
middle-of-the-road parties, and within the military itself, might
even lead to civil war, creating a vacuum which could be exploited
by trained communist minorities.
The situation has been ameliorated by a resolution passed by the
Constituent Assembly on June 9. This resolution has fixed the
following timetable for the country’s return to constitutional rule:
1) promulgation of the constitution on September 15; 2) convocation
of presidential and congressional elections on October 1, with the
elections to be held within six months from that date; 3)
installation of the new congress on June 1, 1966; 4) inauguration of
the new president, vice president and supreme court justices on July
1, 1966. Shortly before this resolution, Peralta was quoted in a press
interview with the New York Times to the
effect that he would not seek to be elected President, but he has
not made a public statement to this effect.5
Even though this new timetable differs substantially from that
originally set forth, it probably will have the immediate effect of
reducing current tensions. It will not, however, eliminate the
political maneuverings among the two major parties and may still
result in dissatisfaction among other moderate parties if, for
example, it becomes clear that Peralta will not permit the PR to conduct an
electoral campaign, or if he excludes other moderate left-of-center
parties, such as the Christian Democrats, from participation in the
electoral process. The government’s intentions in this regard,
however, can only be determined over the next several months.
Taking advantage of the political uncertainties which have prevailed,
there have been several rumors of coups and one serious attempt at a
coup against the Peralta
government by non-communist elements. The most serious was one
planned by Roberto Alejos, a strong supporter of former President
Ydigoras. Alejos, presently in exile in Miami, claimed to have a
number of supporters among the military in Guatemala, planned to
transport arms and Cuban mercenaries from
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Miami to Guatemala during May. His plans were
thwarted due to close coverage of his activities by Customs and
other U.S. enforcement agencies and the sizeable quantity of arms he
accumulated were seized by U.S. enforcement officials.6
B. Economic
Indecision in the political field has been matched by indecision in
the business of government. The Peralta regime, despite its effectiveness in
reducing corruption, has been unable to take any affirmative
decisions in the economic and social fields which would have
contributed to progress and to reduction of counter-insurgency
problems. Government investment programs have stagnated. No AID loans of any consequence have been
completed since installation of the Peralta government two years ago. Several loans have
been authorized by AID and one loan
from the Export-Import Bank has been approved for negotiation, but
U.S. representatives have, up to date, been unable to penetrate the
suspicion and apathy of Guatemalan officials and complete
negotiations on these loans. Neither the AID loans nor the proposed EXIM loan differ in their
provisions from loans which have been concluded with all the other
countries in Latin America.
This inability to come to terms on international loans in support of
the government investment program is not a problem unique with U.S.
agencies, and the Guatemalan attitude cannot be attributed solely to
suspicion of North American motives. The Inter-American Development
Bank has also had its difficulties in working with the GOG. Although the IDB has concluded negotiations on
several loans, the rates of disbursement on these loans have been
abnormally slow due to GOG inaction.
It seems clear that lack of action in the economic field
fundamentally results from the unwillingness or inability on the
part of some members of the government to make effective
decisions.
Fortunately, the governmental shortcomings have been somewhat offset
by a vigorously expanding private sector. Exports have continued to
climb significantly and there has been a substantial shifting away
from dependence on coffee over the last three years due to the
emergence of cotton as an important export commodity. There has also
been a substantial increase in exports to Guatemala’s partners in
the C.A. Common Market, consisting primarily of light manufactures
and processed agricultural products. Under the impetus of increasing
exports and private investment activity, Guatemalan GNP has risen by
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over 6% per year over the last 2
years. Current prospects are that it will continue to increase at
this rate.
Despite improved exports, rapidly rising imports have resulted in a
continued deficit on current account. Since much of the increase in
imports has been financed by supplier credits from the U.S.,
Guatemalan foreign exchange reserves have continued to rise.
Immediate foreign exchange difficulties have thus far been avoided,
but repayment of supplier credits and short-term debts contracted
with private banks in the U.S. will all create a strain over a
somewhat longer period.
The major determinant of Guatemala’s immediate economic future
however is whether or not the business sector will continue to have
confidence in the stability of the government. In the absence of
confidence in the future, foreign exchange reserves could rapidly
disappear, as they did immediately before the overthrow of
Ydigoras.
Guatemalan inability to maintain an effective public investment
program has also seriously affected the ability of economic
assistance programs to focus on some of the social problems and
basic causes of the country’s backwardness. A phenomenon of this
backwardness is the sprawling city slums in Guatemala City on which
urban terrorism feeds. Community development efforts in the
countryside although given lip service by the government are almost
non-existent or couched in such grandiose terms as to be impossible
of fulfillment. The government appears to feel no need for urgent
action in areas of social reform.
C. Internal Defense
For the past several years there have been small bands of guerrillas
in Guatemalan eastern hill country which have engaged in isolated
raids and occasional political assassinations. The Government has
been unable to eliminate these groups although sporadically
aggressive patrol activity by the military has succeeded in keeping
them somewhat off balance. The guerrillas, headed by Yon Sosa,
former Guatemalan army officer, are financed from Cuba and have been
conducting their activities independently of the regular Guatemalan
Communist Party structure (PGT).
In recent months there have been reports of attempts to coordinate
terrorist activities between the PGT
and the Yon Sosa guerrillas and turn the attention of both groups to
urban rather than rural activities. The extent to which this
coordination of efforts has been achieved is uncertain but in any
event there has been a significant increase in urban terrorism.
In January there was an attempted assassination of the Chief of the
U.S. Army Mission and the USAID
motor pool in Guatemala City
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was burned to the ground. In February, terrorists in Guatemala
City, who had intended to assassinate Peralta, threw grenades at a crowd of people and
into a Guatemalan Army truck causing several casualties. As an
immediate effect of this action, a state of siege was imposed by the
Peralta government.
Since imposition of the state of siege, terrorists on March 20
assassinated a police officer who had a reputation as a terrorist,
on March 25 threw a grenade at an Army truck which bounced off in
the street and killed a girl, and on March 31 machine-gunned a
Guatemalan Army building and planted bombs around the city causing
several casualties.
On May 2, the U.S. Consulate was sprayed with machine-gun fire and
bombs were thrown elsewhere in the city. At noon, May 21, the Vice
Minister of Defense was assassinated near his home. On June 7,
approximately 7 bombs were exploded in different parts of the city,
including the residences of the Brazilian and Nicaraguan
Ambassadors, the latter in an apparent protest against the action of
these two countries in sending troops to the Dominican Republic.
CAS reports have continued to give
strong indication of communist intentions to take direct action
against U.S. personnel and installations. As a result of this,
security in U.S. Government installations has been increased
sharply. The Marine Corps complement in the Embassy has been more
than doubled and emergency radio and telephone communications
facilities have been installed to increase the alert capability.
The Guatemalan military forces have sufficient training and equipment
to counter isolated hit-and-run raids by guerrillas in the rural
areas. There are several units in a fair state of readiness,
including an airborne infantry company which could be airlifted to
severe trouble spots should actions develop beyond the capability of
local military commanders. One reason the Guatemalan military forces
are not more effective against the guerrillas is the inadequacy of
their information and patrol systems. More coordinated effort
between police and military efforts should be sought. Another reason
is the general attitude of the rural population as a result of the
military tendency to behave like an army of occupation in the areas
they visit.
In an effort to change their image, the military have engaged in
active and fairly successful civic action programs throughout the
country. Unfortunately, very few of these programs have been located
in areas of rural guerrilla activity.
The qualified success of the military in the rural areas is not
matched by security force capabilities within the city. There are
substantial elements of the national police force located in
Guatemala City but their training and equipment are relatively poor.
More importantly
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there has
been no clear definition of the roles of the police and military in
counter-insurgency operations either in the cities or in rural
areas.
Efforts to improve the police have been hampered by the same lack of
GOG ability to make decisions
evident in political and economic fields. Current levels of
assistance to the police through AID/OPS programs amount to $276,000 of which $100,000
is for U.S. technical advisors. The current level of MAP financing for support of military
forces is $1.3 million. Despite indications that the U.S. was
prepared to consider increased assistance to the police, the
Government of Guatemala has so far not responded affirmatively.
The existence of urban terrorism and guerrilla activities will not in
themselves cause the overthrow of the Peralta government if there is no major
deterioration of the political and economic situation. Nevertheless,
the evidence of increasingly coordinated efforts among the two
extremist groups, and the increasing number of urban terrorist
actions indicate that an effective organization is being created.
Vigorous measures are required to reduce its potential for damage
and to weaken its ability to seize on a deteriorating situation
should one develop.
Action Recommendations
The Latin American Ad Hoc Inter-Agency Group on Counter-Insurgency
has been reviewing in detail the situation described above. It has
come to the obvious conclusion that one of the key impediments to
the development of a counter-insurgency program in Guatemala is
ineffective government leadership and the unwillingness of the
Peralta government to
make decisions involving the economic, political and social
development of the country.
The actions set forth below, which the group has sent as an
instruction to the Country Team,7 will be inhibited by this overriding problem. To
the extent that the Country Team can move forward on such action,
however, the following steps should be taken:
I. Political
- 1.
- Undertake to convince Peralta, other members of his government and
responsible leaders of the moderate, nonextremist political
parties that it is in Guatemalan interests for the government to
press forward now with a broad range of programs directed
towards national progress and development.
- 2.
- In low key, undertake in various ways, including direct
personal conduct, to make known to Peralta the U.S. view that early
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return to constitutional
government is essential and emphasizing the U.S. concern that
failure to move in this direction enhances the possibility of
subversion or civil war.
- 3.
- Encourage Peralta to
permit all “middle-of-the-road” political parties to present
candidates for the presidency.
- 4.
- Discreetly strengthen moderate political parties by all
feasible means.
- 5.
- Discreetly support selected moderate politicians as a
potential leadership resource in the event of a breakdown or
sharp deterioration of the present situation.
II. Economic
- 1.
- Complete negotiations on outstanding AID loans as soon as possible waiving minor
provisions which the present Government of Guatemala can use as
an excuse for its inability to make decisions.
- 2.
- Consider the possibility of financing slum clearance and
related projects in Guatemala City in an attempt to reduce the
major subversion potential represented by urban
discontent.
- 3.
- Explore the possibility of U.S. financing of additional mobile
health units to be concentrated in guerrilla-threatened rural
areas.
- 4.
- Consider the possibility of initiating community development
programs, particularly in guerrilla-threatened areas.
III. Internal Defense
- 1.
- Continue to push for an expanded Public Safety program to
enable the police to deal more effectively with insurgency
problems, with primary emphasis on urban areas but also
including rural activities.
- 2.
- Consider the creation of a special group within the police
force to deal with counter-insurgency.
- 3.
- Urge that there be a clear definition of the roles of the
police and military in counter-insurgency operations.
- 4.
- Examine the attitudes of the rural population toward
Guatemalan security forces and the possibility of more effective
training of such forces to improve civilian/security-forces
relationships.
- 5.
- To the extent feasible, urge the expansion of civic action
programs in threatened areas coordinating with AID programs which may be
developed.
