Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

72. Memorandum of Conversation¹

SecDel/MC/4

New York, November 30, 1964, 11 a.m.

SECRETARY’S DELEGATION TO THE NINETEENTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

New York, November 1964

SUBJECT

• Chinese Representation

PARTICIPANTS

• US
  • The Secretary
  • Assistant Secretary Cleveland
  • Mr. Foster, Director, ACDA
  • Mr. Givan, EUR
• Canada
  • Secretary for External Affairs Martin
  • Ambassador Tremblay, UN Mission
  • Mr. H. Basil Robinson, Deputy Undersecretary for External Affairs
  • Minister Cox, UN Mission
  • Mr. William Barton, OIC, UN Affairs

Minister Martin said that, although he opposed a postponement of the UNGA over Article 19, he would be happy to see a postponement to delay a showdown on the Chinese question. The Secretary said he could see some advantage from that point of view and also to let certain aspects of the Congo question cool off. With regard to the Hanoi-Peiping situation, we will see what the other side is up to in the coming dry season. We feel strongly that anything that causes the Chinese Communists to think they are on the right track is a step toward war.

Martin said he understood the Secretary’s feelings and, because they get along well, they can be frank with each other. The Chinese issue has gone beyond the point where he could do anything to turn back his government. The Canadians are, however, resolved not to do anything without the fullest disclosure and consultation. Although their talks with the Belgians and the Italians have been serious, these are not at all as thorough as they undertake to carry on with the United States. Martin said they would not be honest if they did not say they had reached the point where they must speak out. They cannot delay action any longer.

The Secretary asked what action could not be delayed. We certainly want to delay a war with China if possible. Martin agreed. The Secretary said something that deeply distresses us but which may have the seeds of a suggestion is the fact that in the past two years apparently no country with relations with China has expressed concern to Peiping over its policies in Southeast Asia. Perhaps when Canadian diplomats are in touch with Communist Chinese, they could express the Canadian attitude toward Chinese aggression. When the Chinese react negatively, the Canadian Government could draw the obvious conclusions.

Martin said his government had no contact at all with Peiping, which is symptomatic of the unreality of the present situation. When the Canadian Broadcasting Company planned to do a series on China, Martin asked the CBC representative to pass on unofficially some thoughts to the Chinese leaders. The man saw Chou En-Lai three times and told him forcefully that the Canadians hoped the Chinese attitude on Indochina would enable Canada to do what it believed right in the interests of universality in the UN. Chou replied that this was an old argument, that no one is taking over Indochina, but that no one could stop the march of events; in any case, Canada is merely a satellite of the United States and will do nothing without the US approval. Members of the wheat mission to China had also tried to talk to the ChiComs but the latter said they did not want to talk politics with wheat experts. This illustrates that the GOC has done what it can to convey its views to Chinese leaders. Martin said that, speaking as a friend, he must say that if the Chinese question comes up at this GA and if the vote on substance is close, within perhaps two votes of a majority, the Canadian position as a nation would be impaired for a long time if it did not vote favorably. On the Important Question, Canada would be with the United States.

Martin said that Mr. Cleveland had been in Ottawa when Conservative MPs had asked why the government did not act on China, and if the government was afraid of the United States. Martin had talked with Barbara Ward, who reflected State Department thinking on this issue. She, however, seemed to see something in a parity proposal to protect Formosa’s position. The GOC recognizes the difficulties in making any such proposal but feels that if the Chinese question comes up Canada should say something to protect the rights of Formosa. Martin recalled in this regard that Secretary Rusk had asked in a television speech what should be done for Formosa and whether it was to be thrown to the wolves. The Secretary commented that if Canada maintained diplomatic relations with Formosa, Peiping would not allow Canada to establish relations.

Martin said that his government’s assessment of the voting alignment in the GA on ChiRep is not good. The Secretary asked what Canada would like to see in Southeast Asia and on the western rim of the Pacific. Martin replied that Canada would naturally want to see peace all over the world, but none of us can avoid recognizing that the Chinese will exert increasing influence. This is not in Canada’s interest, nor is it in Canada’s interest to have a Communist regime in Russia. But there it is. To make an ideological identification of one’s enemies is not the right approach. Coming into the UN will not alter the aggressive tendencies of any state, but it will provide that much more contact. The Secretary commented that inclusion in the UN might confirm the aggressive tendencies of Peiping. He could understand, however, if Canada helped the ChiComs in this way if they were willing to put a division into Southeast Asia to help contain Peiping’s expansion. Martin said this was an unfair argument to use with “little fellows” such as Canada that could not put its troops in NATO, Cyprus and everywhere else. If there should be a war, it is axiomatic that Canada would be alongside the United States.

Martin said he had recently asked the Russian Ambassador to Canada what the Soviets would do if the Canadians supported admission of China, and had commented that Chinese admission would pose some difficulties for the USSR. The Ambassador had nodded at this statement.

With regard to the Soviet attitude, the Secretary said that if the Russians had become more cautious lately, it was not because of their contacts in the UN but because of their direct contacts with the United States, and because NATO solidarity had convinced them that they must stop pressing. In addition, since the beginning of the cold war the U.S. defense budget had totalled some 700 billion dollars. With regard to China, Secretary Rusk said he was disturbed by the view that Chinese domination of Southeast Asia is unavoidable. Would Martin say this was equally true of the USSR and Iran? Martin said that it was inconceivable that a nation of 700 million people would not share the authority and influence of Japan and India in Southeast Asia.

The Secretary asked whether the same relationship held between the United States and Canada. Martin said it did indeed, so much so that he had hesitated to speak in this frank way despite his great personal esteem for Secretary Rusk. The Secretary commented that we would never object to a relationship between China and Southeast Asia along the lines of the United States-Canadian relationship.

The Secretary asked what the public reaction in Canada would be if the GOC published an account of what the CBC man had reported of his conversation with Chou En-Lai. Secretary Martin said that this would make no difference. People in Canada would tell the government to show that Canada is not a satellite.

The Secretary said he would be in touch further on the subject and it would certainly be discussed in NATO. It would be of some importance to NATO since US interests could easily swing to the Pacific if the situation there grows more serious. He would also be giving Martin data on increased infiltration in South Vietnam.

Martin recalled that Defense Secretary McNamara had told him that the situation in South Vietnam could go on a thousand years. He could not believe it. Secretary Rusk said that we certainly believe our contribution to security in Europe might have to go on a thousand years, or as long as it is needed. We see no terminal date for it. Martin said that he had suggested to Mr. Cleveland, as he could not suggest to a Secretary of State, that he should not use such arguments because they do not touch reality. Bringing China into the UN would not affect these issues one way or the other. They would affect many people in Southeast Asia; for example, Catholics would be offended beyond words, but this would be temporary.

The Secretary said he appreciated Minister Martin’s frankness. It should be quite clear, however, that if all of our allies in NATO do not feel deeply concerned about how China may be turned away from aggression, there could be bad results in NATO as we are forced to turn to problems of the Pacific. Martin said that the difficulty for the Canadians is that they do not believe entry into the UN would affect this situation. It would be a long process, but it cannot start until we “mingle.” He had talked with Ikeda six weeks ago in Tokyo. The Japanese want to take part when the Chinese question is resolved, although perhaps the new government will have a different idea on timing. He had also talked with Spaak recently who does not go quite as far as the Canadians but feels that resolution of the Chinese question cannot be delayed much longer. The Canadians are not much concerned about the recognition issue, but would want to overcome this at the same time as ChiRep. They would probably regard UN admission as constituting recognition.

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2447. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Givan on December 1, and approved in S on December 2. The source text is labeled “Part II of II.” Part I is ibid. The meeting was held at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in New York.