Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

71. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State¹

Warsaw, November 26, 1964, noon.

1176. Cabot-Wang talks. Embtel 1174.² Comments and recommendations following 123rd meeting.

1. Wang’s tone better than last time, and never so severe that I considered terminating meeting. However it was at times a bit contemptuous, often patronizing and always ex cathedra.

2. No mention of Khrushchev political demise.

3. Wang spoke smugly of their development of nuclear device. Draft agreed announcement re Summit, non-use of and eventual destruction nuclear weapons so patently unacceptable do not believe Chinese themselves take it seriously. Fact Wang proposed next meeting at three-month interval would seem indicate lack of interest in response. I did not refer to obvious unacceptability their proposal, but did point out crucial aspect controls and intimate relation conventional arms and force levels to whole question.

4. At one point Wang said in effect if Geneva agreements were adhered to, there would be no trouble in Indo-China area. I expressed interest in this statement, and said we would be glad conform meticulously to these agreements if only others would do same.

5. I took liberty some omissions and some changes in guidance for opening statement, partly because I wanted emphasize absence polemics and desire for constructive proposals and partly because we could not find references for some of quotes paragraph 1, and feared Wang might ask who said them and when. Hope Department can give documentation all quotes in subsequent guidance.

6. Wang obviously unprepared for moderate tone my opening statement, since he misquoted me three times in his response, assuming that I would naturally say things which in fact I did not say. He paid no attention to my plea for no polemics.

7. As for next meeting, I see no value in lengthy and sterile polemics. I think both sides really know the score, so there is little to gain in propagandizing each others home offices—ostensibly our only audiences until the historians come in. Since two sides differ so basically on so many issues this admittedly leaves little room on constructive side of ledger. Hence if Department agrees, I would propose simply give somewhat shorter responses than has been our habit, adequate to keep record straight, but leaving lengthy preachments up to Wang (he enjoys them so). This would preserve inherent value of holding talks per se, and retain them for time when they can again serve specific useful purpose. For present, Chinese clearly interested in talks only as propaganda forum.

8. Believe we should not go on record as rejecting draft agreed announcement, but ask questions re implementation and control, and reaction conventional force levels.

9. Chinese made no attempt take extensive notes this time, whereas we believe past habit was take seemingly verbatim notes in English shorthand. Do not know whether they have decided it not worth the effort, or whether they now have access to Polish tapes which may emerge from newly activated Mysliewiecki Palace—i.e., we may indeed have a third audience.

Cabot

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Hong Kong, Taipei, Geneva, Moscow, and Stockholm.
2. Document 70.